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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the changes in intra household asset ownership induced by external events. The 
immediate coping mechanisms and long term adaptation strategies in response to climatic and non-climatic shocks 
and the impact of the actions on livelihood outcomes are also investigated. Therefore, a unique and detailed 
country representing household survey panel data is used, known as ‘Bangladesh Climate Change Adaptation 
Survey’ of 2010 and 2012. 
The first part of the investigation deals with the dynamics of assets owned by the household head, his spouse, or 
jointly by both in response to diverse shocks in rural agricultural households in Bangladesh, one of the most 
vulnerable countries to climate change. Accumulating assets is an important means of coping with adverse events 
in developing countries, but the role of gendered ownership is not yet fully understood. Building on existing 
research, this study adds to the understanding of the responsiveness of asset holdings to shocks by providing a 
more comprehensive definition of asset ownership as well as a broader range of shocks than previous analyses. 
Looking at changes within rather than between households, the research shows that land is owned mostly by men, 
who are also wealthier than their spouses, but relative ownership varies by assets types. By constructing a 
comprehensive index including all types of asset holdings, the overall effect on wealth is investigated, which does 
not exist in the literature yet. The results suggest that husband’s and wife’s asset holdings respond differently 
depending on the type of shocks. Weather shocks such as cyclones adversely affect the asset holdings of 
household heads in general, while predicted external events such as seasonal droughts and dowry payments 
reduce assets of both spouses. The focus of the research, however, lies in perceiving changes in ownership of 
disaggregated asset holdings. This allows getting a detailed understanding as well as identifying substitution 
effects. The results suggest that jointly owned assets are not sold in response to shocks; either due to these assets 
being actively protected or due to the difficulty of agreeing on this coping strategy. Women’s asset holdings and 
associated choices of substituting assets are shaped by their lesser involvement in agriculture. 
To know the changes of behavioral patterns in response to these shocks, the factors determining farmers’ 
perception of climate change, immediate coping mechanisms and long term adaptation strategies to the adverse 
effects of shocks are analyzed. The factors constraining the ability to adopt different strategies are also examined. 
The results suggest that households are more likely to adopt short-term coping mechanisms in response to non-
climatic negative shocks rather than to climatic shocks, whereas households are more likely engage in adaptation 
strategies in response to the latter. Furthermore, adaptation strategies are often combined complementary 
efforts, whereas coping mechanisms are mutually independent across the study. In particular, group participation 
in general is associated with crop adaptation strategies and perceptions of climate change among women. Social 
capital attributed to women and political capital to both men and women are associated with crop adaptation 
strategies. Social capital is likely to discourage the adoption of immediate coping mechanisms which often have 
negative long term consequences. Such immediate coping mechanisms may include the reduction of school 
attendance or a reduced food intake. Political capital is positively associated with some coping mechanisms such as 
taking informal loans and pursuing migrant labor options.  
Finally, the research seeks to explore the potential of group based approaches which is receiving a growing 
attention due to their possible role in securing household welfare in the presence of adverse events. Apart from 
examining the factors associated with men’s and women’s participation in different types of groups,  the 
relationship between various forms of group based approaches including social and political capital and welfare 
are investigated. The inherent endogeneity is addressed by using instrumental variables. The results suggest that 
household heads mainly participate in groups that are welfare augmenting and income enhancing, while their 
spouses are mainly active in credit groups due to less personal wealth which are more strongly negatively affected 
by shocks. Furthermore, evidence is found for a positive association of social and political capital with household-
level welfare and with asset holdings of the household head. Interestingly, it seems that this effect is not driven by 
mere participation in groups, but also by other aspects of social capital, for example informal networks, of both 
household heads and spouses.  
 
vi 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die vorliegende Arbeit befasst sich mit den Veränderungen der Vermögenswerte innerhalb eines Haushalts, die 
sich aus externen Ereignissen ergeben. Es werden auch kurzfristige Bewältigungsstrategien und langfristige 
Anpassungsstrategien als Reaktion auf klimatische oder sonstige Kalamitäten, sowie die Auswirkungen dieser 
Anpassungen auf den Lebensunterhalt untersucht. Die Untersuchung nutzt einen einzigartigen und detaillierten 
Haushalts-Paneldatensatz, der als „Bangladesh Climate Change Adaption Survey“ 2010 und 2012 durchgeführt 
wurde und alle agro-ökologischen Zonen des Landes abbildet.  
Im ersten Teil der Untersuchungen werden die Vermögenswerte, die sich im Besitz des Familienoberhauptes, des 
Ehepartners oder im gemeinsamen Besitz befinden, und deren Dynamik hinsichtlich verschiedener Krisen für 
Landwirtschaft betreibende Haushalte im ländlichen Raum in Bangladesch untersucht. Bangladesch ist eines der 
Länder, das am stärksten vom Klimawandel betroffen ist. Die Ansammlung von Vermögenswerten ist eine wichtige 
Strategie, um externe Schocks zu überstehen, aber der Einfluss der relativen Vermögensverhältnisse innerhalb 
eines Haushaltes ist noch nicht weitreichend erfasst. Diese Studie unterscheidet sich von vorherigen 
Untersuchungen, da sie eine sehr viel detailliertere Aufschlüsselung der Vermögenswerte sowie eine 
umfassendere Bandbreite von Schocks berücksichtigt und somit tiefere Einblicke in die zugrunde liegenden 
Prozesse gewährt. Durch Betrachtung der Veränderungen innerhalb statt zwischen den Haushalten kann gezeigt 
werden, dass das Land größtenteils Männern gehört und dass diese gleichzeitig auch reicher sind als ihre 
Ehefrauen. Hingegen variieren relative Vermögenswerte in Abhängigkeit der Güter. Ein umfassender Index, der alle 
Vermögenstypen beinhaltet, wird zur Analyse induzierter Änderungen verwendet, was in der bisherigen Literatur 
noch nicht existiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Einfluss verschiedener Krisen auf das Vermögen von Frauen 
und Männer unterschiedlich ist. Extreme Wetterlagen wie Zyklone verringern vor allem das Vermögen des 
Familienoberhauptes, während erwartete externe Veränderungen wie saisonale Dürren oder Mitgiftzahlungen das 
Vermögen beider Ehepartner reduzieren. Der Fokus der Untersuchung liegt in der Identifikation von 
Veränderungen der disaggregierten Vermögensverhältnisse, was ein tieferes Verständnis und die Bestimmung von 
Substitutionseffekten ermöglicht.  
Um Änderungen im Verhalten als Reaktion auf Krisen festzustellen, werden die Faktoren, die die Wahrnehmung 
des Klimawandels seitens der Landwirte bestimmen, kurzfristige Bewältigungsstrategien und langfristige 
Anpassungsstrategien analysiert. Umstände, die die Fähigkeit zur Anpassung einschränken, werden ebenfalls 
untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Haushalte auf nicht-klimatische Krisen eher mit kurzfristigen Bewältigungs-
strategien reagieren als auf klimatische, während als Reaktion auf letztere langfristige Anpassungsstrategien 
überwiegen. Außerdem beinhalten Anpassungsstrategien meistens kombinierte, komplementäre Anstrengungen, 
während Bewältigungsstrategien innerhalb der Studie wechselseitig unabhängig sind. Insbesondere spielt die 
Partizipation in Gruppen eine Rolle für Anbau-Anpassungsstrategien und die Wahrnehmung des Klimawandels 
unter Frauen. Soziales Kapital von Frauen und politisches Kapital von beiden Ehepartnern sind mit den Anbau-
Anpassungsstrategien verknüpft. Soziales Kapital verhindert in vielen Fällen den Einsatz kurzfristiger 
Bewältigungsmechanismen, die häufig von langfristig negativen Konsequenzen begleitet werden. Politisches 
Kapital ist positiv mit einigen Bewältigungsmechanismen verknüpft wie beispielsweise der Aufnahme von 
informellen Krediten oder der Migration zwecks alternativer Arbeitsmöglichkeiten. 
Abschließend wird das Potential von gruppenbasierten Ansätzen untersucht, welche eine große Aufmerksamkeit 
durch ihre mögliche Rolle in der Sicherung von Haushalten während ungünstiger Bedingungen erlangt haben. 
Neben der Untersuchung von unterschiedlichen Faktoren, welche Frauen und Männer in verschiedenen Gruppen 
aufweisen, wird die Beziehung zwischen verschiedenen Formen gruppenbasierter Ansätze, die das soziale und 
politische Kapital und den Wohlstand miteinbeziehen, analysiert. Die inhärente Endogenität wird durch die 
Verwendung von Instrumentvariablen adressiert. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass Familienoberhäupter 
hauptsächlich in wohlstandsvermehrenden und einkommenserhöhenden Gruppen aktiv sind, während ihre 
Ehefrauen überwiegend in Kreditgruppen partizipieren mit geringeren persönlichen Vermögen und damit stärkerer 
Krisenabhängigkeit. Außerdem wurde ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen sozialem und politischem Kapital mit  
dem Familienvermögen sowie mit dem Vermögen des Haushaltsoberhauptes festgestellt. Interessanterweise 
scheint dieser Effekt nicht alleine von der Gruppenmitgliedschaft, sondern auch von anderen Aspekten des 
sozialen Kapitals wie beispielsweise informalen Netzwerken der beiden Ehepartner abzuhängen. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
Assets are a form of stored wealth that can be liquidated for instant needs as well as provide 
services and generate cash returns and therefore are an important component of livelihood 
outcomes (Quisumbing et al. 2014). Assets support people’s ability to withstand the negative 
effects of shocks, whether they are predictable or not. In developing countries poor households 
typically lack most forms of assets.1 As a result, it is difficult for poor households to cope with 
the wide variety of shocks, such as climate change related phenomena that affect large 
numbers of people or other idiosyncratic shocks like illness, death, dowry expenses that often 
affect relatively smaller numbers of people or households (Dercon 2010). Shocks can severely 
affect income levels, assets, and other productive resources, especially among the poor who 
are forced to sell belongings to cope with the resulting impacts, potentially foregoing future 
spending on non-tangible assets like health care and education for children (Hoddinott and 
Quisumbing 2003; Hoddinott 2006). As a consequence large-scale climate change shocks may 
have devastating long-term impacts on households without or with less valuable assets.  
As in many other developing countries, the adverse impacts of climate change are a growing 
concern in Bangladesh due to its geographic and demographic characteristics. The country has 
a high incidence of poverty. High population density in coastal areas, heavy reliance on 
agriculture, and significant expected negative impacts from increased inland flooding and rising 
sea-level, making Bangladesh a suitable case study for assessing vulnerability to climate change 
that deserves more attention. The increasing frequency of disastrous floods and droughts is 
associated with huge losses in terms of lives, livelihoods, and property. From 1991 to 2000 
there were 93 major natural disasters recorded that caused billions of dollars in damages, 
especially to the agricultural sector (Yu et al. 2010). Living in a developing, densely populated, 
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 Assets can include natural, physical, financial, human, social, and political capital (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2011). 
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level landscape, the poor people of Bangladesh face severe risks due to the effects of climate 
change. For example, from July to September in 2007 a severe flood affected approximately 13 
million people from 46 out of 64 districts in the country. In November of the same year the 
powerful cyclone ‘Sidr’ caused over 3,000 deaths (Yu et al. 2010). In addition, sea level rise is 
predicted to displace around 15 million people in Bangladesh, with important implications for 
sediment balance and salinity, which have important consequences on agricultural production 
in the country (IPCC 2001; Akter 2009; Yu et al. 2010).  
Several studies have highlighted the importance of assets and found positive correlations 
between household assets and income diversification to cope with shocks (Reardon et al. 1992; 
Barrett et al. 2001; Ersado 2003). Households with more tangible and non-tangible assets have 
greater means of production, income diversification, greater ability to live in more secure areas 
(those that are less affected by floods or salinity) or that can reallocate labor to off-farm 
employment alternatives when crops fail or livestock perish. Households with minimal assets 
have fewer opportunities to engage in a variety of economic activities, and temporal shocks can 
have permanent adverse impacts on these households that lead to greater poverty (Dercon 
2004; Carter and Barrett 2006; Brouwer et al. 2007). Many research efforts on asset-based 
approaches to development and poverty alleviation support the notion that control over assets 
plays a fundamental role in increasing income levels, empowering the poor, and reducing 
vulnerability (Moser 2007).  
Control over assets within a household does not follow the traditional theoretical unitary model 
of single preference and pooling resources; but rather husbands and wives within household 
own or control assets either individually or jointly (Quisumbing 2011; Quisumbing et al. 2011). 
Therefore socioeconomic aspects such as gender inequality are important components of asset 
analyses. The failure to identify gender differentiated roles and inequalities hinders the 
development process in many areas, especially among agricultural based societies, as well as 
the development of effective policies for enhancing household welfare (World Bank 2009 cited 
in Quisumbing et al. 2014). Shocks may have gender-specific impacts depending on which 
household members are most affected and their relative ability to cope with and adapt to 
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shocks. Not only do women typically earn less than men in Bangladesh, female-headed 
households are among the poorest of the poor (Zeller et al. 2001). Gender specific levels of 
control over and ownership of assets, as well as roles and responsibilities, imply distinct effects 
of shocks from either climatic or health events among men and women. Consequently assets 
and well-being are affected according to gender, which may exacerbate existing inequalities 
(Brody et al. 2008; Quisumbing et al. 2011).  
Awareness of climate change among farmers is necessary to confront the immediate and long-
term effect of related shocks to the agricultural sector. Among those who are aware, some may 
not be able to adapt to related effects due to various obstacles. Responses to different types of 
shocks have diverse implications for household welfare over the short- and long-term (Dercon 
2010). Adaptation is often considered a long-term strategy to minimize the detrimental effects 
of climate change related shocks through adjustments to systems (ecological, social, economic) 
in response to actual or predicted climatic shocks and their impacts (IPCC 2001). A number of 
literature sources have summarized different types of adaptation strategies among households 
that faced shocks, especially climate change related shocks such as flood, drought, and other 
covariate shocks such as price spikes (Morduch 1999; Dercon 2004; Mogues 2006; Nhemachena 
and Hassan 2007; Kumar and Quisumbing 2011).  
As an immediate coping mechanism for shocks, households can either take ‘consumption-
smoothing’ or ‘asset-smoothing’ strategies depending on their assets (Townsend 1995; Dercon 
2004). The poor already lack assets and typically are reluctant to sell them except as a last 
resort, because it is often very difficult or even impossible for them to recover those assets 
afterwards (Duval et al. 2007). As a result poor households typically prefer asset-smoothing 
strategies such as reducing consumption (Mogues 2006). A large number of literature sources 
emphasize physical resources and socio-economic variables for determining climate change 
adaptation strategies among farmers, which vary according to the types and extent of shocks 
(Nhemachena and Hassan 2007; Bryan et al. 2009). Less emphasize has been given to short-
term coping mechanisms and explicitly distinguishing between the two, which is important for 
improving related policy interventions in rural Bangladesh. 
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The ability of households or societies to adapt is determined not only by individual adaptation 
strategies and coping mechanisms, but also by the ability to act collectively. Group-based 
approaches can support individual efforts to build assets or improve access to benefits that are 
derived by specific groups. This increases the ability to adapt to shocks by sharing information 
and traditional knowledge and is important for livelihoods, especially for those who lack 
traditional types of assets such as physical or financial assets (Anderson et al. 2002; Meinzen-
Dick et al. 2014). Quisumbing (2009) finds that participation in NGO initiated collective efforts 
are higher among women than men in Bangladesh, especially for wealthy women who live close 
to their parents’ village, and have relatively large shares of household assets for marriage. Using 
country representative dataset, however, Sraboni et al. (2013) find that the most important 
indicator of female disempowerment is the lack of participation in groups and public speaking 
with limited access to resources and control over income relative to men, despite the large-
scale microfinance initiatives and women’s groups in Bangladesh.  
 
1.2. Problem Statement and Study Objectives 
Bangladesh, where agriculture is the basis of livelihoods for a majority of rural people, is one of 
the countries most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change and the agricultural 
sector in particular is most affected by related shocks. Assets have an important role in 
mitigating these impacts, and both assets and shocks have gender specific characteristics. 
Households cope with the shocks by adopting either asset-smoothing or consumption-
smoothing strategies depending on whether they are asset poor or affluent with respect to 
tangible assets such as physical capital. While households may degrade their asset base by 
engaging in consumption-smoothing strategies, asset-smoothing strategies often have long-
term negative impacts on intangible assets such as human and social capital, which ultimately 
has deleterious effects on welfare and future asset accumulation. As a result it is necessary to 
examine entire range of assets to reveal household and individual asset dynamics, behavioral 
patterns, and welfare impacts. In addition, observing and perceiving the long-term effects of 
5 
 
climate change among farmers is vital for taking appropriate precautions in response. For 
example, if long-term adaptation strategies are not adopted the impacts of climate change will 
be more severe, especially for an agriculture reliant country like Bangladesh. In addition to 
individual adaptation strategies, group based approaches to asset enhancement have 
important welfare impacts among rural agricultural households, where increasing recognition 
of social capital and group participation has been supported by a large number of empirical 
research efforts. Most of these efforts treat social capital as a household-level variable, while 
others control for the gender of the household head (Grootaert 1999, 2001; Narayan and 
Pritchett 1999; Aker 2005). Individual social and political capital is important to welfare, which 
cannot be measured merely by group participation, but rather requires evaluation of the 
various formal and informal components. Political capital, which is an important component of 
group-based approaches to capital development, is often overlooked by empirical studies that 
employ econometric analyses.  
To address this problem, the specific objectives of this study are as follows: 
1. To better understand gender specific asset dynamics or the degree of joint or individual 
ownership and control of assets by men and women and the impacts of exogenous 
shocks on different types of assets. 
2. To investigate farmer perceptions of climate change, the factors associated with short-
term coping mechanisms and long-term adaptation strategies, and the factors that 
impose constraints on these activities. 
3. To assess the potential of group approaches to asset development for men and women, 
the contribution of such group efforts to household welfare in the presence of climate 
change shocks, and to identify determinants of participation in such groups. 
6 
 
1.3 Dissertation Structure 
Each of the dissertation chapters features econometric analyses of detailed longitudinal data. 
Chapter 1 provides a general introduction that includes the background and justification of the 
research, specific objectives, and the outline of the entire thesis. Chapter 2 features an 
examination of the impacts of different shocks on the asset portfolios of men and women both 
individually and jointly in Bangladesh. The impacts of covariate and idiosyncratic negative and 
positive shocks on assets, including natural capital, financial capital, livestock, and other forms 
of physical capital are examined. The analyses include both aggregated and disaggregated 
approaches by constructing an overall index for men and women, and for jointly owned assets 
of all categories using a principal component analysis (PCA).  
For the disaggregated analyses physical capital other than land and livestock, natural capital, 
and livestock are analyzed. A household fixed effect asset model is developed that allows 
control for unobserved heterogeneity across households, which is important for observing 
effects within households. In addition to using a broad definition of assets and shocks, we focus 
on disaggregated asset ownership by gender and by asset types, which enabled us to identify 
asset substitution and preferences among men and women. Chapter 2 also includes the 
analysis of which type of ownership is most affected and which is relatively more secure in 
terms of risk from the effects of climate change. 
Chapter 3 presents an assessment of the short-term coping mechanisms for climatic and other 
shocks, and long-term adaptation strategies for the effects of climate change in Bangladesh 
according to the gender of the household head. This analysis is meant to improve 
understanding of perceptions of climate change among farmers as a starting point. 
Consequently, the types of immediate and long-term farmer responses are analyzed using 
probit and multivariate probit methods to identify the factors affecting adoption decisions and 
to observe whether the responses are complementary or substitutive. Not all of the farmers 
who perceive the effects of climate change engage in adaptive actions and therefore the 
analysis also identifies constraining factors that hinder the adoption of adaptation strategies.  
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Chapter 4 presents the investigation of potential for group approaches for enhancing welfare 
and asset accumulation. This analysis began with identifying the determinants of participating 
groups, differentiated by types and the gender of participants. The costs and benefits of group 
participation are also discussed on the basis of the information derived from the data set, 
which is an important dimension of group membership. The main focus of the chapter is the 
examination of the welfare impacts at the individual level based on asset variables and at the 
household level based on both asset and consumption expenditure variables. This analysis 
included instrumental variables (IV) using a two-stage least squares approach for any reverse 
causality inherent in the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Chapter 5 
presents the conclusions drawn from the analyses and a discussion of relevant policy 
suggestions in Bangladesh.  
 
1.4 Expected Research Contributions  
Even though entire households experience external events, the negative or positive effects of 
those events depend on who is affected by what type of shocks within families, which is an 
especially important consideration for the design and implementation of poverty alleviation 
programs. Although a growing number of literature sources have examined the impacts of 
shocks on household assets, very few have evaluated gender specific intra-household impacts 
of shocks in Bangladesh (Quisumbing 2011; Quisumbing et al. 2011). To design and implement 
effective policy measures, it is important to understand the impacts of shocks on assets of both 
men and women based on a broad definition of assets and major shocks that may affect 
households with country specific data. Asset analyses differentiated by gender facilitate greater 
understanding of the nexus between control over assets by men and women within 
households, which is essential for effective measures to enhance those assets. This research 
effort provides an opportunity to know more about which types of asset ownership will better 
help men and women withstand shocks, and will support the development of more target 
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oriented policy guidelines that are necessary for effective poverty alleviation programs in 
Bangladesh. 
Identification of local specific options, the factors that influence coping mechanisms and 
adaptation strategies, and identifying the obstacles to adopting such efforts are preconditions 
of effective policy and have not been examined by previous studies, which is an expected 
contribution of this study. This is the first study in Bangladesh that explicitly distinguishes 
between short-term coping mechanisms and long-term adaptation strategies based on 
econometric analysis of empirical evidence, which is very important for identifying effective 
measures to enhance the appropriate coping and adaptation efforts that vary with the nature 
of shocks. 
The research assesses the extent to which the group approaches can increase assets among 
both men and women and enhance welfare in the context of climate change and other non-
climatic shocks. Men and women gain social capital either by participating in formal groups or 
by widening social networks, while the former is commonly captured as a measure of social 
capital in most of the existing literature, the latter is emphasized by very few papers, 
particularly on the basis of empirical evidence and the incorporation of gender issues. This 
research identifies the context-specific factors associated with group based approaches to asset 
enhancement under different aggregations, including: larger group attendance, greater social 
and political capital, and the possible impacts of not only formal group participation, but also 
through informal networks that effect household welfare. This provides a strong comparative 
analytical base to contribute to improved policy formulation and program design.  
 
1.5 Data 
In 2010 a survey was conducted on 800 agricultural households in various unions (local 
administrative units) in Bangladesh. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 
and Data Analysis and Technical Assistance Limited (DATA), conducted the first round of the 
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survey in 2010 for the project, “The Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change in 
Bangladesh,” to study whether agricultural practices had changed due to climate change.2  
The sample unions in this study were selected to represent the seven agro-ecological zones 
(AEZs) of Bangladesh as categorized by the Bangladesh Center for Advanced Studies (BCAS) as: 
the Barind Tract, Tidal Flood Plains, Modhupur Tract, Himalayan Piedmont Plain, the Bill and 
Haor Basins, the Northern and Eastern Hills, and the Floodplains (Figure 1.1). 
  
Figure 1.1 Coverage of the Bangladesh climate change adaptation survey (BCAS) with red dots indicating the 
location of the study sites adopted from Thomas et al. (2013) 
 
The study sample also covered all of the geopolitical divisions of Bangladesh: Dhaka, 
Chittagong, Khulna, Rajshahi, Sylhet, and Barisal. More unions were sampled in the larger AEZs. 
Twenty agricultural households were randomly selected in each sample union (from one village 
per union) for a total of 800 households surveyed. The survey data from 2010 was used as a 
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DATA is a consultancy firm for large-scale household surveys and other research-related activities located in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. 
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baseline and for constructing panel data in this study. In 2012, the Center for Development 
Research (ZEF) of the University of Bonn joined IFPRI and DATA to build on the initial round of 
the survey, known as the Bangladesh Climate Change Adaptation Survey, with a greater focus 
on gender and asset dynamics. We tried to track all the households including the split with an 
attrition rate of 2.66 percent. 
In the analysis presented in the second chapter the sample was restricted to married, male-
headed households according to intra-household analysis norms. Due to the lack of crucial 
information on livestock adaptation strategies, coping mechanisms, group participation, social 
and political capital details, and information on access to Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) and training, etc., the follow-up survey data was used for the analysis of 
perception, adaptation, and coping correlates presented in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 the analysis 
only included married, male-headed households in order to be comparable with other intra-
household gender specific studies. The key dependent and independent variables examined in 
this study included different types of assets such as physical capital, livestock, natural capital, 
human capital, financial capital, social capital and political capital that were measured using 
values and indices, climatic and non-climatic shocks with both negative and positive impacts, 
individual and household characteristics, and access to services and facilities.  
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CHAPTER 2. THE IMPACT OF SHOCKS ON GENDER-DIFFERENTIATED ASSET 
DYNAMICS IN BANGLADESH3 
 
2.1. Introduction 
An analysis of asset holdings is a crucial part of investigating household welfare as assets can be 
converted into cash for consumption if necessary, for example, to cope with shocks or as 
collateral in the credit market. Selling assets in response to shocks may push individuals into 
poverty in the long run, however, which is why exogenous shocks to assets may have long-
lasting and even intergenerational effects for poor families (Dercon 2004). When financial 
assets such as credit, which are an important instrument to cope with severe covariate shocks, 
are limited, individuals sell their physical or natural assets (Dercon 2010). A good number of 
studies examine the interplay of asset dynamics and poverty traps in developing countries (for 
example, Dercon and Krishnan 2000; Carter and May 2001; Jalan and Ravallion 2002; Duflo and 
Udry 2004; Lybbert et al. 2004; Adato et al. 2006; Barrett et al. 2006; Carter and Barrett 2006; 
Carter et al. 2007; Quisumbing and Baulch 2009), but empirical research using longitudinal data 
on asset ownership at the intrahousehold level and the impact of shocks on asset holdings is 
limited (Quisumbing 2011; Quisumbing et al. 2011; Dillon and Quinones 2011), which is what 
this chapter contributes. 
Men and women own and accumulate assets either individually or jointly, also when married 
(Antonopoulos and Floro 2005; Quisumbing 2011; Quisumbing et al. 2011), and draw down 
assets in different ways in response to shocks. Quisumbing et al. (2011), for example, find that 
floods have negative impacts on the land holdings of husbands, while droughts negatively affect 
their consumer and agricultural durable goods and the livestock of wives. Furthermore, 
women’s assets in general are drawn down to cope with illnesses within the household. This is 
of particular importance as female control over assets and income positively affects household 
well-being, especially that of children (Duflo 2003; Qian 2008; Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003; 
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 This chapter of the thesis strongly builds on Rakib & Matz (2014). 
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Smith et al. 2003). Besides studying differentiated ownership of assets, an investigation of all 
types of assets, that is, financial, land, and nonland assets, is important to understand the 
comprehensive impact of shocks on assets, including possible substitution effects (Deere and 
Doss 2006). 
Building on existing studies, this chapter adds to the understanding of the responsiveness of 
asset holdings to adverse external events by using unique panel data from Bangladesh, one of 
the countries most vulnerable to climate change due to its densely populated coastal areas and 
half of the population living below the poverty line. The data is unique in that it includes 
detailed information about shocks as well as ownership of assets, and allows to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across households; that is, effects within rather than between 
households are investigated, which is particularly important in intrahousehold studies where 
bargaining power is a crucial factor, for example. 
Furthermore, a relatively broad definition of assets is applied including financial assets such as 
credit and a comprehensive index including asset holdings of all types is constructed to see the 
overall effect on wealth, which is a contribution to the existing literature. The focus of the 
chapter, however, lies in identifying changes in disaggregated asset holdings, broken down by 
ownership in rural Bangladesh. We are thus able to study the impact on specific types of assets 
such as jewelry by ownership, which enables the identification of substitution effects within 
households. 
The results suggest that men’s and women’s asset holdings respond differently depending on 
the type of shock. Shocks that occur due to climatic variability reduce the asset base of 
husbands in general, while negative nonweather shocks adversely affect both husbands’ and 
wives’ assets. In general, spouses aim to keep their jointly owned assets intact and draw them 
down only in response to predicted shocks such as seasonal droughts and dowry payments, 
which are classified as shocks in this research not because their occurrence is unexpected but 
because their timing and severity are. Livestock is used as a tool of coping, whereas land, 
husbands’ vehicles, and agricultural tools appear important to agricultural production, which in 
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turn determines livelihoods of agriculture-dependent households, as households try to keep 
these goods in functioning condition. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows: The next section outlines the existing literature that 
this study relates to. Section 2.3 describes the data and the construction of the comprehensive 
asset index and presents descriptive statistics. The empirical approach and the results are 
discussed in Section 2.4, and Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Relation to the Existing Literature 
As implied by the definition of poor people as those having low wealth and thus limited 
possibilities to smooth consumption or expenses, poor people are especially vulnerable to 
external events. Such an event, also called a shock, is defined as “a realization of the state of 
the world whose risk may or may not have been recognized beforehand” (Dercon 2010, 16), 
which means that it is an unanticipated event that may have positive or negative implications. 
To cope with negative shocks, especially the poor are often forced to sell tangible assets, which 
in turn leads to less investment in nontangible assets such as health, nutrition, and education, 
thereby possibly leading to long-term poverty (Hoddinott 2006; Hoddinott and Quisumbing 
2003). Shocks may be covariate—that is, affecting a large number of individuals in a given 
locality at the same time, such as climatic shocks—or idiosyncratic—that is, affecting only a few 
individuals or households at a given time, such as an illness or death of a family member 
(Dercon 2010). An example of a positive idiosyncratic shock is the receipt of a dowry, an 
inheritance, or a remittance (Davis 2007; Quisumbing 2011; Quisumbing et al. 2011). Carter et 
al. (2007) divide shocks into asset and income shocks, depending on which of the two they 
affect. As examples of specific shocks that studies look at, Giesbert and Schindler (2010) 
investigate the effect of only droughts on short-term asset accumulation, and Kumar and 
Quisumbing (2011) study the effects of food price shocks on the consumption and poverty of 
female-headed households.  
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We investigate a large array of shocks in this dissertation—weather shocks such as floods, 
droughts, and cyclones; nonclimatic negative shocks such as death, illness, dowry, and wedding 
expenses; and positive shocks such as the receipt of an inheritance, a remittance, or a dowry—
as qualitative studies on rural Bangladesh find that dowry payments, illness, and large 
household size are the three most important factors associated with poverty (Davis 2007, 
2011b). While some of these negative shocks are anticipated, their timing and severity are 
unknown in advance, which still qualifies them as shocks. Take the example of dowry payments: 
even though parents in Bangladesh, as soon as a daughter is born, know that they will at some 
point have to pay a dowry, the timing and the amount of the dowry payment is unknown ex 
ante. Davis (2011b) also specifically argues that life-cycle events are crucial to be included when 
studying the interplay of asset dynamics and the economic well-being of households, and 
Quisumbing (2011) argues that wedding and dowry expenses are a type of shock due to the 
large amount of income lost at one point in time.4 
With similar reasoning, one could claim that remittances, which are often large enough to 
affect the wealth of poor households, are to be expected when a child, especially a son, is born. 
However, only 18 percent of the households in the sample receive remittances, in most cases 
from children and from the Middle East. A possible explanation for the low incidence of 
remittances being sent is that the rural poor are unaware of the legal provisions related to 
international labor migration (Davis 2007). In addition, migrating is costly, difficult, and often 
illegal, which lowers the chances of the migrant being able to support his or her family on top of 
providing for him- or herself. It should also be noted that the households in the sample are in 
large part agricultural subsistence farmers for whom saving to pay for migration or weddings is 
unusual. 
Assets are not only a measure of wealth but a more general indicator of well-being, according 
to Babbington (1999), and are categorized in different ways. Sherraden (1991), for instance, 
defines tangible assets as those that are owned legally while intangible assets are nonphysical 
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Classifying dowry payments and other life-cycle events as shocks is disputable. Note that the results do not hinge on the 
inclusion of these shocks. 
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in nature and relate to social relationships. Among legally owned assets he includes financial 
assets, durable goods, property, production inputs, natural assets, copyrights, and patent rights 
(Nam et al. 2008; Kim and Kim 2013; Lau 2012). What this distinction misses is that tangible, or 
physical, assets may also be controlled without legal ownership, for example, in cases where 
land cannot be owned but use rights are issued. Examples of tangible assets are jewelry, 
appliances, shops, and vehicles, while net savings are nontangible and are classified as a 
financial asset according to Antonopoulos and Floro (2005). Further distinctions are made 
between productive assets, consumer durables, and assets that are used to secure livelihoods. 
Haveman and Wolff (2001; 2004) argue that vehicles should be excluded from an analysis of 
asset holdings as they constitute an essential source of income to owners. 
Existing studies on intrahousehold asset accumulation and the dynamics of these asset holdings 
often use livestock and household capital (Dillon and Quinones 2011) or, more generally, land 
and nonland assets (Quisumbing 2011; Quisumbing et al. 2011). In a qualitative study on 
poverty dynamics, Davis (2011b) uses an even broader definition of assets. He includes 
productive assets, defined as nontradeable but income-generating assets and protective assets, 
which can be sold in times of distress. He further argues that some assets need investment and 
cannot be traded in a conventional way—for example, human and social capital—but that they 
are necessary to generate income and provide protection in times of need. Meinzen-Dick et al. 
(2011) is followed to categorize assets into natural capital, that is, land holdings; physical 
capital, which are measured either directly or with the help of an index made up of nonland 
assets and housing conditions; livestock holdings; and financial capital measured by outstanding 
credit, which allows investigating a comprehensive picture of asset holdings.  A disaggregated 
investigation of assets by gender of the owner is important as assets are not equally distributed 
between men and women, who also differ in their ability to accumulate assets. The asset base 
of an individual depends on assets brought to marriage (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003), and 
the ability to accumulate more assets further depends on marital status, religion, ethnicity, and 
inheritance and property rights. In more general terms, individuals with more assets are better 
able to accumulate further assets, which exacerbates existing inequalities (Lybbert et al. 2004). 
On the other hand, asset accumulation of the initially rich may slow down due to diminishing 
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returns, and the poor have a chance to catch up by initially forgoing some consumption and 
reinvesting (Zimmerman and Carter 2003; Deaton 1989). Especially for women the 
accumulation of assets is also context dependent; that is, social and traditional rules with 
respect to their participation in the labor force or inheritance are important determinants of 
women’s wealth-generating potential. 
Women store their wealth in the form of jewelry and shop assets in Thailand rather than in 
formal financial assets due to their lack of control over the latter, and men hold higher values of 
transportation assets (Antonopoulos and Floro 2005). Similarly and with the help of panel data 
covering a 10-year period in Bangladesh (1996–2006), Quisumbing (2011), comparing changes 
in asset portfolios between husband and wife, finds that the asset composition changes from 
poultry and livestock to other nonagricultural assets for wives, while jewelry remains their most 
important storage of value, and initial endowments of assets affect the ability to accumulate 
further assets and to cope with shocks according to Quisumbing and Baulch (2009). The impact 
of initial endowments is larger for men in the accumulation of livestock and household capital 
than for women, whose assets also grow less quickly in Nigeria. These differences were further 
exacerbated as livestock, a typically male asset, faced a high price rise, whereas household 
goods and jewelry, typically female assets, were subject to lower price increases (Dillon and 
Quinones 2011). 
In one of the few empirical studies on intrahousehold gender-differentiated asset 
accumulation, Quisumbing (2011) finds complementarities between wives’ human capital and 
husbands’ natural capital when investigating longitudinal data including groups that were or 
were not subject to an intervention related to microcredit, allowances to support education, 
and the adoption of innovative agricultural technologies in Bangladesh. Possibly due to the 
involvement of nongovernmental organizations, female land ownership increased during the 
study period. The author, furthermore, finds that weather shocks reduce jointly owned assets, 
while death and illness reduce wives’ agricultural tools, and dowries appear to be paid for with 
husbands’ agricultural assets. Interesting to note, remittances lead to an increase in jointly 
owned consumer assets, whereas the receipt of dowry payments leads to a reduction in jointly 
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owned agricultural assets (Quisumbing 2011). In a related study, Quisumbing et al. (2011) find 
that remittances entail a diversification from agricultural to nonagricultural assets and that 
husbands’ land holdings are negatively affected by floods, whereas those of wives suffer when 
dowries have to be paid. While these two studies are similar to this study, by using data that 
are representative of Bangladesh’s AEZs, the results of this research being more generalizable. 
Specifically, these studies use data that were purposively collected to evaluate “microfinance, 
agricultural technologies, and educational transfers programs” (Quisumbing et al. 2011, 10) in a 
limited number of districts. Furthermore, the results cannot easily be extended to agricultural 
households without program interventions. Last, neither of the other papers covers cyclones, 
which have been the most devastating weather event in Bangladesh in recent decades and 
therefore deserve attention as well. 
Ownership of one type of asset may facilitate access to another. For example, land is necessary 
as collateral for credit markets, which in turn opens up the market for inputs (Quisumbing 
2011). Credit from commercial sources, however, also may lead to a loss of collateral due to 
high interest rates, while off-farm employment may generate income and thereby encourage 
land accumulation (Quisumbing and Baulch 2009). Thakur et al. (2009) find that credit 
encourages women to save, which enables coping with adverse effects of shocks and allows 
investment in income-generating activities. Family allowances, for example, old age pensions, 
allowances for children, food for education, and school stipends for female students, also have 
a positive effect on female economic well-being. Nevertheless, the fact that women take out 
credit does not necessarily imply that they are the ones controlling it. Microcredit programs in 
Bangladesh have been found to improve women’s use of credit, which positively correlates with 
the occurrence of male-controlled, rather than female-regulated, microenterprises (Chowdhury 
2009). 
18 
 
2.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
A short-term representative household survey panel dataset is employed including various types 
of assets and shocks collected in 31 of Bangladesh’s 64 districts, covering all divisions and all of 
the 7 AEZs.5 Bangladesh’s AEZs are characterized by different climates, which makes employing 
data from all over Bangladesh necessary when investigating the ability of households to deal 
with weather shocks in a representative manner. The Barind tract in the northwestern part of 
the country, for example, experiences seasonal droughts, which are less common in other AEZs, 
while the Flood plain and the Bill and haor basin are more prone to floods and the Tidal flood 
plain sees cyclones often relative to the rest of the country. 
The 2012 questionnaire was specifically designed to capture the gender dimension of asset 
ownership. The 2010 questionnaire did not include the ownership information, so this 
information for the first round of the survey had to be collected retrospectively in 2012. To be 
specific, besides asking about the current owner of an asset in 2012, the questionnaire asked 
whether ownership had changed since 2010 and who was responsible if assets had been sold or 
consumed. Besides information about natural capital such as land, physical capital such as 
nonland assets and housing characteristics, and livestock, information about intangible assets 
such as social capital and the use of credit was gathered. 
Regarding data on shocks, households were asked whether they had been affected (positively or 
negatively) by any weather shocks or other external events and to what extent. Furthermore, 
households as well as community leaders were interviewed about the extent of, for example, 
weather shocks in terms of what share of households in the community were affected. To 
ensure that idiosyncratic shocks were mentioned, households were asked whether they had 
experienced any surprises that led to sudden financial losses or gains, out of which the two with 
the highest absolute amounts are considered. Often-mentioned events leading to losses are 
dowry payments and wedding expenses as well as illnesses or deaths of family members, while 
                                                          
5 
The names of the seven AEZs categorized by the Bangladesh Center for Advanced Studies are Barind tract, Flood plain, Bill 
and haor basin, Modhupur tract, Northern and eastern hill, Tidal flood plain, and Himalayan Piedmont Plain (Thomas et al. 
2013). 
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typically mentioned gains occur from the receipt of a remittance or inheritance.6 Similar to 
gender-disaggregated asset ownership, data on idiosyncratic shocks were not gathered in the 
first round of the survey, so the 2012 round included questions about the past two years, that 
is, between the two rounds, and about the two years prior to the baseline interview. 
To investigate the distribution of asset holdings between husband and wife, the sample is 
restricted to families in which both a household head and his spouse are present and 
unchanged in both survey rounds. Furthermore, female-headed households are excluded due to 
them possibly being very different from male-headed ones in terms of relative bargaining 
power, for example, leading to a final sample size of 678 households. 
 
2.3.1. Constructing the Asset Index 
An index as a comprehensive measure of all physical assets held is constructed. The types of 
assets included here are listed in Table A2.1 in the Appendix. The index is computed using the 
following: 
 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡
 = ∑ 𝑤𝑡
𝑘𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘  (1) 
for individual j in household i in time period t with capital C made up of type-k assets a (Moser 
and Felton 2007). The choice of assets to be included is supported by both the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin and Bartlett’s test, and the weight w of each asset is based on a principal components 
analysis following Filmer and Pritchett (2001).7 Note that assets that are owned by less than 3 
percent or more than 97 percent of the sample are excluded. Furthermore, all indices are 
normalized, with larger values implying larger asset holdings. Besides this index for nonland 
                                                          
6
 Some households also mention scholarships given to girls, which come as a periodic inflow of cash from the government 
for the costs of school supplies, as positive income shocks. The monetary value of these grants is too small to affect a 
household’s asset holdings, however, so these are not considered as a shock for the purposes of this study. 
7 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity helps to identify the factors used in a factor analysis by choosing those with eigenvalues 
greater than 1 (Chang et al. 2007). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin criterion measures the adequacy of included variables, and a value of 
70 percent is sufficient for inclusion according to Kaiser (1974). The data yield a value of 75 percent. 
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physical assets including household durables and housing characteristics, a comprehensive 
index of asset holdings is constructed for which livestock and land are included through simple 
indicators for ownership. 
 
2.3.2. Shocks 
Regarding data on shocks, household heads were asked whether their households had been 
affected (positively or negatively) by any shocks and to what extent. Furthermore, household 
heads as well as community leaders were interviewed about the extent of, for example, 
weather shocks in terms of what share of households in the community were affected. To 
ensure that idiosyncratic shocks, were mentioned, respondents were asked whether their 
households had experienced any surprises that led to sudden financial losses or gains, out of 
which we consider the two with the highest absolute amounts. Often-mentioned events leading 
to losses are dowry payments and wedding expenses as well as illnesses or deaths of family 
members, while typically mentioned gains occur from the receipt of a remittance or 
inheritance.8 Similar to gender-disaggregated asset ownership, data on idiosyncratic shocks 
were not gathered in the first round of the survey so the 2012 round included questions on this 
about the past two years, that is, between the two rounds, and about the two years prior to the 
baseline interview. 
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics on external events experienced by the households in our 
sample between the two survey rounds, grouped into weather shocks, other negative shocks, 
and positive shocks. Due to reporting bias being a possible concern (Quisumbing et al. 2011), we 
compare the incidence of weather shocks based on information from household and community 
reports, the latter being obtained from individuals knowing a community well such as 
                                                          
8
 Some households also mention scholarships given to girls, which come as a periodic inflow of cash from the government 
for the costs of school supplies, as positive income shocks. The monetary value of these grants is too small to affect a 
household’s asset holdings, however, so we do not consider them as a shock for the purposes of this study. 
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administrative or traditional leaders or teachers.9 We find that the difference in reporting is 
smaller the more severe a shock was and, generally, that the two are relatively similar. For 
example, 38 per cent of household heads report that they had been affected by floods, while 
the percentage of affected households was 32 per cent according to community leaders. The 
bottom of Table 2.1 reports incidences of idiosyncratic shocks. Similar to the findings of 
Quisumbing (2011) and Quisumbing et al. (2011), death and illness are more prevalent than 
wedding or dowry expenses. With respect to positive shocks, 20 per cent of households 
mention benefitting from remittances, while 4 per cent have received an inheritance or dowry. 
Table 2.1:  Reported shocks and external events between 2010 and 2012 
 Mean Std. dev. 
Weather shocks according to household reports   
Proportion of households affected by flood 0.38 0.49 
Proportion of households affected by drought 0.45 0.50 
Proportion of households affected by cyclone or tornado 0.31 0.46 
Severe weather shocks according to community reports    
Proportion of households affected by flood 0.32 0.47 
Proportion of households affected by drought 0.52 0.50 
Proportion of households affected by cyclone or tornado 0.29 0.46 
Non-climatic negative shocks   
Proportion of households experiencing death or illness of any members 0.26 0.44 
Proportion of households incurring  dowry or wedding expenses 0.05 0.22 
Positive shocks or events   
Proportion of households receiving remittances 0.20 0.40 
Proportion of households receiving a dowry or inheritance 0.04 0.21 
 
2.3.3. Asset Ownership 
Summary statistics on land, livestock, credit, and physical asset (index) ownership by gender, on 
the other hand, are presented in Table 2.2, and descriptive statistics for specific types of non-
                                                          
9
 Community leaders were asked whether a natural disaster had occurred and to assess its impact. If the impact was classified as 
“devastating“, “very serious” or “serious” we classified the event as a shock. If it was classified as “manageable” or “not 
[leading] to much damage”, we did not classify the event as a shock.  
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land physical assets presented in Table A2.2 in the appendix. Note that the construction of the 
asset index is presented in the appendix and that all monetary values used in this paper have 
been deflated to 2010 Bangladeshi Taka.10 A general trend emanating from Tables 2.2 and A2.2 
is that households were able to accumulate land, livestock, and non-land physical assets as 
measured by the composite index between the two survey rounds, even though the picture is 
less clear when the values of livestock and total asset holdings are used. While women hold less 
livestock measured in tropical livestock units (TLU) and physical assets exclusively or also jointly 
with their husbands than household heads exclusively, the most noticeable difference in 
ownership is apparent with respect to land holdings: land is to the largest part held exclusively 
by men in Bangladesh (96% of the total area of households’ land is individually owned by 
household heads in our sample), which is rooted in tradition and religion. Even though Muslim 
law allows sons to inherit a larger share of land than daughters (Deere and Doss, 2006), 
daughters often forgo even their smaller share to continue a good relationship with their 
brothers (Quisumbing, 2011).11 Furthermore, Hindu women are not permitted to inherit 
property from their fathers in Bangladesh (Jinnah, 2013; Aktar and Abdullah, 2007). Another 
factor making land ownership difficult for women is that men are often reluctant to give 
inherited land to their sisters as they are afraid of the land being split and their privacy being 
impeded on if the land is sold subsequently. They therefore prefer paying their sisters a lump 
sum instead of transferring the actual land (Rahman and van Schendel, 1997, cited in Arens, 
2013).  
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 To be specific, all monetary values are deflated on the basis of an inflation rate of food and nonfood items that is 
calculated with the help of the included information about expenditure from the survey data. Furthermore, 1 US-Dollar 
corresponded to 81 Bangladeshi Taka in September 2012 (International Monetary Fund, 2012). 
11
 Arens (2013), however, finds that there are incidences of Muslim women claiming land once both parents are deceased.  
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics of asset ownership 
 N Mean Std. dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
2010       
Plot size in square meters (husband) 678 2,775 3,913.82 0 1,113 27,836 
Plot size in square meters (wife) 678 34 309.92 0 0 4,693 
Plot size in square meters (joint) 678 102 1,014.01 0 0 21,120 
Livestock value in taka (husband) 678 15,360 30,328.21 0 1,275 455,200 
Livestock value in taka (wife) 678 2,915 18,096.91 0 0 425,000 
Livestock value in taka (joint) 678 1,277 7,493.40 0 0 83,500 
Livestock in TLU (husband)  678 0.61 0.85 0 0.10 5.10 
Livestock in TLU (wife)  678 0.34 0.72 0 0 7.90 
Livestock in TLU (joint)  678 0.09 0.47 0 0 7.90 
Total value of physical assets in taka 
(husband) 
678 36,068 74,680.39 0 14,300 855,930 
Total value of physical assets in taka (wife) 678 8,351 24,305.28 0 875 425,000 
Total value of physical assets in taka (joint) 678 7,130 23,017.67 0 0 256,700  
Physical asset index (husband) 678 0.19 0.12 0 0.17 1.00 
Physical asset index (wife) 678 0.09 0.07 0 0.08 1.00 
Physical asset index (joint) 678 0.20 0.15 0 0.2 1.00 
Credit (husband) 678 11,548 66,514.34 0 0 1,275,000 
Credit (wife) 678 5,157 26,682.01 0 0 595,000 
Credit (joint) 678 5,980 24,929.63 0 0 391,000 
2012       
Plot size in square meters (husband) 678 3,095 4,650.894 0 1,355 38,053 
Plot size in square meters (wife) 678 40 338.23 0 0 4,855 
Plot size in square meters (joint) 678 57 521.39 0 0 11,531 
Livestock value in taka (husband) 678 16,856 29,026.51 0 1,700 287,900 
Livestock value in taka (wife) 678 1,864 6,845.14 0 0 78,100 
Livestock value in taka (joint) 678 1,136 7,907.05 0 0 150,000 
Livestock in TLU (husband)  678 0.70 0.91 0 0.22 6.20 
Livestock in TLU (wife) 678 0.38 0.73 0 0 4.06 
Livestock in TLU (joint)  678 0.09 0.38 0 0 2.86 
Total value of physical assets in taka 
(husband) 
678 35,617 58,552.99 0 15,577 530,150 
Total value of physical assets in taka (wife) 678 9,279 26,139.63 0 1,200 321,500 
Total value of physical assets in taka (joint) 678 8,724 27,916.24 0 0 300,000 
Physical asset index (husband) 678 0.25 0.15 0 0.22 1.00 
Physical asset index (wife) 678 0.21 0.11 0 0.18 1.00 
Physical asset index (joint) 678 0.20 0.14 0 0.18 1.00 
Credit (husband) 678 4,913 15,037.25 0 0 148,750 
Credit (wife) 678 6,096 26,037.77 0 0 425,000 
Credit (joint) 678 6,792 25,835.53 0 0 382,500 
Notes: TLU denotes tropical livestock units. 
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The difficulties of inheriting land for women also extend to the case of widow inheritance. 
Muslim law stipulates that widows should receive one-eighth of their deceased husband’s land 
and that the rest should be distributed among their children (Jinnah, 2013). In practice, widows 
usually live in a son’s household without owning land in their own names, however. Widows 
without offspring receive one-quarter of their husband’s land, the rest is inherited by the 
brothers of the deceased (Jinnah, 2013). 
Similarly to the data in Table 2.2, there are clear differences when assets are disaggregated as 
presented in Table A2.2: men generally hold more assets with the exception of jewellery, which 
is a female-owned asset traditionally. Furthermore, jewellery is an often jointly-held asset as 
well as, to some extent, consumer goods, while most productive assets are under exclusive male 
ownership. It should be noted that even though the value of women’s non-land assets 
measured by the comprehensive asset index have increased between the survey rounds as 
displayed in Table 2.2, a large part of the monetary value of physical assets is still in the hands of 
husbands. Overall, non-land assets are more equally distributed than land, however. 
 
2.3.4. Household Characteristics 
Descriptive statistics of other household characteristics are presented in Table A2.3 in the 
appendix. Household heads have a mean age of 46 years during baseline data collection and less 
than 4 years of schooling. Households have, on average, five members and own 3,193 square 
meters of land with a value of 598,938 Taka in 2012 and non-land assets of 33,763 Taka. The 
size of land owned increased by 282 square meters, which is equivalent to 7 decimals, between 
survey rounds.12 Livestock holdings are relatively small with a mean worth of 19,857 Taka or less 
than 1 tropical livestock unit, which is surprising considering that approximately two-thirds of 
male household members older than 15 years of age in our sample report agriculture as their 
                                                          
12
 Decimal is the common measurement of land size in Bangladesh; 1 decimal is equal to 40.46 square meters. 
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main occupation in 2010. Women, on the other hand, are focused on domestic work even 
though their involvement in off-farm activities increased between 2010 and 2012. 
Table 2.3: The distribution of the comprehensive asset index by shock experience, household 
head’s education level, and age 
  Husband  Wife  Joint  
N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Experience of shocks          
Experienced weather shocks 1,272 0.27 0.12 0.24 0.08 0.14 0.11 
Not experienced weather shocks 84 0.28 0.12 0.24 0.07 0.14 0.13 
Experienced negative shocks 413 0.26 0.12 0.24 0.06 0.14 0.11 
Not experienced negative shocks 943 0.27 0.13 0.24 0.08 0.14 0.11 
Experienced positive shocks 267 0.28 0.13 0.25 0.07 0.14 0.10 
Not experienced positive shocks 1,089 0.26 0.12 0.24 0.08 0.14 0.11 
Years of schooling of household head        
No education 582 0.25 0.11 0.23 0.06 0.12 0.10 
Lower primary level (1 to 3 years) 157 0.25 0.11 0.23 0.06 0.14 0.10 
Primary level (4 or 5 years) 233 0.25 0.12 0.24 0.08 0.14 0.09 
Junior level (6 to 8 years) 149 0.29 0.14 0.25 0.06 0.15 0.12 
Secondary level (9 or 10 years)  166 0.30 0.14 0.27 0.12 0.17 0.14 
Higher secondary level (11 or 12 years)  31 0.34 0.13 0.25 0.05 0.17 0.13 
More than 12 years 38 0.38 0.12 0.27 0.06 0.17 0.10 
Age of household head         
Less than 25 years 26 0.22 0.10 0.21 0.09 0.13 0.09 
26 to 35 years 273 0.26 0.12 0.24 0.08 0.15 0.13 
36 to 45 years 353 0.26 0.13 0.24 0.09 0.13 0.10 
46 to 55 years 333 0.27 0.12 0.24 0.07 0.14 0.11 
56 to 65 years 245 0.28 0.12 0.24 0.09 0.14 0.11 
66 to 70 years 61 0.28 0.15 0.22 0.06 0.14 0.09 
More than 70 years 65 0.25 0.12 0.23 0.05 0.13 0.07 
Table 2.3 presents gender-differentiated mean values of the comprehensive asset index 
including land, non-land, and livestock assets, by whether a shock has been experienced, by 
education, and by age of the household head. Negative shocks affect mainly the assets of 
husbands, while those of wives and those that are jointly owned appear to be protected. 
Experiencing positive shocks is associated with larger values of the index for both husbands and 
wives, however. It is interesting that more educated heads have more assets across all 
categories of ownership, while this association begins only above primary schooling. The picture 
is not as clear with respect to age of the household head. The data suggest that assets need to 
be accumulated first as very young households do not hold many assets but also suggest that 
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assets appear to be disposed of after a certain age, possibly due to sale or early bequests and 
older individuals living with their children rather than working with the assets themselves. 
 
2.4. Empirical Approach 
In this section we investigate the effects of different external events on the asset holdings of 
household heads, those of their wives, and those owned jointly. We move from a general 
measure to more specific measures of assets to exploit intra-household dynamics and 
substitution effects. Let us first consider a simple regression equation to be estimated using 
ordinary least squares and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors: 
𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑺′𝒊𝒕𝛂 + 𝑿′𝑖𝑡𝛅 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟2010𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡  ,   (2) 
where A denotes different measures of assets owned by individual j in household i at time t. To 
be specific, asset holdings are first measured by the comprehensive index of land, livestock, and 
non-land assets including housing characteristics to get an overall picture of the impact of 
shocks. Subsequently, we investigate the impact on land, on an index of non-land physical 
assets, and livestock separately. In addition, physical assets and livestock are further 
disaggregated. As a final measure, we look at financial assets, which we measure as the amount 
of loans taken out by the household that still need to be paid back due to our data 
unfortunately not including savings. The ability to borrow is indicative of financial assets as well, 
however, so we feel this exercise is informative in any case. Note that we run separate 
regressions for assets owned by the household head, by his wife, or jointly as denoted by j. 
S denotes a vector of shocks including binary variables for having experienced weather shocks 
and other negative or positive shocks. Year2010 is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 for 
observations from the 2010 survey round and 0 for observations from 2012, µ is an error term. 
X is a vector of household characteristics including the age of the household head, household 
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size, the male-to-female ratio, the dependency ratio, and education of the household head.13 It 
may, however, be the case that there are unobserved characteristics of households that go 
hand in hand with both the exposure to shocks and asset holdings, which the naïve estimation 
strategy outlined in equation 2 does not account for. The advantage of having panel data is that 
we are able to control for this time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across households by 
including household fixed effects: 
𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑺
′
𝒊𝒕𝛂 + 𝑿
′
𝑖𝑡𝛅 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡   ,    (3) 
which yields our main empirical strategy. Parameter 𝜃 represents the inclusion of household 
fixed effects which control for characteristics of a household that do not change over time, that 
is, we investigate changes within households over time, rather than computing average effects 
generated by differences between households. It should be noted, however, that we can no 
longer estimate the effect of time-invariant household characteristics such as education of the 
household head in this case. Furthermore, due to the possibility of the error variances not being 
independent within households, we estimate all our results including household fixed effects 
with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the household level. 
 
2.4.1. The Impact of Shocks on Comprehensive Asset Holdings 
The results of estimating equation 3 for the comprehensive asset index including land, nonland, 
and livestock assets are presented in Table 2.4. The effect on the assets of household heads is 
displayed in column 1, the effect on those of spouses in column 2, and the effect on the index of 
jointly owned assets in column 3.  
Surprisingly, having experienced a flood is not associated with overall asset holdings in a 
statistically significant way, and experiencing a drought is related to the asset holdings of wives 
                                                          
13
 We do not include binary measures for the use of credit or extension agents due to the possibility of simultaneity bias. 
Note that the results are robust to the inclusion of these variables, however. 
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in a positive way. The latter is partly explained with the low involvement of women in 
agriculture, which leads to their owning assets that are not affected by weather events. A 
cyclone and dowry payments reduce the asset holdings of household heads, while death and 
illness lead to spouses disposing of their individually owned assets, which is in line with 
Quisumbing et al. (2011). Interestingly, jointly owned assets appear not to be very responsive to 
shocks with all coefficients being statistically insignificant. 
Table 2.4: Impact of shocks on the comprehensive asset index (fixed effects estimates) 
 Comprehensive Asset Index 
Husband Wife  Joint  
(1) (2) (3) 
Flood –0.007 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
–0.001 
(0.009) 
Drought 0.015 
(0.010) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
Cyclone –0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
Death/illness –0.008 
(0.006) 
–0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
Dowry payment –0.020* 
(0.011) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
–0.001 
(0.019) 
Remittance 0.020** 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
–0.001 
(0.007) 
Inheritance/dowry 
receipt 
0.006 
(0.015) 
–0.000 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
Age of household head -0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.001) 
–0.002* 
(0.001) 
Household size –0.001 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
Male-to-female ratio –0.015** 
(0.008) 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
Dependency ratio –0.088*** 
(0.032) 
–0.002 
(0.022) 
–0.004 
(0.032) 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.079 0.032 0.018 
N 1,356 1,356 1,356 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the household level and are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
The fact that dowry payments affect the asset base of only the household head is not surprising 
and in line with Quisumbing (2011), considering that the payment of wedding costs is the 
obligation of the father of the bride traditionally. Davis (2011a) states that poor people in 
Bangladesh may need to put a mortgage on their land or sell livestock to pay for dowries and 
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wedding expenses, and Quisumbing et al. (2011) also find that land and livestock of wives are 
drawn down to meet these expenses, which illustrates the immense financial burden of the 
tradition. 
The results on death and illness are partly in line with Quisumbing (2011), who finds that death 
and illness affect land and nonland assets of household heads negatively and that there are 
mixed effects for land and nonland assets of their spouses, and with Quisumbing et al. (2011), 
who find that the consumer durables and nonagricultural assets of household heads, and the 
land and jewelry of their wives, are drawn down to cope with death and illness. We find 
remittances to increase only male assets and no statistically significant coefficient for the 
receipt of dowries or an inheritance. 
The magnitude of the coefficients is not straightforward to interpret due to the dependent 
variable being a normalized index, but it should be noted that the effects are of a meaningful 
size in comparison to the means of the indices. To be precise, the coefficients on the variables 
for shocks range between 0.008 and 0.033 in absolute size conditional on statistical significance, 
and the means of the comprehensive asset index between 0.09 and 0.21 so the former are 
indicative of economically significant effects of shocks on asset holdings.  
The low coefficient of determination (R-squared) is likely to be due to the omission of variables 
relevant to asset creation, for example education, and due to the fact that we aim to explain 
wealth as a function of demographic and socio-economic characteristics. We are unable to 
control for factors such as income, however, because of difficulties of measuring it in this rural 
setting and because of questionable data quality in case information is reported.  
 
2.4.2. The Impact of Shocks on Natural, Physical, and Livestock Assets 
Let us investigate asset holdings in more detail. Table 2.5 presents the results of the main 
results, that is, of estimating equation 3 separately for land, nonland physical, and livestock 
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assets by ownership. Land holdings, the dependent variable in columns 1 through 3, are 
measured as the logarithmic value of plot size in square meters. Nonland physical assets in 
columns 4 through 6 are represented by an index, and livestock in columns 7 through 9 are 
measured in TLUs. 
While floods appear to reduce female-owned livestock, droughts, which can to some extent be 
predicted due to seasonality to negatively affect female-owned non-land physical assets. 
Furthermore, cyclones are associated with larger husband-owned and jointly owned land 
holdings, which is surprising, and with a reduction in the physical assets of household heads. 
While non-land physical assets are likely to be drawn down to cope with unexpected weather 
shocks, land is an asset with low liquidity that is also difficult to re-accumulate once sold, which 
may explain that land holdings are not negatively associated with the experience of unexpected 
and adverse weather events in contrast to Quisumbing et al. (2011). 
Interestingly, the receipt of remittances yields a statistically significant and negative coefficient 
for land holdings of household heads. A possible explanation lies in migration and its high costs. 
Firstly, this variable may be picking up the effect of migration rather than remittances but, 
unfortunately, we are unable to control for migration in the estimation apart from migration 
between survey rounds due to neither of the questionnaires asking for household members 
having migrated.14 Secondly, household heads may sell part of their land to facilitate migration 
of themselves or one of their children, for which the household receives remittances in return 
(Davis, 2007) so causality may run in the opposite direction. The positive effect of remittances 
on livestock and other physical assets of spouses is likely to be driven by cases wherein 
remittances are specifically sent to the wife of the household head (possibly even by himself), 
who invests in exclusively owned assets.  
 
                                                          
14
 To be specific, we can only observe migration if household members have left between the two survey rounds. While we 
are able to tell whether these individuals have left for purposes of employment, the fraction of households in which this has 
happened is very small with 2.95%. For this reason and due to the fact that remittances are relatively unlikely to be sent after 
recent migration (the correlation between a household having received remittances and a member having migrated is virtually 
zero in our data), we are unable to include a variable for migration in the estimation in order to net out its effect from that of 
the receipt of remittances. 
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Table 2.5: Impact of shocks on natural, physical, and livestock assets (fixed effects estimates) 
 Land (square meters) Physical assets (index) Livestock (TLU) 
Husband Wife  Joint  Husband Wife Joint Husband Wife Joint 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Flood –0.025 
(0.343) 
–0.096 
(0.074) 
0.266 
(0.170) 
-0.016 
(0.012) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
–0.089 
(0.067) 
–0.142* 
(0.085) 
–0.043 
(0.042) 
Drought 0.229 
(0.297) 
–0.039 
(0.081) 
0.154 
(0.187) 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
-0.024** 
(0.010) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
–0.086 
(0.072) 
0.079 
(0.067) 
0.045 
(0.035) 
Cyclone 0.598** 
(0.278) 
–0.132 
(0.089) 
0.352* 
(0.183) 
-0.023** 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.065 
(0.069) 
0.010 
(0.072) 
–0.040 
(0.040) 
Death/illness –0.019 
(0.239) 
0.058 
(0.075) 
0.054 
(0.100) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
–0.003 
(0.042) 
–0.011 
(0.041) 
–0.006 
(0.023) 
Dowry payment –0.403 
(0.592) 
–0.007 
(0.042) 
–0.005 
(0.183) 
-0.002 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.016) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
–0.166 
(0.110) 
–0.053 
(0.125) 
–0.121** 
(0.057) 
Remittance –0.918*** 
(0.278) 
0.013 
(0.083) 
–0.283** 
(0.126) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.022** 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.052 
(0.061) 
0.141** 
(0.067)  
0.024 
(0.025) 
Inheritance/dowry receipt 1.121** 
(0.524) 
–0.174 
(0.218) 
0.018 
(0.182) 
-0.029 
(0.018) 
0.000 
(0.017) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.122 
(0.104) 
0.004 
(0.113) 
0.023 
(0.023) 
Age of household head –0.014 
(0.022) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
–0.001 
(0.003) 
–0.002 
(0.002) 
Household size –0.108 
(0.133) 
0.043 
(0.039) 
–0.019 
(0.078) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.030) 
–0.009 
(0.033) 
0.000 
(0.019) 
Male-to-female ratio 0.223 
(0.280) 
–0.069 
(0.053) 
0.237 
(0.198) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.040 
(0.070) 
–0.048 
(0.071) 
0.027 
(0.032) 
Dependency ratio 0.787 
(1.230) 
–0.043 
(0.286) 
0.010 
(0.482) 
-0.037 
(0.033) 
0.001 
(0.041) 
-0.007 
(0.024) 
–0.441* 
(0.230) 
–0.369* 
(0.192) 
–0.055 
(0.131) 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.031 0.011 0.026 0.062 0.013 0.030 0.023 0.030 0.018 
N 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the household level and are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
Having to pay for a dowry reduces jointly owned livestock, which is traditionally acquired in 
advance specifically for the purpose of selling it to pay for the wedding expenses of daughters. 
Deere and Doss (2006) argue that livestock is relatively easy to sell and Davis and Ali (2014) also 
find evidence in support of livestock asset liquidation in response to adverse external events. 
The receipt of an inheritance or dowry yields mixed results: the positive effect on the land 
holdings of household heads is reasonable due to the practice of sons inheriting land, as 
explained above. A similar reasoning applies to the positive association with jointly owned other 
physical assets. We find that death/illness within the household is positively and statistically 
significantly associated with jointly-held non-land physical assets which is initially surprising. An 
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explanation may be that some of the deceased’s wealth is transferred to the household without 
being entirely captured in the effect of receiving an inheritance. 
In general, it should be noted that jointly held assets are less affected by unexpected events 
than individually owned assets and rather used to cope with shocks that can be predicted to a 
certain degree such as seasonal droughts and paying for dowries. It may be that assets owned 
by both the household head and his wife are protected compared to individually owned ones or 
that it is simply difficult for spouses to agree on selling jointly owned assets. With respect to 
household characteristics, our main results, in which we control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity across households, suggest that age of the household head is mostly positively, 
and a high dependency ratio negatively related to asset holdings in general. 
We verify the robustness of our main results in several sensitivity checks. First, we compare 
Table 2.5 to the results of estimating equation 2, that is, the ordinary least squares specification 
whose results are presented in Table A2.4 in the appendix. They suggest that, if an external 
event yields a statistically significant coefficient, they are positive, even for shocks such as 
droughts, floods, and cyclones, which may be explained partly by emergency relief in the 
aftermath of severe covariate shocks. The inconsistency in coefficients in terms of sign and 
statistical significance compared to our main results suggests that unobserved heterogeneity 
across households plays a role and, thus, that using household fixed effects is plausible. 
Furthermore, while the variables for the exposure to external events are self-reported by 
households throughout the paper, we also use community reports on weather-related shocks. 
The results are presented in Table A2.5 in the appendix and largely support the main results 
with respect to the effects of idiosyncratic and still self-reported shocks such as death and 
illness, dowry payments, and positive events such as the receipt of remittances, an inheritance, 
or dowries. When it comes to covariate shocks, the effects of shocks reported by the 
community are only partly supportive of our main results and stronger in terms of statistical 
significance, most likely due to community officials being aware only of events affecting a large 
number of households, which probably implies that the shocks and its consequences are severe. 
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Table A2.6 in the appendix presents another sensitivity check in which we use the logarithmic 
value of the self-reported monetary values of the three categories of assets as dependent 
variables rather than plot size for land, the index for physical non-land assets, and TLU for 
livestock. The main results in Table 2.5 are well-supported for land holdings, but only partly so 
for non-land assets and livestock, which may be due to the index for non-land physical assets 
and the measurement in TLU being relatively crude compared to the values of assets. 
Irrespective of these shortcomings, Table A2.6 allows us to compare effects across different 
categories of assets. A cyclone, for example, is associated with an increase in the value of 
jointly-held land holdings by 96.6%, but with a reduction in non-land physical assets and 
livestock by 30.3% and 32.4%, respectively.15 
 
2.4.3. The Impact of Shocks on Disaggregated Physical Assets 
Let us now take a look at more specific types of nonland physical and livestock assets. Table 2.6 
presents the results of estimating equation 3 separately for consumer durables (columns 1 
through 3), agricultural tools (columns 4 through 6), and vehicles (columns 7 through 9) by 
ownership as dependent variables. Table 2.7 reports the results for jewelry in columns 1 
through 3, for poultry in columns 4 through 6, and for cattle in columns 7 through 9. 
                                                          
15 Note that this is not directly given by the coefficient on the variable denoting the occurrence of a shock as the latter is 
binary and the outcome in logarithmic terms. Please see, for example, Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) for an explanation of 
how to interpret coefficients such as these. 
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Table 2.6: Impact of shocks on consumer durables, agricultural tools, and vehicles (fixed 
effects estimates) 
 Log(value of consumer durables) Log(value of agricultural tools) Log(value of vehicles)  
 Husband  Wife  Joint  Husband  Wife  Joint  Husband  Wife  Joint  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Flood –0.319 
(0.307) 
–0.088 
(0.233) 
0.003 
(0.182) 
–0.383 
(0.323) 
0.325 
(0.218) 
0.191 
(0.165) 
0.417 
(0.292) 
0.068 
(0.094) 
–0.205 
(0.143) 
Drought 0.219 
(0.249) 
–0.395** 
(0.200) 
0.168 
(0.147) 
0.263 
(0.319) 
–0.069 
(0.203) 
–0.055 
(0.139) 
0.252 
(0.276) 
–0.394*** 
(0.150) 
–0.131 
(0.165) 
Cyclone –0.871*** 
(0.289) 
0.236 
(0.195) 
–0.122 
(0.166) 
–0.187 
(0.285) 
0.597*** 
(0.220) 
0.252* 
(0.145) 
–0.284 
(0.288) 
0.016 
(0.123) 
–0.236 
(0.156) 
Death/illness 0.304 
(0.192) 
–0.061 
(0.158) 
0.121 
(0.124) 
–0.205 
(0.214) 
0.085 
(0.141) 
0.072 
(0.092) 
0.053 
(0.220) 
0.085 
(0.103) 
–0.104 
(0.086) 
Dowry payment –0.191 
(0.395) 
0.388 
(0.330) 
–0.091 
(0.328) 
0.283 
(0.474) 
–0.023 
(0.389) 
–0.119 
(0.214) 
0.400 
(0.480) 
–0.474* 
(0.264) 
0.219 
(0.251) 
Remittance 0.681*** 
(0.205) 
–0.650*** 
(0.193) 
–0.080 
(0.165) 
1.487*** 
(0.267) 
–0.389** 
(0.184) 
–0.201** 
(0.094) 
0.406 
(0.278) 
–0.023 
(0.122) 
–0.175* 
(0.096) 
Inheritance/dowry 
receipt 
0.057 
(0.368) 
0.113 
(0.374) 
0.302 
(0.322) 
–0.579 
(0.501) 
0.430 
(0.375) 
0.042 
(0.126) 
0.762 
(0.500) 
0.217 
(0.142) 
–0.173 
(0.166) 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.057 0.041 0.017 0.075 0.032 0.038 0.023 0.031 0.026 
N 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 
Notes: The specification includes the same control variables as those reported in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Standard errors are clustered at the 
household level and are given in parentheses.  
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
The most interesting result is that the finding from Table 2.5 that cyclones are associated with a 
decrease in non-land physical assets of household heads is supported and enriched in Table 2.7: 
the reduction in physical assets is driven by drawing down consumer durables, while household 
heads protect their agricultural tools and vehicles, possibly due to their role in income 
generation of rural families. To be specific, a cyclone is associated with a reduction in the value 
of consumer durables by 58.1% but not with agricultural tools or vehicles of household heads in 
a statistically significant way. It should be noted, however, that vehicles owned by the spouse 
are drawn down to cope with droughts and dowry expenses, which is in line with Davis (2011a, 
b) who finds that dowry expenses in Bangladesh are often paid by parents selling (productive) 
assets such as livestock, rickshaws, land, household durables, and jewellery, which pushes them 
even deeper into poverty. The positive effects of covariate shocks found here are most likely 
due to aid programs as mentioned above. 
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Table 2.7: Impact of shocks on jewelry, poultry, and livestock (fixed effects estimates) 
 Log(value of jewellery)  Log(value of poultry)  Log(value of cattle)  
Type of shock Husband  Wife  Joint  Husband  Wife  Joint  Husband  Wife  Joint  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Flood –0.049 
(0.410) 
–0.063 
(0.385) 
–0.343 
(0.334) 
–0.149 
(0.398) 
–0.655* 
(0.365) 
–0.031 
(0.137) 
–1.488*** 
(0.454) 
0.610** 
(0.276) 
0.198 
(0.228) 
Drought –0.961** 
(0.382) 
1.434*** 
(0.380) 
0.101 
(0.288) 
–1.209*** 
(0.365) 
0.833** 
(0.347) 
0.407*** 
(0.145) 
0.206 
(0.426) 
0.427* 
(0.231) 
0.320 
(0.212) 
Cyclone 0.256 
(0.356) 
–0.849** 
(0.364) 
–0.316 
(0.308) 
0.003 
(0.377) 
–0.976*** 
(0.333) 
–0.274* 
(0.154) 
–0.264 
(0.410) 
–0.085 
(0.243) 
–0.224 
(0.184) 
Death/illness 0.169 
(0.266) 
0.041 
(0.296) 
0.046 
(0.216) 
0.029 
(0.259) 
–0.265 
(0.260) 
0.099 
(0.107) 
–0.196 
(0.332) 
–0.097 
(0.204) 
–0.071 
(0.111) 
Dowry payment 0.396 
(0.584) 
–0.896 
(0.598) 
–0.330 
(0.568) 
0.179 
(0.529) 
–0.146 
(0.611) 
–0.357* 
(0.198) 
–0.942 
(0.749) 
0.497 
(0.472) 
–0.094 
(0.249) 
Remittance –0.894*** 
(0.334) 
1.824*** 
(0.349) 
0.588** 
(0.257) 
–0.778** 
(0.307) 
1.468*** 
(0.316) 
0.119 
(0.127) 
0.121 
(0.382) 
0.247 
(0.236) 
0.280** 
(0.130) 
Inheritance/dowry 
receipt 
0.237 
(0.567) 
–1.260** 
(0.622) 
–0.123 
(0.406) 
–0.228 
(0.530) 
–0.702 
(0.617) 
0.082 
(0.135) 
0.808 
(0.743) 
–0.426 
(0.421) 
–0.014 
(0.149) 
Household fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.041 0.111 0.021 0.044 0.087 0.038 0.029 0.016 0.025 
N 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 
Notes: The specification includes the same control variables as those reported in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Standard errors are clustered at the 
household level and are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
When looking at Tables 2.6 and 2.7 in conjunction, it is obvious that remittances impact on 
assets positively and negatively depending on the type of asset. Spouses of household heads 
appear to use remittances to accumulate jewellery and poultry instead of consumer goods and 
agricultural tools, while the case is reversed for household heads. While the explanation for the 
negative association between remittances and land holdings of the household head found in 
Table 2.5 is likely to be grounded on their liquidation to finance migration, the motivation for 
the different strategies presented here may lie in differences of bargaining power and of 
characteristics of the remittance-sending process: women prefer investing in assets that 
obviously belong to them (also for the case of the possibly migrated household head sending 
the remittances returns) due to less control over other assets of the family, while men staying in 
the household and receiving remittances, for example from migrated children, may generally 
have more bargaining power to protect their assets and invest to improve the economic well-
being of the whole family.  
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Surprisingly, the receipt of an inheritance or dowry is associated with a decrease in jewellery 
owned by the wife of the household head by 71.6% as displayed in column 2 of Table 2.7, which 
is probably due to the spouse of the household head also transferring some of her jewellery to 
her daughters(-in-law). Another interesting finding from Table 2.7 is that poultry of spouses is 
drawn down in response to floods and cyclones, while poultry of household heads is reduced in 
association with droughts, which are positively related to the jewellery and cattle of wives, 
possibly due to the accumulation of these as an ex ante coping strategy as droughts can partly 
be predicted due to seasonality. And even though the cattle holdings of household heads 
decrease by 77.4% in response to a flood, this is possibly not because of sales to cope with the 
shock but because of animals not being able to survive such a covariate shock, which is partly in 
line with Quisumbing et al. (2011) who argue that the livestock of wives is relatively strongly 
affected by droughts and the associated lack of water and feedstuff in Bangladesh. In 
accordance with our main findings in Table 2.5, dowry and wedding expenses appear to be paid 
for with jointly owned poultry, and households generally appear to prefer keeping larger 
livestock, which may also play a role in agriculture, and rather sell smaller animals. In 
conclusion, the picture emerging from Table 2.5 is supported: weather shocks are generally 
negatively associated with physical assets held individually by household heads and their 
spouses. 
 
2.4.4. The Impact of Shocks on Financial Capital 
Financial capital is an important means of coping with unexpected external events, but 
measuring it is difficult, especially if saving is not part of the data as in our case. Even though the 
ability to borrow and the amount of credit to be paid back depend on other assets serving as 
collateral and most likely a minimum level of education, it is the best measure we have for 
financial capital. Table 2.8 reports the results of estimating equation 3 for the log of amount of 
money borrowed that still needs to be paid back as the dependent variable. 
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Table 2.8: The impact of shocks on the logarithmic value of loans to be paid back (fixed effects 
estimates) 
Explanatory variables Husband  Wife  Joint  
(1) (2) (3) 
Flood –0.577 
(0.523) 
0.641 
(0.490) 
–0.729 
(0.492) 
Drought 1.038** 
(0.486) 
0.252 
(0.482) 
1.374*** 
(0.473) 
Cyclone –2.053*** 
(0.525) 
–1.973*** 
(0.464) 
–1.578*** 
(0.518) 
Death/illness 0.094 
(0.369) 
0.181 
(0.341) 
0.073 
(0.358) 
Dowry payment 0.459 
(0.879) 
–0.743 
(0.781) 
1.190 
(0.904) 
Remittance 1.854*** 
(0.463) 
0.905** 
(0.434) 
2.522*** 
(0.479) 
Inheritance/dowry receipt –0.708 
(0.773) 
0.811 
(0.884) 
0.271 
(0.752) 
Age of household head –0.016 
(0.025) 
0.020 
(0.024) 
0.042 
(0.034) 
Household size 0.108 
(0.250) 
–0.461** 
(0.210) 
0.265 
(0.261) 
Male-to-female ratio –0.575 
(0.429) 
–0.987** 
(0.394) 
–0.580 
(0.450) 
Dependency ratio –2.427 
(1.679) 
–1.615 
(1.546) 
–1.070 
(1.627) 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  
R-squared 0.087 0.082 0.113 
N 1,356 1,356 1,356 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the household level and are given in parentheses.  
**p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
The two most striking results of Table 2.8 are: cyclones are associated with lower outstanding 
credit, and the opposite is true for receiving remittances. Even though both of these findings 
appear surprising at first, they are possibly both rooted in less or more collateral being available 
when applying for a loan, respectively. An alternative explanation is that loans may be used to 
finance migration associated with remittances and that disaster relief after severe covariate 
shocks is effective enough for borrowing not to be necessary. Spouses of household heads are 
found to borrow less in families that are bigger and have a relatively high share of male 
members, possibly due to income diversification. 
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2.5. Conclusions 
Asset holdings as well as strategies to cope with external events differ depending on whether 
the household head or his wife is concerned, even when a shock affects the whole household. 
With respect to asset holdings and in line with the existing literature, we find men to hold more 
assets than their spouses in general and especially with respect to land, while jewellery is 
traditionally a female-owned asset. 
To investigate the effects of external events, we initially look at a comprehensive measure of 
asset holdings differentiated by who owns them; we subsequently disaggregate assets into land, 
non-land physical, and livestock assets; and finally disaggregate them into specific types of the 
latter two categories. The overall picture that emerges is that household heads’ physical assets 
are negatively affected by unexpected weather events, particularly by cyclones, and that assets 
owned by the spouses are drawn down to cope with the death or illness of family members. 
Expenses for weddings and dowries are found to be met by selling assets of household heads 
when measured crudely and smaller jointly owned livestock when investigating the specific 
types of assets. 
The fact that the results change and complement each other when moving from the 
comprehensive index of asset holdings to categories of assets and, finally, to specific types 
highlights the importance of substitution effects within a household’s asset portfolio. One 
important finding emanating from this is that larger animals and other assets employed in the 
generation of income, for example agricultural tools, are protected when coping with 
unexpected events, and especially household heads sell their consumer durables as they do not 
have to be as concerned with keeping assets that clearly belong to them (such as jewellery for 
women) but can focus on the economic well-being of the whole family. Interestingly, we also 
find that jointly owned assets are not drawn down easily and mostly in response to expected 
shocks, possibly due to an ad hoc agreement on their sale being difficult. 
As mentioned above, assets in the hands of women are often found to be beneficial to the well-
being of children with respect to health, education, and nutrition, which illustrates the 
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importance of programs aimed at protecting these assets or at encouraging female ownership 
of assets that are not easily drawn down to cope with shocks, for example land, through 
reforming and enforcing inheritance laws. Land ownership, in turn, may also enable women to 
be more active in financial markets due to collateral being available. Female asset holdings, 
relative bargaining power within families, and the position of women in Bangladeshi society in 
general are interrelated so the protection of female-owned assets may positively affect 
women’s social and human capital and vice versa, ultimately possibly even extending to an 
abolition of the tradition of paying dowries. The latter constitutes a large financial burden for 
the poor, and laws against the practice have been passed but, unfortunately, with little success. 
Trainings and the provision of credit may, furthermore, enhance asset holdings of both 
household heads and their spouses. In conclusion, our findings suggest that the design of 
policies to protect assets when facing a shock needs to take into account the different 
accumulation and coping strategies of men and women. 
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CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR ADAPTING TO AND COPING WITH SHOCKS AMONG 
AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS IN BANGLADESH 
 
3.1. Introduction 
With the increasing threat of climate change, farmers are required to find suitable adaptation 
strategies. Adaptation is an effective way to mitigate adverse long-term impacts of related 
shocks and to reduce vulnerability (Easterling et al. 1993; Rosenzweig and Parry 1994). Farmers 
must perceive climate change beforehand and be aware of the available adaptation strategies in 
order to choose from a given a set of options in their immediate regions. By reducing potential 
damage, adaptation provides rural people with a means for coping with the adverse 
consequences of climatic shocks and variability (IPCC 2001).  
Adaptation differs from coping in that the latter is typically a short-term measure taken 
immediately in response to shocks (flood, drought, death, etc.,) in order to survive, often by 
degrading existing resource bases. Adaptation is typically a long-term strategy adopted in 
anticipation of shocks for the purpose of securing livelihoods by using available resources 
efficiently (Taylor et al. 2010). Much attention has focused on farmer adaptation strategies to 
the effects of long-term climate change, some of which considers adaptation as a single 
decision, while other consider the available options as individual decisions. Relatively little 
attention has been given to the explicit distinction between short-term coping mechanisms to 
climatic shocks and long-term adaptation strategies to climate change based on empirical 
evidence, especially in Bangladesh. It is found that rather than migrating or changing livelihoods 
to off-farm activities, female-headed households chose fewer adaptation strategies in terms of 
both crop production and livestock management, and were more likely to undertake coping 
mechanisms in response to shocks, which has adverse long-term impacts on their livelihoods 
and well-being such as dietary changes and keeping children out of school.  
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Some recent literature on adaptation follows a top-down approach that begins assessing 
vulnerability from a global perspective (Carter and Mäkinen 2011). Other recent empirical 
research efforts have focused on bottom-up approaches to examine adaptation strategies at the 
local level, particularly in Africa (Maddison 2007; Nhemachena and Hassan 2007; Deressa et al. 
2008; Gbetibouo 2009). Many of these studies do not explicitly distinguish between short-term 
coping mechanisms and long-term adaptation strategies. A few studies have examined coping 
mechanisms for shocks, particularly for floods in Bangladesh (Brouwer et al. 2007; Santos et al. 
2011).  
To date there has not been any known empirical examination of farmer adaptation efforts to 
climate change or coping mechanisms for climatic and other negative shocks in Bangladesh 
using econometric analyses. Using the baseline survey featured in this research effort and a 
limited number of regressors, Thomas et al. (2013) identifies correlates of farmer crop 
production adaptation strategies, although their main focus is to observe the impacts of climate 
change on agriculture by modeling crop production. This research is expected to contribute to 
the understanding of the perceptions and the crop and livestock adaption strategies and coping 
mechanisms of Bangladeshi farmers from an empirical perspective by separately examining the 
factors associated with each. This research also examines how farmer perceptions can constrain 
the adoption of relevant strategies.  
Agriculture, which is heavily affected by climatic shocks in Bangladesh, accounts for 65% of the 
total labor force and approximately 20% of the country’s GDP (Yu et al. 2010). It has been 
predicted that a one-meter rise in sea level will inundate a 29,846 square kilometers of the 
country (15–17% of the national territory) and displace around 15 million people in the coming 
decades (IPCC 2001; Akter 2009).  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the existing 
relevant literature. Section 3.3 gives an overview of the study area and data source with 
summary statistics of variables included. The empirical findings is discussed in Section 3.4 and 
Section 3.5 concludes with some policy suggestions and limitations of the study. 
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3.2. Literature Review 
Adaptation is a dynamic social process of diversifying livelihood strategies to minimize the 
adverse effects of shocks through a range of public and private channels, planned and 
autonomous actions, collective and individual organization, and anticipatory and reactive 
responses. Adaptation of agricultural production is indispensable for the protection of the 
livelihoods of shock vulnerable people and to enhance their assets (Brouwer et al. 2007). The 
resilience of victims can be enhanced to mitigate the potential negative impacts of shocks by 
adjusting behaviors or changing habits (IPCC 1996; IPCC 2001; ISET 2008).  
The understanding that climate is changing is the precondition for farmers to adjust behavior. 
Farmers have to first identify the indicators which cause long term climate change among 
which, delayed rainfall, prolonged drought, and temperature extremes are the most severe 
threats to agriculture in Bangladesh (MoEF 2005). However, BCAS (2009) find that erratic 
temperature and precipitation, extreme weather events, and soil salinity are the most 
prominent effects of climate change in Bangladesh. The country has experienced a positive 
temperature increase trend, which will continue and intensify drought conditions in near future 
(Adger et al. 2003, Yu et al. 2010). Most papers on Africa find that farmers are perceptive of 
temperature and rainfall changes (Maddison 2007; Nhemachena and Hassan 2007; Gbetibouo 
2009). Among the very few studies on Bangladesh Thomas et al. (2013) find 80 percent of 
farmers are aware of the long term climate change through frequent flooding, cyclone, extreme 
temperature changes etc. Other than identifying the perception of farmers of whether and how 
climate is changing, this paper also tries to examine the underlying correlates of farmers’ 
perception.   
In spite perceiving climate change farmers sometimes find it difficult to adapt due to the 
associated costs. The IPCC (2001) defines these costs by the difference between total expenses 
and the value of benefit from the adoption of specific adaptation strategies, while it can also be 
defined as the maximum value of net revenues per acre under perfect perception of impending 
climate change minus the maximum value of net revenues per acre under current levels of 
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climate change perception (Kolstad et al. 1999; Maddison 2007). Fankhauser (1998) emphasizes 
the separation of the adaptation costs from any damages that may occur, even if the adaptation 
strategy is adopted. In this study crop and livestock adaptation by farmers includes different 
options that have distinct costs. Purchasing fertilizer or motorized pumps and constructing 
irrigation water reservoirs are the respective actions that determine the costs of adaptation in 
crop production, although there might still be reductions in yields during drought periods. 
Furthermore, there is the possibility of other natural disaster that might damage crops even 
though the farmers change planting dates. In the case of livestock production, even if farmers 
change feeds and use vaccinations there is still the possibility that a cyclone or other natural 
calamity could cause livestock deaths. Therefore for each adaptation strategy there is an 
expected benefit of reducing the negative effects of climatic shocks and increasing resiliency 
even though some unavoidable residual costs or damages may be incurred that in turn influence 
farmer decisions of whether or what strategies to adopt.  
To maximize the expected benefit it is imperative to choose effective adaptation strategies by 
integrating and combining basic knowledge with modern scientific idea in a complementary 
manner (Ajani et al. 2013). Various studies have identified crop adaptation strategy options such 
as changing crop varieties, planting trees, soil conservation, changing planting dates, irrigation 
water storage, crop diversification, and changing the area of land cultivated (Nhemachena and 
Hassan 2007; Deressa et al. 2008; Bryan et al. 2009; Gbetibouo 2009). These options are often 
categorized into two broad classes on the basis of crop diversification and management with 
evidence of complementarities among them (Nhemachena and Hassan 2007). Likewise, 
individual adaptation strategies are also categorized broadly as crop, livestock, livelihood, and 
land management (Bryan et al. 2011). Although the studies mentioned above took place in 
Africa, Thomas et al. (2013) identify changing crop varieties, increasing irrigation, and fertilizer 
application changes as the three major crop adaptation options in Bangladesh. To add with the 
existing finding in Bangladesh, this chapter examines associating factors in choosing adaptation 
options in crop and livestock including relevant factors along with group participation by male 
and female.  
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Both short-term coping mechanisms and long-term adaptation strategies can be interdependent 
in their effects on the livelihood outcomes of shock vulnerable people. Strategies adopted 
before adverse events are reflected in the immediate coping mechanisms in response to shocks, 
which in turn influence the decision about whether or not to adopt further adaptation 
strategies in future (Dercon 2010). Households not only cope with climatic shocks, but also to 
idiosyncratic shocks such as sudden changes in health, which is typically managed better than 
the covariate climatic shocks in Bangladesh (Santos et al. 2011). That study also find that poorer 
Bangladeshis are more affected by climatic shocks while having more limited ability to employ 
coping mechanisms, either by taking asset-smoothing strategies by sacrificing essential and 
nonessential consumption or by taking consumption-smoothing strategies by forgoing asset 
bases, often by reducing savings, selling assets, or borrowing. Unlike other studies, the present 
research distinguishes between immediate coping mechanisms and long-term adaptation 
strategies and investigates the correlates by using a broader definition of shocks and 
considering wider types of group membership rather than only concentrated in microcredit 
groups. 
 
3.3. Data and Summary Statistics 
The dataset used for this study includes all the geopolitical and agro-ecological areas in 
Bangladesh, making it more representative of the entire set of major climatic shocks than the 
very few past empirical surveys on coping and adaptation in Bangladesh (Brouwer et al. 2007; 
Santos et al. 2011). In order to assess farmer perceptions, adaptation strategies, and short-term 
coping mechanisms, information was collected on demographic characteristics, physical assets, 
livestock and land ownership, crop and livestock management practices, access to credit and 
extension services, prior experience with climatic and non-climatic shocks, perceptions about 
climate change, social, political capital, group participation by main adult male and female 
household members, and coping mechanisms. Of the sample households, 89% are headed by 
men and 11% are headed by women. Among the female-headed households about 32% are 
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widowed or separated, while in the rest of the cases husbands had left the home, mostly for 
work purposes.  
Farmers first have to understand the changing pattern of climate change so that they can timely 
adopt the appropriate adaptation strategies. Decreasing precipitation and increasing 
temperature are two widely used indicators of climate change. Household respondents were 
asked about their perceptions of changes in temperature, precipitation, and the overall climate 
over the previous 20 years. About 90% of the households reported perceiving that the overall 
climate had changed over the last 20 years. Almost 88% of households reported awareness that 
precipitation is decreasing and approximately 86% reported that temperatures are increasing 
(Table 3.1). The three most cited changes are more erratic rainfall, longer periods of drought, 
and later onset of seasonal precipitation. This is consistent with Thomas et al. (2013) by using 
the baseline survey of the present research, which is expected given that the follow-up survey 
was conducted only two years afterwards.  
Table 3.1: Household perceptions of precipitation and temperature changes over the past 20 
years in Bangladesh 
Household perceptions  Precipitation  Temperature 
Share of sample households (%) that…   
perceived an increase  8.5 86.0 
perceived a decrease  88.4 8.9 
perceived no change 2.8 4.6 
did not know 0.3 0.5 
Totals 100.0 100.0 
 
For the purposes of this study adaptation strategies are divided into two broad categories as 
crop management and livestock management strategies which also comprises a range of 
subcategories. The available crop adaptation strategies are subdivided into six categories on the 
basis of taxonomy used in the literature and the adaptation types as follows: changes in 
fertilizer for Aman, Aus, and Boro rice varieties;16 changes in crop variety, type and crop 
consumption; changes in field management such as increases in cultivable land, changes in field 
                                                          
16
 Aman, Aus, and Boro are the major rice varieties cultivated in Bangladesh. 
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location, planting trees for shade, constructing diversion ditches; and soil and water 
management techniques. Any changes in irrigation and water harvesting are categorized as 
irrigation change, changes in cultivation dates are categorized as change in cultivation dates, 
and labor related migration and off-farm employment are in a separate category.  
Table 3.2 shows the adaptation strategy differences between male- and female-headed 
households in 2010. Agriculture, mainly crop production, is mostly a male oriented occupation 
in Bangladesh and therefore females are typically less directly involved in field-level cultivation 
and management. This is not only due to social and cultural norms, but also because women 
have less access to productive capital such as natural capital and opportunities for 
implementing technological advances. Even though female participation in agriculture is 
growing, mostly among relatively deprived households and especially in the absence of adult 
male household members and particularly as wage laborers responsible for rice husking and 
managing post-harvest processing, women continue to have limited decision-making roles 
regarding adaptation strategies.  
In a recent study using a representative sample from Bangladesh, Sraboni et al. (2013) find that 
only about one-third of male respondents reported that they were disempowered with regard 
to making decisions regarding agricultural production relative to most women respondents. This 
reflects the relative disadvantage women face with respect to making decisions about whether 
to adopt crop adaptation strategies or which strategies to adopt, although the frequency of 
choosing to adopt adaptation strategies is increasing among women from 17% in 2010 to 26% in 
2012 (Table 3.2). Furthermore, female-headed households reported greater participation 
migratory labor and off-farm activities than male-headed households. 
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Table 3.2: Crop and livestock adaptation strategies by gender of the household head in 
Bangladesh, 2010 and 2012  
Adaptation strategy 
Male-headed 
households  
Female-headed 
households  
2010 2012 2010 2012 
Crop production adaptation      
Share of households (%) that...     
changed crop cycle timing  39 35 35 23 
changed fertilizer use 59 77 49 51 
changed crop  63 78 60 56 
used irrigation 65 64 54 50 
changed field management practices 29 40 26 30 
sought migratory or off-farm employment 16 14 19 24 
did nothing 8 6 26 17 
Livestock production adaptation  
Share of households (%) that...  
changed the number of livestock   12  07 
changed livestock feed  33  16 
sought veterinary intervention  38  27 
did nothing  50  62 
 
 
In addition to crop adaptation strategies, livestock adaptation strategies include changes in 
livestock number (increase or decrease in livestock breeding or herd/flock sizes), changes in 
livestock feed (any change, diversification, or supplementation of livestock feed) and changes in 
veterinary interventions. Livestock adaptations are less common than crop adaptation 
strategies, especially among female-headed households. Half of the male-headed households 
and a majority of female-headed households reported not adopting any adaptive livestock 
management strategies. Among those that did report adopting livestock adaptation strategies 
the most common is veterinary intervention, probably because of governmental and NGO 
initiatives for vaccination campaigns and other livestock veterinary support programs.  
All of the households that reported perceiving climate changing may not adopt adaptation 
strategies. Households were asked to explain the major constraints on the adoption of 
adaptation strategies, the three most frequent responses are summarized in Table 3.3. Financial 
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limitations and the lack of information on climate change and adaptation options are two of the 
major barriers reported by both male and female household heads. Female-headed households 
expressed greater concern about water shortages, which is consistent with FGD findings from a 
qualitative study in the study area by Davis and Ali (2014). This is probably because women are 
traditionally responsible for water collection in rural Bangladesh. Male household heads 
reported greater need for access to inputs, while female heads reported that access to land is 
the most important constraint, probably because in Bangladesh land is typically owned by 
males. Lack of information, labor and financial limitations, and poor irrigation are identified as 
the major constraints by a similar study in the Nile Basin of Ethiopia (Deressa et al. 2008). 
Table 3.3: Major constraints on the adoption of adaptive strategies for crop and livestock 
production by household head gender in Bangladesh  
 Male-headed  
households 
Female-headed households 
Constraints to adaptation  Ranked 
1st 
Ranked 
2nd 
Ranked 
3rd 
Ranked 
1st 
Ranked 
2nd 
Ranked 
3rd 
No information on climate change and 
adaptation options 
22.06 14.72 14.04 14.47 10.2 6.67 
Financial limitations 18.52 29.26 25.44 19.74 26.53 40 
Lack of access to inputs 17.23 10.37 21.05 13.16 14.29 6.67 
Lack of access to land 13.20 15.05 7.02 13.16 14.29 20 
Water scarcity in irrigation 12.88 15.38 8.77 21.05 24.49 0 
Lack of market 5.31 5.69 8.77 2.63 2.04 13.33 
Labor limitations 1.77 3.34 3.51 5.26 2.04 0 
Lack of access to credit 6.44 5.69 7.89 5.26 2.04 6.67 
Others  2.58 0.67 3.51 5.26 4.08 6.67 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The major coping mechanisms utilized by households in rural Bangladesh are selling assets; 
borrowing from friends, relatives, or other informal lenders; changing diets (including eating 
less); keeping children out of school; and seeking migratory or off-farm employment (Table 3.4). 
Summary statistics indicate that male-headed households typically employed coping 
mechanisms that do not affect consumption, mostly by selling assets. Female-headed 
households typically keep their asset bases intact by modifying their diet and keeping children 
out of school, which may have been due to the lack of assets to sell in response of shocks. Male-
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headed households are more likely to borrow money through informal lenders. Santos et al. 
(2011) also find borrowing to be a common coping mechanism in response to shocks in 
Bangladesh. Although a large percentage of the sample households did not take coping tools 
against shocks, still the variability of households who coped is more than one-third which 
validates our investigation. For each and every type of coping tools except food modification, 
the average physical and livestock assets of households which did not cope are higher than the 
copers. Although the maximum amount of physical and livestock assets of households who 
coped by modifying food habit is much lower than the maximum of non-copers. However, 
households having larger amount of land asset, cope by taking different types of mechanisms 
even though those with less land mostly coped by migrating elsewhere or by seeking off-farm 
employment. Therefore, it is not likely that the asset level induces the households to adopt the 
coping mechanisms. 17 
Table 3.4: Household coping mechanisms for shocks by household head gender in Bangladesh 
Coping mechanisms Male-headed households Female-headed households 
Share of households (%) that...   
did nothing 62 68 
sold assets 8 5 
borrowed from informal lenders 23 5 
Sought migratory or off-farm 
employment 8 13 
dietary modifications 5 8 
kept children out of school 5 15 
 
Literature on other developing countries has identified borrowing, selling assets, and forgoing 
children’s schooling as common coping mechanisms in response to shocks (Udry 1994; Jacoby 
and Skoufias 1997). The majority of the households reported that they did not employ coping 
mechanisms in response to shocks and this majority was greater among female-headed 
households (68%) than male-headed households (62%). These statistics support the research 
findings presented in Chapter 2 that wives typically own fewer assets than their husbands, 
which probably lessens their ability to cope with shocks through the use of assets. Santos et al. 
                                                          
17 Later in this chapter we have analyzed the determinants of coping mechanisms.  
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(2011) find that almost 59% of Bangladeshi households were unable to cope with climate 
change related shocks.  
Gender disparity is prevalent with respect to employing coping mechanisms among households 
responding to climate change related shocks. Household heads were asked which household 
member was responsible for employing coping mechanisms in the event of a shock. Among 
those who are responsible for employing coping mechanisms, husbands or adult males made 
the decision of whether or not to engage in a coping mechanism in response to flood among 
86% of the respondent households, while wives or adult females only initiated coping 
mechanisms among 3% of the respondents. Among male-headed households 89% reported 
employing coping mechanisms in response to drought and 84% in response to cyclones, 
whereas among female-headed households only 2% reported employing coping mechanisms in 
response to either phenomena.  
 
3.4. Empirical Findings  
We investigate the factors associated with the perception that climate change is occurring as 
well as with different crop and livestock adaptation strategies and the correlates of coping 
mechanisms of agricultural household heads. This begin with a simple probit model developed 
using the maximum likelihood method to identify the correlates of adaptation and coping 
strategies. Whether the adopted strategies are taken as complementary or substitutive is 
checked by applying bivariate and multivariate probit approaches in appropriate cases and 
these results are presented as the main results in this chapter. To address possible 
heteroscedasticity, a robust standard error is used throughout the analysis.  
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3.4.1. Description of Variables 
Most of the relevant studies in the field include physical capital, natural capital and livestock 
variables for similar analysis (Nhemachena and Hassan 2007; Gbetibouo 2009; Deressa et al. 
2010) even though there may be reverse causality or simultaneity among the different types of 
assets and the dependent variables. For example, current asset ownership might influence to 
the decision of whether or not to adopt adaptation strategies and vice versa. Therefore, the 
asset variables—physical capital, livestock, social capital, and political capital are calculated as 
‘leave out mean’ instead of a regular mean within each village based on the tendency of people 
from same village to have similar asset endowments. The ‘leave out village mean’ of each 
household’s asset base is the mean value of the rest of the household assets in the same village, 
excluding the household in question (Goldstein 1999, Jacobi and Mansuri 2006). The hypothesis 
behind using the leave out village mean technique is that, the percentage of assets of other 
households in the village is not in a direct cause-and-effect relationship between choosing 
adaptive strategies or coping mechanisms of a specific household (Quisumbing and McNiven 
2010). The robustness of the results is evaluated by using base year asset information, as well as 
by both including and excluding the asset variables in the models to minimize the simultaneity 
bias. The influence of group participation on perception, adaptation, and coping is examined by 
including group participation into the models and then to a broader extent by including social 
and political capital indices.   
To identify the factors influencing the perception of climate change and decisions of whether or 
not to adopt adaptation strategies and/or coping mechanisms, a set of explanatory variables are 
chosen according to relevance and on the basis of theory and existing studies. The independent 
variables include: gender, years of schooling, work experience, and age of the household head, 
household land ownership, physical assets (measured by an index generated using a principal 
component analysis [PCA]),18 livestock ownership (measured in tropical livestock units [TLU]), 
household access to agricultural extension services and credit, information on group 
                                                          
18 See Chapter 2 for physical asset index construction details. The results are largely robust from using the total value of 
household physical assets measured by the leave out mean at the village level. 
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participation, social and political capital of the main adult male and female household members, 
household experiences with climate change shocks, access to ICT, and training of main adult 
male and female household members.19 Basic summary statistics of the sample household 
characteristics are presented in Table A3.1 in the appendix.  
The social and political capital indices are constructed by applying a PCA in the similar way as 
the physical capital index mentioned above.20 Components included to construct the social 
capital index are: informal respondent networks, group membership costs, labor contributions 
to groups, regular meeting attendance, participation in group decision making, participation in 
community-based activities, whether or not respondents have trust in neighbors and fellow 
villagers, and whether or not group memberships are heterogeneous with respect to wealth and 
gender. The political capital index is based on information on: whether or not a respondent 
votes in national elections, attends local council meetings and protests, mentions local 
problems to the media or police, and whether or not respondents feel that their opinions and 
decisions are considered and valued by elites. Both indices are normalized to range between 
zero and one.  
Land ownership is defined as a binary variable based on whether or not the household owns 
more than 50 decimals of land, which reflects functional land ownership from the Bangladeshi 
perspective (Hossain et al. 2007; Quisumbing 2011).21 It is intuitive that choosing crop 
adaptation strategies is associated with whether farmers own plot rather than the size. 
However, the robustness of the results is also checked by household plot sizes.22  
Another PCA derived index is based on access to ICT by the primary adult household member of 
either gender using components such as: whether or not the respondent received information 
on markets and government from electronic media, whether or not he/she watched television 
                                                          
19 As not all of the household heads were married, the responsible adult male and female members of each household 
were directly asked for information on their membership and the extent of participation in formal and informal groups, and in 
voluntary and involuntary associations. 
20 See Chapter 4 for social and political capital index construction details. 
21 Decimal is a common measurement of land area in Bangladesh; one decimal is equal to 40.46 square meters. 
22 Note that the results are mostly robust based on the variable of total plot size of households calculated in the leave out 
village mean. 
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regularly, and whether or not the respondent used a mobile phones to make a call over the 
previous month. Similarly, whether or not the primary adult household member received 
training or not is indexed using the binary variables of receiving training on crop and livestock 
production over the last two years. Experience with climate change related shock is used as a 
control variable because shock affected farmers are expected to better understand the 
necessity of adopting adaptation strategies relative to farmers that has not experienced related 
extreme weather events.  
 
3.4.2. Determinants of Farmer Perceptions of Climate Change  
Perception is a prerequisite to implement adaptation strategies in agricultural production and 
therefore it is important to know which types of farmers are more likely to perceive climate 
change. For this study temperature increase and precipitation decrease are considered as two 
separate perception variables. To identify the correlates of farmer perceptions of climate 
change the binary dependent variable takes a value of one if the household head perceives that 
temperature is increasing or precipitation is decreasing over the last 20 years and a value of 
zero otherwise. However, the perception of increasing temperature and decreasing 
precipitation are likely to be correlated to one other, which is why the seemingly unrelated 
biprobit model is used. The analysis results are presented in Table 3.5.  
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.5 include farmer perceptions of climate change with asset 
variables calculated as ‘leave out mean,’ at the village level while columns (3) and (4) present 
the same as index value of asset. The results are consistent in terms of signs and statistical 
significance for all other variables in the first and last pairs of columns except for the livestock 
asset. Having livestock asset measured as ‘leave out mean,’ is positively and significantly 
associated with temperature increase and precipitation decrease, which is consistent with the 
findings of Gbetibouo (2009) in South Africa while household livestock in TLU does not show any 
association. Probably, the endogeneity inherent in the relationship drives the result. 
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Table 3.5: Marginal effects of farmer perceptions of climate change with group participation 
in Bangladesh 
 Seemingly Unrelated Biprobit model results 
Variable Temperature  
increase 
Precipitation 
decrease 
Temperature  
increase 
Precipitation 
decrease 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male-headed household  –0.072 
(0.217) 
–0.399* 
(0.238) 
–0.055 
(0.217) 
–0.389* 
(0.236) 
Age of HH head 0.008 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
–0.002 
(0.006) 
Years of formal education of HH head 0.017 
(0.015) 
–0.009 
(0.018) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
–0.009 
(0.018) 
Experience of HH head 0.002 
(0.006) 
–0.002 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
Whether or not HH functionally owns land  –0.074 
(0.128) 
0.199 
(0.132) 
–0.025 
(0.127) 
0.215 
(0.133) 
Physical asset index value (leave out village 
mean) 
0.720 
(0.927) 
1.291 
(0.989) 
  
Total livestock in TLU (leave out village mean) 0.323* 
(0.169) 
0.477*** 
(0.181) 
  
Physical asset index value   0.106 
(0.340) 
–0.260 
(0.390) 
Total livestock in TLU   –0.102 
(0.065) 
0.010 
(0.080) 
Access to credit –0.294** 
(0.142) 
–0.114 
(0.137) 
–0.315** 
(0.141) 
–0.132 
(0.136) 
Access to extension services –0.112 
(0.140) 
0.214 
(0.148) 
–0.079 
(0.138) 
0.247* 
(0.145) 
Affected by climatic shocks 0.212* 
(0.121) 
0.128 
(0.125) 
0.232* 
(0.122) 
0.140 
(0.124) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult male 0.756*** 
(0.188) 
0.541*** 
(0.201) 
0.803*** 
(0.188) 
0.566*** 
(0.199) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult female 0.135 
(0.362) 
0.380 
(0.418) 
0.083 
(0.367) 
0.397 
(0.405) 
Group participation by primary HH adult male –0.182 
(0.140) 
0.089 
(0.141) 
–0.184 
(0.141) 
0.077 
(0.140) 
Group participation by primary HH adult female 0.305* 
(0.181) 
0.422** 
(0.189) 
0.341* 
(0.178) 
0.449** 
(0.188) 
Wald chi2(28)         68.99***  68.76***  
Total observations 740 740 740 740 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
An important finding is that, access to information and technology by the primary adult male 
household member and group participation of primary household adult female are positively 
and significantly associated with the perception of both temperature and precipitation changes, 
which may reflect the importance of access to information in developing the perception of 
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climate change either by using technology or by coming in contact with others by actively taking 
part in groups. In particular, the positive significant association of group participation by primary 
household adult females with the perception of climate change may reflect the importance of 
group participation by women, which serves as a platform for women to develop outlook 
through social contacts. 
Surprisingly, access to credit is negatively associated with the perception of climate change, 
perhaps because the credit groups do not emphasize this issue or because households that have 
access to credit might have the means of overcoming problems associated with temperature 
increases such as the means to increase irrigation. It is counterintuitive that education has no 
effect on the perception of climate change, probably because farmers in the study area have an 
average of three years of formal education, which is very limited and therefore would not be 
expected to contribute to awareness of climate change and variability. Table A3.2 in the 
appendix summarizes the marginal effects of standard probit results, which are consistent to 
the main results of table 3.5.23 The results using ‘leave out village mean’ are robust for the 
relevant variables across the analyses. 
Tables A3.3 and A3.4 replicates the results of Tables A3.2 and 3.5 respectively by using social 
and political capital, which are the measures beyond group participation. In each of the tables, 
columns (1) and (2) report the results with respect to the leave out village mean value of asset 
variables, while columns (3) and (4) present the results with index values. Especially when 
measured with respect to the leave out village mean households with physical and livestock 
assets are more likely perceive precipitation decrease, probably because adequate rainfall is 
necessary for the ownership of agricultural tools such as motorized pumps or supplementary 
livestock fodder. Political capital of primary household adult males is positively associated with 
climate change perception, while social capital of the primary adult males and females are 
negatively associated with the climate change perception. It is possible that households with 
more social capital are less likely to be directly involved in farming activities or that the relevant 
groups do not emphasize building awareness of climate change.  
                                                          
23
 The results are evaluated by using base year physical asset value, livestock in TLU and household plot size in square 
meter and are largely consistent to the main results in Table 3.5. 
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3.4.3. Determinants of Crop Production Adaptation Strategies  
For identifying the associating factors of crop adaptation strategies a univariate probit analysis is 
used as a starting approach for each of the six different types of crop adaptation options 
mentioned earlier. Given a set of available options, it is unlikely that farmers adopt a single 
adaptation strategy at a time, but rather may consider a number of strategies as either 
complementary or substitutive. Individual estimation of each binary dependent variable does 
not take into account the relationships among adaptation options, which could be revealed 
using a multivariate probit model, which is also applied to each type of crop and livestock 
adaptation strategy.  
The marginal effects of the multivariate probit model using the resurvey data are presented in 
Table 3.6. Male-headed households are less likely to seek migratory labor opportunities or find 
off-farm employment which is also consistent with Table 3.4. Larger household size signifies 
greater available labor and thus has a significant positive association with farmers’ decisions to 
use fertilizer and manage fields as shown in columns (2), and (5) respectively of Table 3.6. The 
model estimates that each additional household member reduces the probability of adopting 
irrigation, a strategy that requires financial resources to adopt, by 8.4%. More household 
dependents reduces the probability of adopting crop production adaptation strategies, while it 
is logical that families with more elderly and young children are less likely to spend more on 
adopting new production strategies.  
Furthermore, households that own a meaningful amount of land, which is a durable and 
location specific asset, are less likely to relocate, seek migratory labor opportunities, or to seek 
off-farm employment, and are more likely to adopt individual adaptation strategies such as 
modifying the timing of cultivation cycles and irrigation. Household experiences with climate 
change related shocks and group participation among primary household adult males and 
females seem to be important factors associated with adopting crop production adaptation 
strategy, which is strongly and positively correlated to several adaptation options.  
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Table 3.6: Multivariate probit results for marginal effects of the determinants of group-based 
crop production adaptation strategies in Bangladesh, 2012 
Variables Crop cycle 
dates 
Fertilizer   Change 
crop 
variety 
Irrigation Field 
management 
practices 
Migratory/ 
off-farm 
employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male-headed households –0.062 
(0.215) 
0.238 
(0.208) 
0.125 
(0.211) 
0.082 
(0.193) 
–0.169 
(0.200) 
–0.703*** 
(0.218) 
HH size 0.009 
(0.028) 
0.061** 
(0.030) 
–0.026 
(0.030) 
–
0.084*** 
(0.028) 
0.060** 
(0.027) 
0.044 
(0.031) 
Male to female ratio 0.024 
(0.060) 
–0.010 
(0.062) 
–0.020 
(0.065) 
0.024 
(0.060) 
–0.019 
(0.060) 
–0.098 
(0.069) 
Age of HH head –0.006 
(0.005) 
–0.001 
(0.005) 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
–0.006 
(0.005) 
–0.005 
(0.005) 
–0.004 
(0.006) 
Years of formal education of HH head 0.002 
(0.014) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
–0.002 
(0.016) 
–0.012 
(0.014) 
0.028** 
(0.013) 
–0.013 
(0.016) 
Dependency ratio –1.100*** 
(0.300) 
–0.684** 
(0.324) 
–0.442 
(0.345) 
–0.579** 
(0.298) 
–0.355 
(0.286) 
–0.687** 
(0.334) 
Experience of HH head 0.000 
(0.005) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
–0.002 
(0.005) 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
Whether or not HH functionally owns 
land  
0.300*** 
(0.105) 
0.108 
(0.110) 
0.159 
(0.112) 
0.236** 
(0.107) 
–0.192* 
(0.104) 
–0.520*** 
(0.132) 
Physical asset index value (leave out 
village mean) 
0.354 
(0.294) 
0.358 
(0.336) 
0.225 
(0.321) 
–0.197 
(0.303) 
0.095 
(0.297) 
–0.204 
(0.350) 
Total livestock in TLU (leave out village 
mean) 
–0.037 
(0.058) 
0.056 
(0.057) 
0.186** 
(0.075) 
0.094 
(0.062) 
–0.026 
(0.057) 
–0.054 
(0.081) 
Access to credit –0.145 
(0.113) 
–0.090 
(0.121) 
–0.230* 
(0.127) 
–0.209* 
(0.117) 
–0.067 
(0.110) 
0.067 
(0.137) 
Access to extension services 0.177 
(0.113) 
0.091 
(0.125) 
0.237* 
(0.132) 
0.487*** 
(0.116) 
0.259** 
(0.111) 
0.194 
(0.147) 
Affected by climate change related 
shocks  
0.342*** 
(0.107) 
0.480*** 
(0.109) 
0.487*** 
(0.110) 
0.318*** 
(0.104) 
0.159 
(0.105) 
0.692*** 
(0.143) 
Training received by primary HH adult 
male 
0.899 
(0.656) 
20.183*** 
(6.521) 
0.065 
(0.992) 
–0.175 
(0.799) 
1.702** 
(0.735) 
–0.105 
(0.807) 
Training received by primary HH adult 
female 
0.093 
(0.359) 
0.372 
(0.458) 
1.738** 
(0.673) 
0.079 
(0.397) 
0.311 
(0.384) 
0.179 
(0.481) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult male 
(index) 
0.013 
(0.163) 
0.393** 
(0.177) 
0.130 
(0.176) 
0.152 
(0.158) 
–0.027 
(0.162) 
0.107 
(0.184) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult 
female (index) 
0.080 
(0.299) 
0.194 
(0.321) 
–0.408 
(0.350) 
0.164 
(0.311) 
–0.142 
(0.304) 
0.518 
(0.380) 
Group participation by primary HH 
adult male 
0.285** 
(0.118) 
0.208* 
(0.125) 
0.304** 
(0.127) 
0.366*** 
(0.120) 
0.216* 
(0.115) 
–0.052 
(0.141) 
Group participation by primary HH 
adult female 
0.440*** 
(0.138) 
0.060 
(0.150) 
0.241 
(0.153) 
0.233* 
(0.139) 
0.182 
(0.136) 
0.048 
(0.161) 
 Rho1  Rho2 Rho3 Rho4 Rho5 Rho6 
Rho1 1      
Rho2 0 .571*** 1     
Rho3 0 .446*** 0 .418*** 1    
Rho4 0 .463*** 0 .507*** 0 .385*** 1   
Rho5 0 .246*** 0 .197*** 0 .135*** 0 .063 1  
Rho6 0 .150** 0 .135** 0 .182** 0 .124** 0 .276*** 1 
Likelihood ratio test chi2(15) =  296.63***     
Total observations 740      
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
 *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Access to extension services, training opportunities for both men and women, and access to ICT 
by adult males are positively associated with adopting different crop production adaptation 
strategies, which are also consistent with other studies from Bangladesh and Africa 
(Nhemachena and Hassan 2007; Thomas et al. 2013). It is likely that increasing access to mobile 
phones and television broadcasting, male farmers have greater access to information and have 
greater awareness of adaptation options. Access to credit on the other hand is negatively 
associated with the decision to adopt crop production adaptation strategies and choosing 
irrigation as an adaptation strategy. 
The standard probit and multivariate probit model results, including for social and political 
capital are mostly robust with the main results in table 3.6 (tables A3.5 and A3.6 in the 
appendix).24 Surprisingly, social capital of primary household adult males is negatively 
associated with the adoption of crop production adaptation strategies, although social and 
political capitals of primary household adult females are positively associated with choosing 
alternative crop production adaptation options. By participating in social groups and political 
activities, women probably become more familiar with available adaptation options and are 
more likely to adopt the strategies. Political participation is associated with greater engagement 
in migratory labor among men, probably because it helps them form broader networks that 
enable increased mobility, even outside of their villages, by providing access to better 
information about seasonal migratory labor or off-farm employment opportunities.  
The correlation coefficients of the error terms from the multivariate probit model results are 
positive and statistically significant, which implies complementarity among the adaptation 
strategies. For instance, households tend to modify crop varieties or the timing of cultivation 
cycles simultaneously with irrigation or fertilizer application efforts. This supports the notion 
that adaptation strategies are mutually dependent, while the significant differences of the 
alternative adaptation strategy coefficients validate the model. Additionally, the results of the 
likelihood ratio test of dependence based on the log-likelihood values of the multivariate model 
                                                          
24
 The results are also evaluated by using base year physical asset value, livestock in TLU and household plot size in square 
meter and are largely consistent to the main results in Table 3.6. 
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results indicate that the model equations are connected, with at least one covariance of the 
error term being statistically significant.  
 
3.4.4. Determinants of Livestock Production Adaptation Strategies 
The major factors that influence livestock adaptation strategies are identified by the marginal 
effects from the probit model (first three columns of Table 3.7) and the multivariate probit 
results (last three columns in Table 3.7) based on the follow-up survey data. Unlike crop 
production adaptation strategies, gender of the household head does not have a significant 
relationship with the adoption of livestock adaptation strategies. Similar to the results for crop 
adaptation strategies, wealthier households (in terms of land, livestock, and physical assets 
ownership) adopt more livestock adaptation strategies. Access to extension services, training by 
adult female household members, and to ICT by adult male household members all increase the 
likelihood of adopting livestock adaptation strategies, probably because these are the means of 
increasing awareness of effective adaptation options and training is particularly helpful for 
women to adopt livestock feed options.  
Similar to crop adaptation, experience with climate change related shocks is significantly and 
positively related to the adoption of livestock adaptation strategies. People who had suffered 
shocks in the previous year might be more conscious of the advantages of adaptive measures to 
save their livestock from damage. Unlike crop adaptation, group participation has no influence 
on choosing livestock adaptation options. Probably, the groups that respondents participate in 
focus on crop rather than livestock production. Alternatively, respondents are more likely to be 
involved in crop production than livestock.  
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Table 3.7: Determinants of household livestock production adaptation strategies with group 
participation in Bangladesh, 2012 
 Probit  model results Multivariate probit model results 
Variable  Veterinary 
intervention 
 
Changes to 
livestock 
feed 
Changes in 
livestock 
Veterinary 
intervention 
Changes to 
livestock feed 
Changes in 
livestock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male-headed household 0.023 
(0.077) 
–0.018 
(0.079) 
–0.042 
(0.053) 
0.041 
(0.211) 
–0.060 
(0.225) 
–0.235 
(0.263) 
HH size –0.022** 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
–0.057** 
(0.028) 
0.005 
(0.028) 
0.019 
(0.038) 
Male to female ratio –0.038 
(0.023) 
0.004 
(0.021) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
–0.106* 
(0.064) 
0.014 
(0.062) 
0.042 
(0.076) 
Age of HH head –0.004** 
(0.002) 
–0.003 
(0.002) 
–0.002 
(0.001) 
–0.011** 
(0.005) 
–0.007 
(0.005) 
–0.010 
(0.007) 
Years of formal education 
of HH head 
–0.010** 
(0.005) 
–0.008* 
(0.005) 
–0.003 
(0.003) 
–0.028** 
(0.014) 
–0.025* 
(0.014) 
–0.017 
(0.017) 
Dependency ratio –0.043 
(0.116) 
–0.227** 
(0.106) 
–0.015 
(0.063) 
–0.131 
(0.310) 
–0.643** 
(0.310) 
–0.063 
(0.388) 
Experience of HH head 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
–0.001 
(0.007) 
Whether or not HH 
functionally owns land  
0.117*** 
(0.039) 
0.049 
(0.038) 
0.005 
(0.022) 
0.302*** 
(0.104) 
0.172 
(0.109) 
0.044 
(0.136) 
Physical asset index value 
(leave out village mean) 
–0.012 
(0.117) 
0.102 
(0.103) 
0.137** 
(0.058) 
–0.063 
(0.313) 
0.323 
(0.303) 
0.787** 
(0.372) 
Total livestock in TLU 
(leave out village mean) 
0.118*** 
(0.023) 
0.102*** 
(0.022) 
0.036*** 
(0.010) 
0.323*** 
(0.062) 
0.317*** 
(0.064) 
0.245*** 
(0.065) 
Access to credit –0.018 
(0.044) 
–0.027 
(0.040) 
0.032 
(0.021) 
–0.033 
(0.116) 
–0.050 
(0.117) 
0.228 
(0.152) 
Access to extension 
services 
0.103** 
(0.044) 
0.065 
(0.040) 
0.063** 
(0.027) 
0.283** 
(0.114) 
0.160 
(0.116) 
0.335** 
(0.147) 
Affected by climatic 
shocks 
0.163*** 
(0.037) 
0.057 
(0.037) 
0.078*** 
(0.020) 
0.448*** 
(0.109) 
0.184* 
(0.112) 
0.554*** 
(0.155) 
Training received by 
primary HH adult male 
–0.026 
(0.275) 
–0.061 
(0.225) 
0.190 
(0.127) 
–0.015 
(0.738) 
–0.165 
(0.649) 
1.186 
(0.812) 
Training received by 
primary HH adult female 
0.015 
(0.147) 
0.223* 
(0.136) 
0.054 
(0.072) 
0.065 
(0.396) 
0.721* 
(0.390) 
0.415 
(0.460) 
Access to ICT by primary 
HH adult male (index) 
0.009 
(0.061) 
0.165*** 
(0.057) 
0.055* 
(0.032) 
0.009 
(0.162) 
0.460*** 
(0.168) 
0.316 
(0.205) 
Access to ICT by primary 
HH adult female (index) 
–0.056 
(0.115) 
–0.096 
(0.105) 
0.041 
(0.062) 
–0.147 
(0.306) 
–0.273 
(0.307) 
0.227 
(0.392) 
Group participation by 
primary HH adult male 
0.049 
(0.044) 
0.053 
(0.041) 
0.000 
(0.023) 
0.120 
(0.118) 
0.150 
(0.120) 
0.015 
(0.145) 
Group participation by 
primary HH adult female 
0.071 
(0.053) 
0.024 
(0.050) 
–0.038 
(0.024) 
0.197 
(0.139) 
0.036 
(0.148) 
–0.277 
(0.193) 
    Rho1  Rho2 Rho3 
    Rho1  Rho2 Rho3 
Rho1    1   
Rho2    0 .585*** 1  
Rho3    0 .318*** 0 .269*** 1 
Likelihood ratio test  chi2(3) =   124.28 *** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.109 0.100 0.130  
Total observations 740 740 740 740   
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
 *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Larger households and household with older heads are less likely to adopt veterinary 
interventions. Older household heads may be less aware of the relatively new adaptation 
strategies or if they are aware, they may be less willing to modify their traditional practices. 
Thomas et al. (2013) find in crop adaptation that older farmers are likely to choose irrigation, 
while according to Gbetibouo (2009) the effects of farmer age are context specific. Similar to 
the determinants of crop adaptation strategies, the multivariate probit model results presented 
in Table 3.7 also exhibit complementarities among livestock production adaptation strategies.25  
Table A3.7 includes the broader results of group-based approaches including social and political 
capital of the primary household adult males and females rather than their participation in 
group activities. Social capital of adult females and political capital of both males and females 
are positively correlated to the adoption of livestock adaptation strategies. The social capital of 
adult males is negatively associated with livestock adaptation measures, however, which is 
similar to the results for crop adaptation measures (Table A3.7). It is likely that adult males with 
greater social capital have to spend more time participating in groups and community activities 
and are therefore less likely to raise livestock. Alternatively, livestock fodder and feeding is 
typically managed by female household members and therefore men are less likely to be 
involved. Larger household size is positively associated with strategies involving changes to 
livestock feed and household livestock portfolios, probably because of greater labor availability 
within the household to care for livestock.  
 
3.4.5. Determinants of Coping Mechanisms   
Among the coping mechanisms, selling assets; borrowing from friends, relatives, or informal 
sources; modifying or reducing diets; keeping children out of school; and seeking migratory or 
off-farm employment opportunities are the most reported (Table 3.4). Unlike a number of 
existing studies two-stage estimation by conditioning perception in the adaptation model is not 
                                                          
25
 The results are also evaluated by using base year physical asset value, livestock in TLU and household plot size in square 
meter and are largely consistent to the main results in Table 3.7. 
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applied. This is because almost 90% of farmers reported that they perceived climate change, 
which is quite a large percentage to use as a selection variable. The standard probit and 
multivariate probit models are used to be consistent with the previous analyses. In contrast to 
crop and livestock adaptation strategies presented in table 3.6 and 3.7, the results of the 
likelihood ratio test of dependence of the multivariate model in Table 3.8 do not indicate 
significant joint correlations. This implies that the model equations are not correlated to each 
other. The correlation coefficients of the error terms in the multivariate model in table 3.8 also 
exhibit a different scenario than the adaptation options in the previous analyses. Seeking 
migratory or off-farm employment and selling asset are weakly and negatively correlated with 
withdrawing children from school which reflects that the shock affected household either sell 
their asset or withdraw their children from school, however, there is no evidence of strong 
complementarity or substitution among the coping mechanisms. Tables 3.8 and A3.8 present 
the marginal effect of standard probit and multivariate probit model results respectively for the 
associated factors to cope with shocks using group participation. Tables A3.9 and A3.10 present 
the same by using social and political capital - a broader measure beyond group participation.  
The results of tables A3.8 - A310 are largely consistent for the common variables with the main 
result reported in table 3.8.26 Experiences with climatic and other negative shocks are 
significantly associated with household ability and willingness to take coping measures. 
Households are less likely to sell assets in response to floods, but rather would opt for dietary 
modifications. During seasonal drought periods in Bangladesh, people often cope by shifting to 
greater consumption of dried and processed foods. Households are more likely to keep their 
children out of school in response to cyclones and female-headed households are more likely to 
keep children out of school than male-headed households. This may be because women less 
access to income generating activities and inputs and technology in rural Bangladesh, which 
may make them more reliant on household labor, especially in times of shocks. However, non-
climatic negative shocks and expenses associated with dowries, weddings, and illness, which can 
represent a relatively large amount of money for rural households, are more likely to elicit 
                                                          
26
 We also checked the robustness of asset variables by using base year information and the results are supportive to the 
original results presented in Table 3.8. 
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coping responses than climatic shocks. Unlike covariate shocks, the idiosyncratic shocks affect 
smaller numbers of people who can probably adopt coping mechanisms such as selling assets or 
borrowing from neighbors or friends who are not affected by the same shock.  
Group participation by main adult male appears to cope by modifying diet while group 
participation by main female member cope with shocks by withdrawing her children from 
school. Probably because they want to save money by skipping school as well as are lack of 
extra labor in time of shocks (Table 3.8). On the other hand, households with trained adult 
female members are less likely to keep their children out of school, perhaps because they are 
better able to manage household matters without the help of child labor or else they are more 
aware of the detrimental effects of lost educational opportunities for their children. Those who 
are group members may be well aware of the long-term adverse impacts of most coping 
mechanisms such as selling assets, borrowing or, as a group member they might have a more 
extensive social network that can help them during crises, by improving access to credit or other 
financial or food assistance. 
The choice of coping mechanisms differs according to demographic characteristics. Households 
with older heads are less likely to borrow from informal sources and seek migratory labor 
opportunities because of mobility challenges. Households borrow more in response to shocks 
when the household head is male headed, with more dependents in family and has experienced 
negative non-climatic  shocks and those who have access to credit, probably with greater ability 
to repay loans from employers or credit organizations. Santos et al. (2011) also find that 
households with access to micro-credit institutions are better able to cope with shocks. 
Households with adult male members that have access to ICT are likely to choose consumption-
smoothing strategies and are more likely to sell assets rather than reducing or otherwise 
modifying diets or borrowing in response to shocks. Wealthy households in terms of more 
physical asset modify their dietary habit in to cope with shocks.   
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Table 3.8: Multivariate probit model results for correlates of household shock coping 
mechanisms based on group participation in Bangladesh, 2012 
Variable  Selling asset Informal 
borrowing 
Migratory/ off-
farm employment 
Reducing and 
modifying diet 
Withdrawing 
children from school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Affected by flood -0.346* 
(0.186) 
0.260* 
(0.158) 
0.087 
(0.200) 
0.602*** 
(0.193) 
0.045 
(0.228) 
Affected by drought -0.064 
(0.193) 
0.196 
(0.163) 
-0.011 
(0.206) 
0.612*** 
(0.223) 
0.423* 
(0.228) 
Affected by cyclone -0.272 
(0.212) 
0.058 
(0.178) 
0.286 
(0.210) 
0.317 
(0.230) 
0.815*** 
(0.210) 
Affected by non-climatic negative 
shocks 
0.412** 
(0.191) 
0.986*** 
(0.185) 
0.620 
(0.229) 
0.539** 
(0.239) 
0.673** 
(0.284) 
Affected by positive shocks -0.135 
(0.194) 
0.010 
(0.145) 
0.149 
(0.195) 
0.159 
(0.211) 
0.336* 
(0.196) 
Male-headed household -0.098 
(0.326) 
1.028** 
(0.416) 
0.345 
(0.320) 
-0.576 
(0.377) 
-0.741*** 
(0.275) 
HH size -0.105** 
(0.044) 
0.002 
(0.033) 
0.016 
(0.043) 
0.016 
(0.052) 
-0.055 
(0.057) 
Male to female ratio 0.044 
(0.094) 
0.024 
(0.077) 
0.111 
(0.097) 
-0.298** 
(0.126) 
0.055 
(0.120) 
Age of HH head 0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
-0.018** 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
Years of formal education of HH 
head 
0.017 
(0.020) 
-0.011 
(0.017) 
-0.031 
(0.021) 
-0.026 
(0.028) 
-0.031 
(0.024) 
Dependency ratio 0.063 
(0.451) 
0.814* 
(0.432) 
-1.233*** 
(0.457) 
-0.498 
(0.533) 
0.318 
(0.630) 
Experience of HH head 0.005 
(0.008) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
Whether or not HH functionally 
owns land  
0.218 
(0.163) 
-0.100 
(0.131) 
-0.088 
(0.171) 
0.078 
(0.209) 
0.132 
(0.197) 
Physical asset index value (leave 
out village mean) 
1.938 
(1.475) 
1.362 
(1.197) 
-0.412 
(1.496) 
4.382*** 
(1.375) 
-1.022 
(2.228) 
Total livestock in TLU (leave out 
village mean) 
0.046 
(0.196) 
-0.039 
(0.186) 
0.042 
(0.237) 
0.283 
(0.255) 
0.025 
(0.220) 
Access to credit 0.188 
(0.187) 
0.649*** 
(0.165) 
-0.360* 
(0.192) 
0.210 
(0.195) 
-0.017 
(0.199) 
Access to extension services 0.062 
(0.179) 
0.384*** 
(0.145) 
0.539*** 
(0.197) 
-0.059 
(0.219) 
0.182 
(0.219) 
Training received by primary HH 
adult male 
0.128 
(0.931) 
1.037 
(0.685) 
0.291 
(0.928) 
-13.244 
(9.867) 
-1.399 
(1.094) 
Training received by primary HH 
adult female 
0.042 
(0.492) 
-0.197 
(0.453) 
-0.370 
(0.816) 
0.069 
(0.547) 
-1.898** 
(0.739) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult 
male (index) 
0.520** 
(0.265) 
-0.370* 
(0.215) 
-1.008*** 
(0.252) 
0.305 
(0.346) 
0.062 
(0.297) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult 
female (index) 
-0.720 
(0.557) 
-0.256 
(0.396) 
0.532 
(0.500) 
0.204 
(0.571) 
0.336 
(0.580) 
Group participation by primary HH 
adult male 
0.095 
(0.194) 
0.021 
(0.147) 
-0.127 
(0.194) 
0.545** 
(0.228) 
0.273 
(0.222) 
Group participation by primary HH 
adult female 
0.131 
(0.221) 
-0.169 
(0.167) 
-0.009 
(0.208) 
0.304 
(0.250) 
0.610*** 
(0.214) 
 Rho1  Rho2 Rho3 Rho4 Rho5 
Rho1 1     
Rho2 0.049 1    
Rho3 –0 .182 –0 .105 1   
Rho4 0 .132 –0 .125 0 .331 1  
Rho5 -0 .281* –0 .227 –0 .092* -0 .069 1 
Likelihood ratio test chi2(10) = 
9.58 
    
Total observations 740 740 740 740  
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Households with more livestock are more likely to keep their children out of school, possibly 
because they rely on child labor for caring for their livestock, especially when subject to shocks 
(Tables A3.9 and A3.10 in the appendix). Social capital of primary household adult males and 
females have a negative relationship with borrowing from informal sources, selling assets, or 
withdrawing children from school, which ultimately is likely to have positive long-term impacts 
on household well-being. Women with greater social and political capital are more likely to 
engage in migratory or off-farm employment, probably because they have more developed 
social networks and better access to information about income generating opportunities.  
Interestingly, political capital among primary household adult men is positively correlated to 
borrowing in response to shocks. Men likely benefit from their social status in their community, 
and as members of a political group they can find more lending sources than those who are not 
active in political groups especially in the context of Bangladesh. From this analysis of the 
determinants of coping mechanisms it appears that alternative options to cope are largely 
independent of each other. 
 
3.5. Conclusions  
In this chapter the determinants of long-term adaptation strategies and short-term coping 
mechanisms among agricultural households in Bangladesh are empirically explored. The results 
indicate that Bangladeshi farmers (especially those with assets and access to credit, extension 
services, and ICT; greater female group participation; and more exposed to climate change 
related shocks) typically already perceive that climate change is occurring, which also supports 
the previous results based on the baseline data from Thomas et al. (2013) and the qualitative 
study of Davis and Ali (2014). The latter study also identifies factors that constrain the ability of 
male and female household heads to adopt adaptation strategies, such as the lack of 
information about adaptation and climate change, financial shortcomings, the lack of access to 
inputs, and shortages of water which is in line with our findings.  
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Participating households choose more crop adaptation strategies rather than strategies for 
livestock, especially those that participate in social groups, among which male-headed 
households cope and adopt adaption strategies more than female-headed households. This may 
simply be due to the fact that the groups they participate in are more oriented towards crop 
than livestock production adaptation. Social capital among adult males, which is more than 
mere group participation, is negatively associated with adopting different crop and livestock 
adaptation strategies; whereas social capital among adult females and political capital among 
both adult males and females is positively associated with adoption of adaptive strategies. 
Social capital among both adult males and females is negatively associated with coping 
mechanisms such as selling household asset bases, borrowing from informal sources, and taking 
children out of school as opposed to generating alternative income through seeking migratory 
or off-farm employment. Households are more likely to engage in coping mechanisms for 
dealing with idiosyncratic non-climatic shocks rather than for covariate climatic shocks, which 
supports the findings of Santos et al. (2011), although experiences with the latter form of shocks 
is associated with the adoption of long-term crop production adaptation strategies. 
Furthermore, although farmers often choose to adopt a number of complementary adaptation 
strategies, coping mechanisms are typically pursued independently. 
These findings suggest that greater access to information and means of communication can help 
farmers perceive climate change and adapt by modifying how they manage the production of 
crops and livestock. Similarly, training opportunities for women could encourage the adoption 
of livestock production adaptation strategies, which is less common among women in the study 
area. In addition, given that households primarily cope with climatic shocks by modifying their 
diets, training opportunities could also help households learn to store food for periods of 
negative shocks.  
Increasing food aid and other relief during times of negative shocks could help household 
members avoid the need to skip meals or eat less—a practice that is even more prevalent in 
response to negative non-climatic shocks—while at the same time protecting household asset 
bases and per capita consumption levels. Given that social capital among women is positively 
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associated with the adoption of adaptation strategies, awareness campaigns targeting women 
could be offered by local organizations and broader media outlets on a range of subjects, such 
as the long-term detrimental impacts of keeping children out of school or reducing food intake.  
Participation in social groups by both men and women is an important factor associated with 
the adoption of crop adaptation strategies, and participation by women is particularly important 
for enhancing perceptions of climate change, which should be encouraged by the government 
through appropriate policy. Government policies to improve household access to extension 
services should be pursued, which would improve and diversify knowledge among farmers 
about innovative adaptation strategies for both crop and livestock management. Improving 
opportunities for households to generate off-farm income could provide another strategy for 
mitigating negative shocks. The analyses do not disaggregate data by gender of farmers who 
adapt and cope, which might be important for further investigation given the growing 
contribution of women in agricultural sector in Bangladesh. Future research efforts using panel 
data and data disaggregated by gender of farmer will improve understanding of the 
complexities of mitigating climate change and other shocks. 
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CHAPTER 4. PROTECTING ASSETS AND ENHANCING WELFARE: THE GENDER-DIFFERENTIATED 
POTENTIAL OF GROUP-BASED APPROACHES27 
 
4.1. Introduction   
Social capital generated through group membership is an important tool of risk management in 
developing countries. In particular, group based approaches, which consist of the participation 
in social groups and political parties (Verba et al. 1978), can serve to increase risk awareness 
and to offer coping strategies for different types of risk to rural households (Bhattamishra and 
Barrett 2008), for example related to climatic risk. While studies on the relationship between 
group participation and household welfare exist, the fact that the participation of men and 
women in groups may have different impacts has not been explicitly addressed (e.g. Grootaert 
1999, Narayan and Pritchett 1999), a gap this chapter attempts to fill. To be precise, factors 
associated with participation are identified in typically male and typically female groups, and 
investigate the gender-differentiated impact of social and political capital on household welfare, 
as well as on the welfare of household heads and their spouses within households, paying 
particular attention to addressing the endogeneity inherent in the relationship. The result 
suggests that social capital is beneficial for household welfare in general and particularly so for 
assets of household heads, and that this effect is not merely driven by the participation in 
groups but also by other aspects of social capital such as networks. 
Group membership offers a way of building capital for those who do not possess or have access 
to physical and natural capital, or those with low levels of human capital (Anderson et al. 2002). 
To be precise, participation increases social capital (Godquin and Quisumbing 2008) and some 
groups provide credit and training that may be used as collateral to invest in other forms of 
capital. Membership in groups may also be a way of managing natural capital by offering 
information and technology, of strengthening human capital through trainings and information, 
and of increasing financial capital, thereby increasing income and, in turn, wealth. Group-based 
                                                          
27
 This chapter of the thesis strongly builds on ‘Protecting Assets and Enhancing Welfare: The Gender-Differentiated 
Potential of Group-Based Approaches’ a research paper coauthored with Julia Anna Matz.  
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microfinance programs, for example, often increase the earnings of group participants by 
investing in assets necessary for small-scale income generating activities such as livestock, 
sewing machines, and looms (Anderson et al. 2002).  
With respect to the characteristics of participants, risk uniformity among group members allows 
participants to share ex ante measures and information (Stiglitz 1990), whereas asset rich and 
asset poor members in the same group may pool risk better ex post by offering financial support 
within groups if needed (Zeller 1998). The importance of group activities therefore extends 
beyond the purely social aspect, which lays the foundation for this study. 
The chapter is structured as follows: the existing literature on the relationship between social 
and political capital and household welfare are reviewed in the following section and the 
household survey data used are presented in Section 4.3. The empirical strategy, including 
discussions of the endogeneity inherent in the relationship and of the results, is presented in 
Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2. Relation of the Study to the Existing Literature 
Even though there is broad consensus on the concept, there are different definitions of social 
capital. For Coleman (1990), social capital is given by the mutual relationship between 
individuals that enables them to achieve common goals. Similarly, Putnam (1995) sees it as a 
collective form of capital enhancing the collective benefit, while Lin (1999) takes a more 
individualistic view and defines it as an asset helping individuals to reach their personal goals. 
Both Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1995) stress trust, personal relations between group 
members, and social norms as important elements of social capital. In line with this, Putnam 
(1993) states the importance of considering the nature of participation, and group structure and 
density, and Narayan and Pritchett (1999) combine group density at the village level, the 
heterogeneity of groups with respect to income and kin, and the degree of effective group 
functioning into a social capital index. Grootaert (1999) extends the definition by Narayan and 
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Pritchett (1999) by adding the costs of participation and the degree of orientation of groups 
towards community interests.  
Besides membership in social groups disseminating knowledge or information on strategies to 
cope with shocks and to adapt to climate change as mentioned above and by, for example, 
Adger (1999), Aker (2005), and Schoon (2006), frequent interactions and close physical 
proximity among group members enable the identification of the most vulnerable among them, 
which improves targeting of assistance (Bhattamishra and Barrett 2008). In addition, Putnam 
(1995) mentions that group activities often act to increase trustworthiness within and the well-
functioning of groups.  
A concept that is related to social capital is that of political capital (Verba et al. 1978), which 
may complement social capital in strengthening resilience to adverse events. Booth and Richard 
(1998) define political capital as the commitment to democratic norms, to hold and exercise 
voting rights, to participate in campaigning activism, and to contact public officials. Birner and 
Wittmer (2003) take a very similar but slightly broader point of view and define political capital 
to include electoral power, the ability to organize demonstrations and public rallies, to lobby 
decision makers and administrative officials, and to influence or create ideologies that may 
influence public opinion and attract international support. The participation in groups often 
works as a stimulator to these factors, for example by reinforcing the knowledge of citizen’s 
rights. 
Besides the mentioned advantages of group membership, there are also other aspects that 
need to be considered, for example vertical relationships of power between male and female or 
poor and affluent members, many groups being informal, membership not guaranteeing the 
acquisition of social capital, and costs associated with membership. Different levels of power 
within groups may, for example, hamper the accumulation of social capital and Ostrom (1990) 
mentions that, if there is a lack of communication and trust or disagreement about the common 
interest among members, group-based approaches may fail. Similarly, Meinzen-Dick et al. 
(2012) mention that power structures inherent in communities may be translated to groups, 
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thereby excluding the already marginalized also from benefits accruing from group 
membership. Bhattamishra and Barrett (2008) also points out that the poor, women, and 
members of ethnic minorities are often excluded from participating in groups and the resulting 
benefits. In line with this, Quisumbing et al. (2008) find that poor people participate in fewer 
groups and have smaller networks than households with more human and physical capital in the 
Philippines. Furthermore, groups involve costs, which may contribute to the poor not 
participating. Besides the direct costs accruing to members in the form of fees, Weinberger 
(2000) mentions the costs associated with communication, compromising, and cooperation 
from the point of view of organizations, where, for example, the size of group and their 
heterogeneity matter. 
A more general concern is that investment in adaptive measures may also be discouraged 
through strong networks with neighbors and friends due to the dissemination of conflicting or 
confusing information (Di Falco and Bulte 2013). Furthermore, the ability of group-based 
approaches to influence individual adaptation strategies is limited due to the focus on the 
encouragement of group-based adaptation through the enforcement of social norms and the 
practice of collectively oriented strategies (Agarwal and Perrin 2008, Nam 2011). In addition, 
social funds are often spent on coping with challenges related to, for example, population 
growth; increasing mobility, and frequent climatic shocks, rather than on ameliorating 
community-based risk (Bhattamishra and Barrett 2008).   
When it comes to factors associated with participation, much of the literature has focused on 
characteristics of the household rather than the individual (e.g. Grootaert 1999, Bandyopadhay 
et al. 2004, Aker 2005, Quisumbing et al. 2008). Bandyopadhay et al. (2004), for example, find 
different indicators of economic wellbeing and human capital, the participation rate within the 
village, and the loss of livestock through wild animals to be positively associated with the 
participation in community conservation programs. Weinberger (2000), on the other hand, 
focuses on individual characteristics such as age, education, and a within-household bargaining 
power index, besides household-level ones such as wealth and household size when 
investigating group membership.  
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Paying attention to gender-differences is of importance due to the different roles and 
responsibilities, and thereby different drivers of group membership, of men and women, 
however. With respect to formal groups in the Philippines, Godquin and Quisumbing (2008) find 
wealth and human capital to be positively associated with group membership in general and, to 
be more specific, education to have a particularly positive effect on the membership of women 
in groups and relatively poor men to be less likely to participate in productive groups. 
Furthermore, exposure to shocks tends to increase female participation. Quisumbing (2009) 
supports the latter finding with data from Bangladesh, with the opposite effect of shocks on the 
likelihood of men participating. In contrast to the findings of Godquin and Quisumbing (2008) in 
the Philippines, she also finds poor households, on average, to be more likely to be group 
members in Bangladesh, and for education and land ownership to positively impact on the 
participation rates of household heads. In addition, Quisumbing (2009) states that there are 
more female participants in formal groups founded by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
This, however, may be due to the fact that the data were based on an impact evaluation of the 
activities of NGOs, which limits the generalizability of the findings and is where this chapter aims 
to contribute. 
Relating social capital to household welfare, Miller et al. (2004) state that group membership 
may lead to households exiting poverty and becoming more resilient to shocks (cited in 
Bradshaw 2006). Similarly, Narayan and Pritchett (1999) find a positive association between 
social capital measured by an index combining the frequency of interactions with groups and 
characteristics relating to their structure, and household welfare in Tanzania. Grootaert (1999) 
adds to these results by disaggregating social capital and including a larger number of group and 
individual characteristics, for example the number of groups a household participates in. The 
author states social capital to benefit household welfare in the long run through access to credit 
and an increase in asset accumulation, which differs, however, by whether membership is 
mandatory as stipulated by the government or voluntary with the latter being more beneficial. 
Adding to this by including trust within groups, Olawuyi and Oladele (2012) find that distrust 
among members is widespread and harmful to welfare in Nigeria. Similarly to the current study, 
Zeller et al. (2001) look at Bangladesh, but focus on group-based financial institutions and do 
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not pay attention to gender differences apart from controlling for the gender of the household 
head. They find positive associations of membership with welfare, specifically through better 
nutrition, health, and children’s education. 
 
4.3. Data  
The household survey data collected in 2012 among 800 agricultural households is used for this 
chapter. The earlier round of data from 2010 cannot be used for this study, however, due to the 
absence of crucial information for this investigation such as details on the participation in 
groups and on social and political capital. The data collected in 2012, however, includes 
information on individual membership in groups as well as individual asset ownership besides 
the rather standard questions on, for example, household structure and characteristics. Basic 
summary statistics of the characteristics of the households in the sample are presented in Table 
A4.1 in the appendix. In the remainder of this section we focus on presenting the variables 
related to group membership and social and political capital, all other variables used in the 
estimation are presented when the empirical strategy is discussed. Note that the sample 
exclusively consists of households with male, married heads. 
 
4.3.1. Group Membership  
Household heads and their spouses were directly asked about their membership and extent of 
participation in formal and informal groups, and in both voluntary and involuntary associations. 
Furthermore, they were asked detailed questions about the activities, characteristics, costs, and 
benefits of the two most important groups they participate in. Household heads participate in 
one to two groups on average, while their spouses are only involved in one as presented in 
Table A4.1 in the appendix. Table 4.1 displays group membership rates of household heads, 
spouses, and any household member in different types of groups. It is obvious that farmer 
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groups, credit groups, and religious groups are the most important ones in terms of relative 
participation, while the nature of participants differs greatly. While farmer groups appear 
oriented towards male participation (indicated by 46% of household heads being members), 
credit groups are much more important for women with 30% of the spouses of household heads 
being members. The latter is expected because of the large prevalence of credit groups targeted 
at women, because of these groups having been established, in most cases, by NGOs in 
Bangladesh, and because women’s assets are more vulnerable to depletion in the presence of 
adverse events (see e.g. Rakib and Matz 2014). In general, group membership is widespread 
with 78% of household heads and 43% of their spouses being members of at least one group. 
Table 4.1: Group membership rates of household heads, their spouses, and any household 
members  
Type of group HH heads Spouses Any household member 
Farmer group 46.1 0.3 46.4 
Credit group 5.3 30.2 34.7 
Religious group 13.6 2.8 16.4 
Women’s group 0 5.0 5.1 
Political group 5.1 0.2 5.3 
Community group 2.8 0.8 3.6 
Any group 78.0 43.3 89.4 
Notes: All figures are percentages. 
Costs of group membership for participants accrue both in the form of cash (registration and 
membership fees and contributions to group funds measured in Bangladeshi taka), and in labor 
contribution to group activities (measured in hours per week).28 While a larger proportion of 
female respondents pay registration fees, their size is bigger for household heads than for their 
spouses conditional on payment (see Table 4.2). With respect to the monthly obligatory 
payment, female respondents are slightly more likely to pay these but they report very similar 
amounts as their husbands, while the mostly voluntary yearly contribution is higher for 
household heads, who are also much more likely to pay. On the other hand, household heads 
                                                          
28
 One US-dollar corresponded to 81 Bangladeshi Taka in September 2012 (International Monetary Fund 2012). 
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are less likely to contribute labor to group activities but, if they do, they spend more time on 
this than their wives. 
Table 4.2: Costs of participation in the most important group 
   HH heads  Spouses   
Type of costs Percentage of 
heads paying/ 
contributing 
Mean Std. Dev. Percentage of 
spouses paying/ 
contributing 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Registration fees in taka 14 339.6 769.8 54 73.2 129.6 
Monthly payment in taka 26 97.5 175.8 38 107.0 98.9 
Yearly contribution in taka 18 5248.1 41192.9 7 640.2 433.5 
Weekly labor hours  51 1.4 1.7 78 1.0 0.9 
 
Table 4.3 presents the perceived benefits of group membership as reported by household heads 
and spouses in relation to their self-reported most important group. Almost a third of 
household heads who participate in groups find them to improve household welfare, while less 
than 14% of spouses mention this. For female respondents, on the other hand, group 
membership appears to be more important to cope with shocks as almost a quarter of them 
state this as a main benefit of their most important group. Other main advantages of groups are 
that they are sources of information and benefit the community, where it has to be noted that 
these were mainly mentioned by male respondents. 
Table 4.3: The benefits of group membership 
Type of benefit HH heads  Spouses  
Improve current household livelihood 31.15 13.86 
Important in times of shocks 16.67 24.14 
Source of information 15.26 4.36 
Benefits the community 13.24 1.87 
Enjoyment or recreation 2.65 1.4 
Other benefits 1.09 0.62 
Notes:  All figures are percentages. 
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4.3.2. Group Membership and Shock Resiliency 
Table 4.4 and 4.5 show the percentage of households affected by different types of shocks 
reported in the base year and in the resurvey year respectively, with respect to the date of 
becoming member in the very first group. Given shorter recall period and yearly nature of the 
weather shocks, the respondents were asked how many times in the past five years the listed 
weather events affected and in which year it was the most devastating in nature. While the 
recall periods differ between table 4.4 and 4.5 and other underlying factors might influence 
group membership, we cannot establish any causal relationship.29 Households involved with 
groups for longer time seem to be more resilient to negative shocks between 2006 and 2010 
reported in 2010 and to shocks between 2011 and 2012 reported in 2012. In the base year, 5 
percent of households among those who are affected by flood in last five years have been group 
members for more than 40 years while 48 percent of the flood affected households became 
participants after 2000. Similarly, for other negative shocks, the longer period of group 
membership is positively associated with less exposure of the households to shocks.  
Table 4.4: Percentage of households affected by different types of shocks from 2006 to 2010 
reported in the baseline with respect to their year of joining in groups 
 Climate change shocks Non-climatic negative shocks Positive shocks 
Joining period Flood  Drought  Cyclone  Death/illness Dowry payment Remittance  Inheritance  
From 1960 to 1970 5 2 3 2 0 0 0 
From 1971 to 1980 6 8 6 9 16 11 6 
From 1981 to 1990 18 12 7 13 5 18 24 
From 1991 to 2000 23 26 24 31 21 21 29 
From 2001 to 2010 48 52 60 45 58 50 41 
Up to February 2011 11 10 9 9 10 18 19 
Notes:  All figures are percentages. 
 
Households affected by shocks reported in the resurvey year shows similar trend. It is 
noticeable that, in both tables, remittance and inheritance increased with the latest group 
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 Later in the chapter we analyzed the correlates of group participation and its impact on household welfare in detail. 
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memberships. Probably, the provisions of immigration increased day by day or alternatively 
with improvement of internet and communication, the information of migration is more 
available to mass population.  
Table 4.5: Percentage of households affected by different types of shocks from 2011 to 2012 
reported in the resurvey round with respect to their year of joining in groups 
Joining period Flood  Drought  Cyclone  Death/illness  Dowry payment Remittance  Inheritance  
From 1960 to 1970 2 2 3 2 0 3 4 
From 1971 to 1980 4 6 8 6 7 9 8 
From 1981 to 1990 13 11 6 8 11 14 19 
From 1991 to 2000 20 21 20 25 15 15 8 
From 2001 to 2010 41 41 40 42 44 37 27 
From 2011 to 2012 5 10 9 9 16 14 23 
Notes:  All figures are percentages. 
 
 
4.3.3. Social and Political Capital 
To measure social and political capital several characteristics of groups and the nature of 
membership are combined into separate indices for social and political capital, and a 
combination of the two, using a principal component analysis.30 To be precise, the nature of the 
respondent’s network,31 the payment of membership costs, labor contributions to the group, 
whether a member is an active co-decision maker within the group and whether he attends 
meetings regularly, whether the individual participates in community-based activities, whether 
he generally has trust in neighbors and fellow villagers, and whether groups participated in are 
heterogeneous with respect to wealth and gender are components of the social capital index. 
Information on whether a respondent votes in national elections, attends local council meetings 
and protests, mentions local problems to the media or police, and whether he believes his 
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 The social and political capital indices are constructed like the physical asset index used in Rakib and Matz (2014). 
31
 Indicator variables such as whether there are close friends and neighbors the respondent can borrow from in times of 
need, whether somebody would mind the respondent’s children if necessary, and whether other people seek help from the 
respondent if necessary give information on the respondent’s informal network.  
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opinions and decisions are considered and valued by elites, forms the political capital index. 
Both indices as well as the combined one are normalized to range between zero and one. 
Table 4.6 presents average values of the social and political capital indices by different 
categories of individuals and households. It shows, for example, that the index of social capital 
takes a value of 0.33 for literate household heads and a value of 0.30 in the case of illiterate 
ones. It is apparent that male respondents hold more social and political capital, on average, 
than female ones, and that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship with age. Interestingly, 
having experienced climatic or other negative shocks is associated with higher social and 
political capital, which may be due to negatively affected household relying relatively strongly 
on group-based approaches in coping with adverse events.32  
Furthermore, while social capital of head increases with wealth measured by both consumption 
expenditure and household physical asset; this is not the case for spouses or political capital 
(Table 4.6). Therefore, being in the same household while social or political capital of head 
increases, spouses’ do not which lead us to assume that head and spouse are different entity 
even though they are members of the same household. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 The category “non-climatic negative shocks” comprises death or illness of family members and dowry payments. 
Remittances, inheritances, and the receipts of dowries are classified as “positive shocks”. Please see Rakib and Matz (2014) for 
more detail on the nature of shocks and their effects on asset holdings of household heads and their spouses. 
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Table 4.6: Values of the social and political capital indices for household heads and their 
spouses by binary individual and household characteristics 
 Social capital Political capital 
 HH heads Spouses  HH heads Spouses  
Literacy of respondents     
Literate 0.33 0.27 0.50 0.47 
Illiterate 0.30 0.26 0.48 0.47 
Age of respondents     
25 and below  0.33 0.25 0.45 0.44 
26 to 40 0.34 0.28 0.52 0.47 
41 to 55 0.36 0.27 0.52 0.48 
56 and above 0.34 0.26 0.49 0.47 
Prevalence of shocks     
Affected by climatic shocks  0.35 0.28 0.52 0.47 
Not affected by climatic shocks 0.32 0.25 0.49 0.47 
Experienced non-climatic negative 
shocks 
0.34 0.29 0.51 0.47 
Not experienced non-climatic negative 
shocks 
0.34 0.27 0.50 0.47 
Experienced positive shocks 0.37 0.30 0.49 0.47 
Not experienced positive shocks 0.33 0.26 0.52 0.47 
Quintile of household consumption expenditure per capita  
1
st
 quintile 0.28 0.27 0.50 0.47 
2
nd
 quintile 0.34 0.28 0.51 0.47 
3
rd
 quintile 0.34 0.27 0.50 0.47 
4
th
 quintile 0.35 0.28 0.52 0.47 
5
th
 quintile 0.39 0.27 0.52 0.47 
Quintile of household total physical 
asset 
    
1st quintile 0.27 0.27 0.48 0.46 
2nd quintile 0.31 0.27 0.49 0.47 
3rd quintile 0.31 0.26 0.49 0.46 
4th quintile 0.34 0.27 0.51 0.47 
5th quintile 0.36 0.25 0.50 0.47 
Notes: All figures are average values of the respective index. 
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4.4. Empirical Findings 
This section begins by examining the factors associated with group membership in general and 
of male and female respondents separately. We continue by investigating the relationship 
between group membership, social and political capital, and household welfare, and discuss and 
address the inherent endogeneity. Throughout, it is allowed for gender-differentiated effects by 
separating social and political capital as well as welfare of household heads and spouses. 
 
4.4.1. Correlates of Participation in Groups 
The factors associated with group membership with the help of a Probit specification are 
investigated in which the dependent variables is binary for household-level membership of the 
household head or his spouse, or for each of them separately at the individual level. The 
marginal effects corresponding to this exercise are presented in Table 4.7, where columns (1) 
and (2) investigate household-level participation and columns (3) and (4) look at group 
membership of household heads and their spouses, respectively.  
The result shows that education of the household head is positively associated with their 
likelihood of participating in groups, which is in line with the findings of Bandyopadhay et al. 
(2004), while this is not the case for membership at the household level for spouses. On the 
other hand, the results indicate that women who are engaged in off-farm employment are more 
likely to be group members, while the coefficient on the corresponding variable for household 
heads is statistically insignificant.  
Furthermore, a negative correlation between age and membership for both the household head 
and his spouse in two out of four columns is found, which is in contrast to Weinberger (2000). 
Household size is negatively and statistically significantly associated with group membership in 
three out of four columns, which may be due to larger families demanding more time being 
spent on providing for the family and less time being available for other activities. 
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Table 4.7: Marginal effects of factors associated with participation in groups by gender 
 Participation of households Participation 
of heads 
Participation of 
spouses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years of schooling of HH head 0.002 
(0.003) 
 0.009** 
(0.005) 
 
Years of schooling of spouse  0.004 
(0.004) 
 -0.004 
(0.007) 
Age of HH head -0.002** 
(0.001) 
 0.000 
(0.002) 
 
Age of spouse  -0.001 
(0.001) 
 -0.006** 
(0.003) 
HH head employed off-farm 0.004 
(0.035) 
 -0.019 
(0.051) 
 
Spouse employed off-farm  0.033 
(0.062) 
 0.230* 
(0.142) 
Household size -0.011** 
(0.006) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.030*** 
(0.009) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
Male-to-female ratio 0.012 
(0.013) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
0.014 
(0.020) 
-0.018 
(0.025) 
Household dependency ratio -0.066 
(0.080) 
-0.082 
(0.079) 
-0.016 
(0.113) 
-0.271*  
(0.148) 
Log of total plot size (square meters) -0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
Total livestock (TLU) 0.003 
(0.034) 
0.018 
(0.039) 
0.032 
(0.049) 
-0.067 
(0.063) 
Log of total value of assets -0.001 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.021** 
(0.010) 
Access to television by HH head 0.007 
(0.024) 
 0.042 
(0.034) 
 
Access to television by spouse  - 0.000 
(0.026) 
 0.048 
(0.044) 
HH ownership of mobile phone 0.018 
(0.027) 
0.020 
(0.026) 
0.031 
(0.036) 
0.016 
(0.045) 
Affected by climatic shocks 0.030 
(0.025) 
0.033 
(0.025) 
-0.008 
(0.033) 
0.111*** 
(0.042) 
Affected by non-climatic negative shocks 0.044* 
(0.023) 
0.041* 
(0.023) 
0.004 
(0.035) 
0.115*** 
(0.043) 
Affected by positive shocks 0.043* 
(0.023) 
0.044** 
(0.023) 
0.017 
(0.036) 
0.174*** 
(0.046) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.060 0.065 0.051 0.063 
N 642 642 642  642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.  
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Interestingly, the results indicate that the experience of any type of shock, both positive and 
negative, is positively associated with group participation, but especially so for women.33 To be 
precise, having experienced a climatic shock in the past two years increases the likelihood of a 
household head’s spouse being a group member by 11% with the impact of other negative and 
positive shocks being of similar or larger magnitude. It appears likely that information on coping 
strategies and support provided by a group is most needed and availed of in times of distress as 
suggested by the reported benefits of groups presented in Table 4.3. In line with this, a 
household’s value of asset holdings is negatively related to female group membership. 
Rather than investigating the factors associated with membership in any type of group, 
household-level membership in the most important groups are considered according to 
participation rates in the sample in Table 4.8: farmer groups (columns (1) and (2)), credit groups 
(columns (3) and (4)), and religious groups (columns (5) and (6)). Recall the gender differences in 
group participation: farmer groups, for example, mainly have male members, while credit 
groups mainly have female ones as discussed above. 
Table 4.8 adds some interesting insights to the discussion of factors influencing group 
membership.34 Education of the household head, for example, is negatively associated with 
household-level membership in farmer and credit groups, possibly due to less guidance and 
credit needed, while his and his spouse’s education are positively correlated with membership 
in religious groups.  
 
 
                                                          
33
 Note that the results are largely robust to using variables indicating that a household has experienced a severe positive 
or non-climatic negative shock rather than any positive or non-climatic negative shock, with severe shocks being defined as 
shocks in which the ratio of the amount gained or lost, respectively; to total consumption expenditure is larger than the median 
value in the sample. Furthermore, note that climatic adverse events are classified as “shocks” only if more than one village of a 
union was affected. 
34
 We have also checked whether household head’s education and assets influence wife’s group participation and vice 
versa. Education of head/wife is statistically significantly and positively correlated to group participation of the spouse. 
Although, wealth of head is positively and significantly associated with wife’s group participation, wife’s assets do not influence 
head’s group participation.  
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Table 4.8: Marginal effects of factors associated with household-level participation in groups 
by group type 
 Participation in farmer 
groups 
Participation in credit 
groups 
Participation in 
religious groups 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Years of schooling of HH head -0.012** 
(0.005) 
 -0.011** 
(0.005) 
 0.009** 
(0.004) 
 
Years of schooling of spouse  0.000 
(0.007) 
 -0.009 
(0.007) 
 0.009* 
(0.005) 
Age of HH head -0.003 
(0.002) 
 -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 
Age of spouse  -0.003 
(0.002) 
 -0.008*** 
(0.002) 
 0.006*** 
(0.001) 
HH head employed off-farm -0.062 
(0.060) 
 0.042 
(0.058) 
 0.043 
(0.049) 
 
Spouse employed off-farm  -0.377*** 
(0.078) 
 0.172 
(0.139) 
 0.196 
(0.133) 
Household size -0.040*** 
(0.012) 
-0.033*** 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
Male-to-female ratio 0.029 
(0.025) 
0.027 
(0.025) 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
-0.010 
(0.023) 
0.000 
(0.018) 
0.004 
(0.018) 
Household dependency ratio -0.010 
(0.137) 
-0.130 
(0.144) 
-0.435*** 
(0.131) 
-0.385*** 
(0.137) 
0.027 
(0.094) 
0.085 
(0.096) 
Log of total plot size (square meters) 0.005 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
Total livestock (TLU) 0.039 
(0.059) 
0.056 
(0.058) 
-0.086 
(0.059) 
-0.087 
(0.059) 
0.032 
(0.040) 
0.031 
(0.041) 
Log of total value of assets 0.011 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.014 
(0.009) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
Access to television by HH head 0.024 
(0.043) 
 -0.018 
(0.041) 
 -0.001 
(0.032) 
 
Access to television by spouse  0.046 
(0.044) 
 0.006 
(0.042) 
 0.006 
(0.032) 
HH ownership of mobile phone -0.053 
(0.045) 
-0.098** 
(0.045) 
0.088** 
(0.043) 
0.083** 
(0.042) 
-0.013 
(0.034) 
0.003 
(0.032) 
Affected by climatic shocks -0.053 
(0.042) 
-0.064 
(0.042) 
0.017 
(0.040) 
0.018 
(0.040) 
0.046 
(0.028) 
0.051* 
(0.028) 
Affected by non-climatic negative 
shocks 
0.065 
(0.043) 
0.064 
(0.043) 
0.055 
(0.041) 
0.046 
(0.041) 
-0.008 
(0.030) 
-0.002 
(0.030) 
Affected by positive shocks 0.035 
(0.046) 
0.030 
(0.046) 
0.170*** 
(0.045) 
0.165*** 
(0.045) 
0.024 
(0.033) 
0.031 
(0.033) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.035 0.041 0.070 0.066 0.050 0.055 
N 642 642 642  642 642 642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
Furthermore, the negative association of age in Table 4.7 appears to be driven by the 
participation in credit groups, whereas higher age appears to increase the likelihood of 
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participating in religious groups. The negative coefficient on household size is only found for the 
participation in farmer groups in columns (1) and (2), while a high dependency ratio reduces the 
likelihood of group membership in credit groups as presented in columns (3) and (4).  
In addition, the result shows some evidence for a negative association between ownership of a 
mobile phone and participation in farmer groups, but evidence of the reverse case for credit 
groups. Interestingly, having been affected by climatic shocks increases the likelihood of 
participating in religious groups, while positive shocks such as the receipt of remittances are 
positively associated with participation in credit groups, possibly due to more collateral 
becoming available in response to a positive shock. 
 
4.4.2. Group Membership, Social and Political Capital, and Welfare 
When investigating the welfare effects of group-based approaches, we begin with a naïve 
approach that assumes all explanatory variables to be exogenous. To be specific, the following 
equation using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors: 
𝑙 𝑛(𝑌𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑗 +
                   𝜌 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝒁𝑖𝜽 + 𝑿𝑖𝝈 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗   ,                                    (1) 
where two dependent variables are used to measure the economic wellbeing of household i: 
the logarithmic value of total asset holdings, including, for example, consumer durables, 
agricultural goods, jewelry, and vehicles, and the logarithmic value of total monthly per capita 
expenditure on food and non-food items.35 While we follow Grootaert (1999), Narayan and 
Pritchett (1999), and Aker (2005) in choosing consumption expenditure, both asset holdings and 
                                                          
35
 Note that the results for asset holdings are replicated with an index of asset holdings constructed with the help of a 
principal component analysis as used in Rakib and Matz (2014). The findings are largely robust but slightly weaker when using 
this alternative measurement as presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table A4.2 in the appendix. To be specific, the social and 
political capital of neither the head nor his spouse yields a statistically significant coefficient here. 
85 
 
expenditure are often-used measures of economic wellbeing as income is difficult to measure 
and not necessarily representative of the economic well-being of agricultural households.  
The main explanatory variables are different sets of capital: social and political, human, and 
physical capital other than assets, i.e. land and livestock holdings. Apart from the latter due to 
the inability of accurately separating them by individual ownership, the types of capital are 
indexed by j for either being held by the household head or his spouse. To be specific, social and 
political capital is measured by the aggregate index introduced above, human capital is 
measured by years of schooling, and other physical capital is given by the logarithmic value of 
the household’s total plot size and total livestock holdings measured in tropical livestock units 
(TLU). Z is a vector of individual characteristics of the household head or his spouse such as age 
and a binary variable for off-farm occupation, and X is a vector of household-level 
characteristics including household size, the male-to-female ratio, the dependency ratio, and 
measures for the exposure to climatic, other negative, and positive shocks. The error term is 
represented by ϵij. 
A rather obvious challenge with respect to endogeneity arises from this exercise. Firstly, there 
may be reverse causality or simultaneity between physical wealth and social and political 
capital, an issue is discussed and addressed in the following section. Secondly, even though 
existing studies include physical capital when investigating the effect of social capital on 
consumption expenditure (Grootaert 1999, Narayan and Pritchet 1999, Grootaert 2001), land 
and livestock holdings may be subject to similar concerns. Note that the results described in the 
following are largely robust to the exclusion of these variables. 
Table 4.9 presents the results of estimating equation (1) with a combined index for social and 
political capital, while by using separate ones is presented in Table A4.3 in the appendix. It is 
interesting to see that, while the combined social and political capital of household heads is 
associated with both physical capital (column (1)) and consumption expenditure (column (3)) in 
a statistically significant and positive way, the coefficients on the index for the social and 
political capital of their spouses are statistically insignificant (columns (2) and (4), respectively).  
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Table 4.9: Aggregate social and political capital and economic well-being: OLS results  
 log of total assets log of per capita consumption 
expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Social and political capital of HH head 1.895** 
(0.735) 
 0.700*** 
(0.224) 
 
Social and political capital of spouse  -0.302 
(0.904) 
 -0.141 
(0.298) 
Years of schooling of HH head 0.079*** 
(0.017) 
 0.037*** 
(0.006) 
 
Years of schooling of spouse  0.145*** 
(0.023) 
 0.052*** 
(0.008) 
Age of HH head -0.014* 
(0.008) 
 0.011*** 
(0.002) 
 
Age of spouse  -0.003 
(0.010) 
 0.016*** 
(0.002) 
HH head working off-farm 0.019 
(0.204) 
 0.005 
(0.061) 
 
Spouse working off-farm  -0.493 
(0.622) 
 -0.076 
(0.154) 
Household size 0.032 
(0.045) 
0.048 
(0.047) 
-0.074*** 
(0.014) 
-0.073*** 
(0.014) 
Male-to-female ratio -0.164 
(0.107) 
-0.165 
(0.108) 
0.028 
(0.031) 
0.027 
(0.030) 
Household dependency ratio 0.479 
(0.595) 
0.046 
(0.639) 
0.197 
(0.152) 
0.116 
(0.160) 
Log of total plot size (square meters) 0.045* 
(0.028) 
0.046* 
(0.027) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
Total livestock (TLU) 1.084*** 
(0.327) 
1.148*** 
(0.330) 
-0.040 
(0.064) 
-0.013 
(0.064) 
Affected by climatic shocks -0.218 
(0.171) 
-0.180 
(0.165) 
0.071 
(0.047) 
0.088* 
(0.047) 
Affected by non-climatic negative shocks -0.422** 
(0.185) 
-0.403** 
(0.185) 
0.061 
(0.048) 
0.082* 
(0.050) 
Affected by positive shocks -0.032 
(0.172) 
-0.030 
(0.172) 
0.032 
(0.050) 
0.041 
(0.053) 
R- squared 0.112 0.116 0.182 0.160 
N 642 642 642  642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
 *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
Education of both the household head and his spouse yield a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient in all columns, household size is negatively associated with per capita consumption 
expenditure, and livestock holdings positively with asset holdings. Surprisingly, having been 
affected by a climatic shock in the past two years yields a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient on consumption expenditure, possibly due to disaster relief and the need to buy 
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more food items than usually and to replace lost physical items. Similarly, while having 
experienced non-climatic negative shocks yields a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient for asset holdings, there is some evidence for a positive association with per capita 
consumption expenditure, which may also be explained by coping mechanisms such as the sale 
of assets to enhance consumption. 
Investigating the results in Table A4.3 in the appendix, it is obvious that the positive association 
of the aggregate index of social and political capital of household heads is driven by their social 
capital. A further disaggregation is presented in Tables A4.4 and A4.5 in which the key 
explanatory variables are central components of social capital: group membership and informal 
networks, respectively.36 It is interesting to see that group membership is statistically 
significantly and positively related to economic well-being for the household head only when 
these are measured by asset holdings, which indicates that there is more to social capital than 
simply the membership in groups. Furthermore, group membership of the spouse yields a 
statistically significant and negative coefficient with asset holdings and consumption 
expenditure per capita. Investigating Table A4.5, on the other hand, the informal network of 
both household heads and their spouses are found to play a critical role for household welfare 
as the coefficients on the informal network are statistically significant and positive in three out 
of four columns. 
 
4.4.3. Addressing the Endogeneity 
As briefly mentioned above, social and political capital are likely to be endogenous in equation 
(1). To be specific, membership in groups is not randomly assigned but individuals choose to 
participate, which may be influenced by economic wellbeing, the dependent variable, or other 
factors that influence both the membership in groups and wealth, for example education. In 
order to address this endogeneity, instrumental variables (IV) is used in a two-stage least 
                                                          
36
 Group membership is given by an indicator variable and the network is measured with an index computed with the help 
of a principal component analysis and on the basis of the indicator variables describing networks mentioned in Section 3.2. 
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squares estimation, the instruments used being the relative engagement of a household in 
groups, taking initiative in local development actions by that household, and trust in strangers. 
In the following in favor of the validity of each of these instruments are argued. 
The relative engagement in groups is measured as the ratio of the number of groups a 
household participates in to the number of groups existing in the village the household resides 
in. While a positive association between this variable and social capital is obvious with social 
capital being built through the interaction with other individuals, it seems there is no direct and 
causal relationship with economic wellbeing. The chapter rests on the idea that group 
membership is beneficial to economic wellbeing but we fail to see why the relative engagement 
in groups should impact on household welfare, which makes this variable a valid instrument. 
Similarly, Bandopadhay et al. (2004) use the village-level proportion of participants as an 
instrument and argue that it is related to household-level participation, but not causally to 
welfare. 
Whether a household head takes initiative in local development steps may be an indicator of 
the willingness to cooperate with others and appears likely to be strongly positively correlated 
with the participation in groups and social capital. On the other hand, there appears to be no 
direct relationship with economic wellbeing in the sample: While it may possibly be understood 
as the likelihood of household heads to take these steps somewhat increasing with wealth 
measured by consumption expenditure (even though the increase is non-linear and non-
monotonic), there is no linear relationship between economic well-being and the likelihood of 
spouses taking initiative for local development steps. To be specific, 20% of the spouses of 
household heads in wealth quintiles 1 and 4 are active in this, while it is 15-16% in quintiles 2 
and 3, and 24% in the highest quintile, which shows that it is the spouses of households at the 
extremes of the distribution of economic wellbeing who are most likely to be active taking local 
development steps, making this another valid instrument.  
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Table 4.10: The first stage 
 Social and political capital 
of HH head 
Social and political capital 
of spouse 
 (1) (2) 
Relative participation  0.574*** 
(0.060) 
0.182*** 
(0.046) 
Initiative in local development steps 0.075*** 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
Trust in strangers 0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
Years of schooling of HH head 0.002** 
(0.001) 
 
Years of schooling of spouse  -0.001 
(0.001) 
Age of HH head 0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Age of spouse  0.000 
(0.000) 
HH head employed off-farm 0.001 
(0.011) 
 
Spouse employed off-farm  0.039** 
(0.019) 
Household size 0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Male-to-female ratio -0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
Household dependency ratio -0.004 
(0.026) 
-0.019 
(0.021) 
Log of total plot size (square meters) 0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Total livestock (TLU) 0.009 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
Affected by climatic shocks 0.012 
(0.008) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
Affected by non-climatic negative shocks 0.000 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
Affected by  positive shocks -0.004 
(0.009) 
0.020*** 
(0.007) 
First stage F-statistic  65.92  9.95 
R- squared 0.305 0.081 
N 642 642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
In line with much of the existing literature (Narayan and Pritchet 1999, Yusuf 2008, Grootaert 
2001, Grootaert and Bastelaer 2001), trust is also used as an instrument for social capital. To be 
specific, self-reported trust in strangers that is measured with the help of a scale ranging from 
one to five with one denoting “To a very small extent” and five denoting “To a very large extent” 
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is used. Generally trusting individuals are likely to have closer ties with other individuals and 
therefore higher social capital, and trust in people in general increases the chance of ties 
outside of the village, thereby possibly also increasing social and political capital. On the other 
hand, we fail to see how trust in strangers could be causally related to welfare. Even though 
trust in friends and relatives may be related to wealth through experience also in an economic 
dimension, Narayan and Pritchet (1999) also argue that trust towards outsiders is a different 
and more general trait.  
Table 4.10 displays the results of the first stage, i.e. of regressing the aggregate index for social 
and political capital on the instruments and additional explanatory variables. It is reassuring to 
see that there appears to be a strong relationship between all instruments and the endogenous 
variable as five out of six coefficients on the instruments are statistically significant and, 
according to expectation, positive.  
Furthermore, the F-statistic is almost at a value of 10, the conventional threshold, in column (2) 
when the variables of the spouse of the household head are used, and significantly larger than 
that in the case of using individual variables of the household head in column (1), thereby 
indicating that the instruments are sufficiently correlated with the endogenous regressor, the 
aggregate index of social and political capital, at least in the case of household heads. In support 
of the argumentation for the validity of the instruments above, the Sargan statistic of the test 
for over-identification is statistically insignificant, i.e. there is no evidence of the instrumental 
variables being correlated with the error term of the second stage. The results of estimating the 
relationship with the help of an instrumental variables technique as outlined above are 
presented in Table 4.11.37  
 
                                                          
37
 Note that the results for asset holdings are replicated with an index of asset holdings. The findings are stronger with this 
alternative measurement as presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table A4.2 in the appendix. To be specific, social and political 
capital of the household head and his spouse both yield a statistically significant coefficient when the asset index is the 
dependent variable and an instrumental variables estimation technique is used. We still use the logarithmic value of asset 
holdings and not the asset index in the main specification, however, as the key explanatory variables, social and political capital, 
are also measured by indices. 
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Table 4.11: Aggregate social and political capital and household welfare: IV results  
 Log of total assets Log of per capita consumption 
expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Social and political capital of HH head 2.631* 
(1.528) 
 0.942** 
(0.409) 
 
Social and political capital of spouse  5.683 
(5.546) 
 4.223** 
(1.700) 
Years of schooling of HH head 0.075*** 
(0.022) 
 0.036*** 
(0.006) 
 
Years of schooling of spouse  0.146*** 
(0.027) 
 0.052*** 
(0.008) 
Age of HH head -0.013** 
(0.007) 
 0.011*** 
(0.002) 
 
Age of spouse  -0.004 
(0.009) 
 0.015*** 
(0.003) 
HH head employed off-farm -0.019 
(0.250) 
 0.005 
(0.067) 
 
Spouse employed off-farm  -0.706 
(0.577) 
 -0.232 
(0.175) 
Household size 0.030 
(0.047) 
0.051 
(0.049) 
-0.075*** 
(0.013) 
-0.070*** 
(0.015) 
Male-to-female ratio -0.161 
(0.103) 
-0.155 
(0.106) 
0.030 
(0.028) 
0.034 
(0.032) 
Household dependency ratio 0.474 
(0.566) 
0.166 
(0.616) 
0.196 
(0.151) 
0.203 
(0.189) 
Log of total plot size (square meters) 0.044 
(0.027) 
0.052* 
(0.028) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
Total livestock (TLU) 1.067*** 
(0.242) 
1.095*** 
(0.249) 
-0.046 
(0.065) 
-0.052 
(0.076) 
Affected by climatic shocks -0.234 
(0.175) 
-0.268 
(0.193) 
0.066 
(0.047) 
0.023 
(0.059) 
Affected by non-climatic negative shocks -0.429** 
(0.176) 
-0.437** 
(0.182) 
0.059 
(0.047) 
0.058 
(0.056) 
Affected by positive shocks -0.032 
(0.185) 
-0.163 
(0.226) 
0.032 
(0.050) 
-0.056 
(0.069) 
R- squared 0.110 0.075 0.180 0.081 
N 642 642 642  642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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It is interesting to see that the hypothesized relationship between social and political capital and 
household welfare also exists in three out of four columns when the endogeneity inherent in 
the relationship is addressed.38 Thus, the positive relationship between social and political 
capital found in the OLS estimation presented in Table 4.9 is supported. For consumption 
expenditure as the measure of household welfare, the relationship is also found for spouses of 
household heads rather than only for the latter as is the case in Table 4.9. Thus, the findings 
suggest that the social and political capital brought about by group-based approaches has 
positive effects on the economic wellbeing of households and is in line with Narayan and 
Pritchett (1999), Grootaert (1999), Aker (2005) and  Yusuf (2008) with respect to the positive 
impact of social capital.  
As expected, education is positively related to economic wellbeing, while age is positively 
associated with consumption, possibly due to dissaving, but negatively with asset holdings in 
one case. Land and livestock holdings are, unsurprisingly, positively related to wealth, but do 
not yield a statistically significant coefficient for consumption being the dependent variable. 
Household size is negatively associated with the latter, while non-climatic negative shocks yield 
a negative coefficient for asset holdings being the dependent variable. 
Table A4.6 in the appendix presents the results of replicating the main findings reported in 
Table 4.11 with the separate indices for social and political capital rather than the combined 
one. The results largely support the main ones in Table 4.11 but also confirm a finding from the 
naïve OLS results to a certain extent: the effects of social and political capital found in the main 
results appear to be mostly driven by social rather than political capital, especially for 
consumption expenditure per capita. Consequently, the effects of group membership and 
informal networks on household welfare is investigated individually also when addressing the 
discussed inherent endogeneity. In contrast to the OLS results on group membership, there is 
no evidence of an association between group membership and asset holdings or per capita 
consumption expenditure here as presented in Table A4.7 in the appendix.  
                                                          
38
 Note that the results are largely qualitatively robust but slightly weaker when each of the three instruments is used 
separately in the estimation. 
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Table 4.12: Informal network and household welfare: IV results 
 Log of total assets Log of per capita consumption 
expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Informal network of HH head  2.862 
(4.028) 
 3.993*** 
(1.184) 
 
Informal network of spouse   1.807 
(4.367) 
 3.832*** 
(1.280) 
Years of schooling of HH head  0.084*** 
(0.022) 
 0.034*** 
(0.006) 
 
Years of schooling of spouse   0.145*** 
(0.027) 
 0.038*** 
(0.006) 
Age of HH head -0.015** 
(0.007) 
 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 
Age of spouse  -0.003 
(0.008) 
 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
HH head employed off-farm 0.042 
(0.251) 
 0.038 
(0.074) 
 
Spouse employed off-farm  -0.490 
(0.531) 
 0.053 
(0.075) 
Household size 0.034 
(0.047) 
0.048 
(0.047) 
-0.078*** 
(0.014) 
-0.072*** 
(0.014) 
Male-to-female ratio -0.173* 
(0.103) 
-0.171* 
(0.104) 
0.025 
(0.030) 
0.011 
(0.031) 
Household dependency ratio 0.440 
(0.570) 
0.039 
(0.594) 
0.131 
(0.167) 
0.162 
(0.167) 
Log of total plot size (square meters) 0.045 
(0.028) 
0.047* 
(0.027) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
Total livestock (TLU) 1.123*** 
(0.239) 
1.125*** 
(0.243) 
-0.030 
(0.070) 
-0.068 
(0.072) 
Affected by  climatic shocks -0.199 
(0.175) 
-0.201 
(0.176) 
0.054 
(0.051) 
0.051 
(0.052) 
Affected by non-climatic negative 
shocks 
-0.410** 
(0.176) 
-0.393** 
(0.177) 
0.062 
(0.052) 
0.090* 
(0.052) 
Affected by  positive shocks -0.057 
(0.188) 
-0.051 
(0.188) 
-0.001 
(0.055) 
0.003 
(0.055) 
R-squared 0.113 0.116 0.012 0.013 
N 642 642 642 642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
Considering further disaggregation in types of group main adult male and female of the 
households are members of, household welfare and merely group membership are not 
associated with although religious group participation by male is positively associated with 
household per capita consumption expenditure (see Table A4.8). On the other hand, even 
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though the OLS results on this (see Table A4.5) are not fully supported, Table 4.12 strongly 
suggests that informal networks are a driver of the positive association between social and 
political capital and consumption expenditure. 
 
4.4.4. Gender-disaggregated Welfare 
After investigating the effects of social and political capital and selected aspects of the former 
on the economic wellbeing of households, we now turn to disaggregating household welfare 
and focus on individual asset holdings of the household head and his spouse as the dependent 
variables. Similarly to the main specification, the logarithmic value of the value of asset holdings 
is used, separated by ownership of the head or his spouse, and the empirical approach outlined 
above is followed otherwise, i.e. we move from a naïve OLS specification to an instrumental 
variables technique.39   
The results of disaggregating household welfare are presented in Table 4.11 with the OLS results 
in columns (1) and (2) and the IV results in columns (3) and (4).40 It is striking that social and 
political capital yield a positive and statistically significant coefficient only when asset holdings 
of the household head are the dependent variable, while no evidence for an association with 
wealth of his spouse is found, which illustrates the necessity of disaggregating asset holdings by 
individual ownership.  
Education is also positively associated with the wealth of the head only, while household size 
yields a statistically significant and negative coefficient with asset holdings of the spouse being 
the dependent variable. The ratio of males to females within the household is statistically 
significantly associated only with asset holdings of the spouse, in a positive way. Livestock 
ownership is consistently positively associated with the asset holdings of both the head and his 
                                                          
39
 Note that the results reported in this section are also robust to using indices for individual asset holdings as reported in 
Table A4.9 in the appendix. 
40
  We have checked the spillover effect of spouse’s social and political capital on head’s assets and head’s social and 
political capital on spouses’ assets in OLS and IV regressions, which do not show significant impact of any spouse’s social capital 
on the other spouse’s assets. 
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spouse, while land ownership, which is a male dominated asset, yields a statistically significant 
and positive coefficient with wealth of the household head only. Non-climatic negative shocks 
are found to be negatively related only to economic wellbeing of the head, while there is some 
evidence for a positive association between positive shocks and assets of the spouse of the 
household head when instrumental variables are used. 
Table 4.13: Aggregate social and political capital and gender-disaggregated welfare  
 OLS IV 
 Log of total 
assets of the 
HH head  
(1) 
Log of total 
assets of the 
spouse  
(2) 
Log of total 
assets of the 
HH head  
(3) 
Log of total 
assets of the 
spouse  
(4) 
Social and political capital of HH head 1.826*** 
(0.628) 
 3.159** 
(1.219) 
 
Social and political capital of spouse  0.418 
(1.995) 
 -7.089 
(9.830) 
Years of schooling of HH head  0.070*** 
(0.016) 
 0.063*** 
(0.017) 
 
Years of schooling of spouse  0.035 
(0.050) 
 0.034 
(0.049) 
Age of HH head 0.007 
(0.006) 
 0.007 
(0.005) 
 
Age of spouse  -0.041*** 
(0.015) 
 -0.039*** 
(0.015) 
HH head employed off-farm 0.128 
(0.187) 
 0.129 
(0.199) 
 
Spouse employed off-farm  0.339 
(0.816) 
 0.606 
1.022) 
Household size 0.048 
(0.040) 
-0.431*** 
(0.090) 
0.044 
(0.038) 
-0.434*** 
(0.086) 
Male-to-female ratio 0.016 
(0.108) 
0.442** 
(0.170) 
0.022 
(0.082) 
0.429** 
(0.188) 
Household dependency ratio 0.085 
(0.510) 
1.688 
1.071) 
0.077 
(0.452) 
1.538 
(1.093) 
Log of total plot size (square meters) 0.078*** 
(0.023) 
-0.010 
(0.051) 
0.075*** 
(0.022) 
-0.018 
(0.050) 
Total livestock (TLU) 0.421** 
(0.188) 
1.047** 
(0.455) 
0.390** 
(0.193) 
1.114** 
(0.441) 
Affected by climatic shocks -0.004 
(0.150) 
0.253 
(0.312) 
-0.033 
(0.140) 
0.365 
(0.343) 
Affected by non-climatic negative shocks -0.378*** 
(0.141) 
-0.185 
(0.322) 
-0.389*** 
(0.141) 
-0.143 
(0.322) 
Affected by  positive shocks 0.009 
(0.134) 
0.526 
(0.332) 
0.010 
(0.148) 
0.693* 
(0.400) 
R- squared 0.110 0.088 0.103 0.069 
N 642 642 642 642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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4.5. Conclusions 
This chapter investigates the effect of social and political capital on economic wellbeing of 
households in Bangladesh, paying particular attention to identifying the causal relationship and 
to gender differences with respect to social and political capital, and wealth. 
As a first step, the determinants of group membership of household heads and their spouses is 
studied and the result finds that men and women generally take part in different groups due to 
their different needs and opportunities. Farmer groups, for example, are to the very largest 
extent made up of male participants (possibly due to their relatively strong involvement in 
agriculture), while the members of credit groups are mostly women, which is likely due to NGOs 
encouraging credit use among women in the area and female assets being disproportionately 
negatively affected by adverse events such as climatic and non-climatic shocks. Furthermore, 
household heads participate in more groups than their spouses on average, who are more likely 
to spend time on group activities but devote less time to group activities if they do, possibly due 
to their workload and widespread involvement within the household. 
Turning to the relationship between social and political capital and economic wellbeing, a 
combined index of social and political capital and separate ones are developed, and particular 
attention to addressing the endogeneity inherent in the relationship is paid. To be specific, 
while the prior is that social and political capital has a positive impact on household welfare, 
causality may not necessarily run in the hypothesized direction if economic wellbeing facilitates 
group membership, possibly directly through less severe time constraints, or indirectly through 
education positively impacting on both, for example. Initially a naïve OLS estimation is 
conducted and subsequently employ an instrumental variables technique using the household’s 
initiative in taking local development steps, the household’s relative group membership, and 
trust in strangers as instruments. Overall, the result suggests a positive impact of social and 
political capital on household welfare in general, and especially so for asset holdings of 
household heads. Interestingly, this effect appears to be mainly driven by social capital. To be 
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more specific, the results suggest that it is not merely group membership but the strength of the 
informal network that leads to a positive association with household welfare. 
Recalling that household heads are more likely to participate in groups to begin with, the finding 
that social capital is beneficial for especially their economic wellbeing invites the 
recommendation of policies aiming to increase active female group membership, possibly also 
in groups that are important for enhancing livelihood outcomes, and not mostly in those that 
help coping with adverse events. Active participation in these kinds of groups of women and 
strengthening their informal networks may help to improve their economic position within the 
household. 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this dissertation three closely related issues are investigated in Bangladesh, a country that is 
threatened by the negative effects of climate change: (1) the intra-household asset dynamics in 
response to a wide variety of shocks among rural agricultural households, (2) the factors that  
influence the short-term coping mechanisms and long-term adaptation strategies employed by 
households in response to  shocks, and (3) the potential for group-based approaches to enhance 
household well-being and the factors associated with group participation. These three 
interrelated issues are analyzed based on a rich two-stage household survey dataset to offer 
insight into the development of appropriate policies and interventions for enhancing household 
assets and adaptation strategies, which have potentially large welfare impacts on households 
that suffer from the adverse impacts of climate change.  
The results indicate that male household heads typically have more assets than their spouses, 
especially with respect to land, while jewelry is traditionally a female-owned asset. Household 
assets controlled by men and women are degraded differentially depending on the type of 
shock that is suffered. The physical assets of household heads are negatively affected by 
climatic shocks, particularly by cyclones, and assets owned jointly by husbands and wives are 
negatively affected by unexpected negative shocks such as death or illness. Predicted shocks 
often cause households to sell jointly owned assets. Jointly held assets are also accumulated in 
anticipation of negative shocks such as drought and dowries, which often represent significant 
assets to rural agricultural households.  
Households probably have more difficulty liquidating jointly owned assets, in part because it is 
difficult to reach a mutual agreement by couples and also because the most important jointly 
owned assets are often kept until they are needed most. Disaggregating an asset index revealed 
a clearer breakdown of which types of assets are used to cope with particular shocks. The 
findings from the impacts on the overall asset index are supported by the fact that husbands 
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typically sell durable consumer goods in response to shocks, however, in general husbands 
protect assets that are used to generate income such as agricultural tools and large livestock.  
Shocks and their effects on asset ownership are gender specific and gender issues are important 
determinants of in household resource allocation. Gender disparity in asset ownership and 
particularly land need to be directly addressed, in Bangladesh an important measure would be 
the reformation of national inheritance legislation. This would facilitate women’s access to 
other forms of capital such as credit, because land can be used as collateral for loans. Increasing 
women’s productive assets also has direct impacts on overall household well-being, especially 
for children. This would also strengthen bargaining power among women. Such a reform of 
increasing bargaining power would also help to reduce dowry practice, which is considered a 
major negative economic shock to families due to the enormous financial burden it places on 
low-income families in Bangladesh. Strict implementation of the existing law is necessary to 
restrict the practice. Furthermore, taking into account the coping mechanisms of men and 
women for dealing with shocks in the design of policy and programs that provide training and 
credit could help protect household assets and might enhance control over critical assets such 
as livestock.  
The available options and associated factors that influence the adoption of long-term 
adaptation strategies and short-term coping mechanisms, and the perception of climate change 
among agricultural households in Bangladesh are also investigated. The results indicate that 
farmers rely on different type of assets for dealing with climatic shocks, and many already 
perceive the effects of climate change. However, not all farmers who perceive climate change 
take preventive measures. The lack of information about adaptation and climate change, 
financial limitations, limited access to agricultural inputs, and water scarcity are major 
constraints to the adoption of adaptive strategies for the effects of climate change.  
Another important finding is that farmers are more likely to adopt adaptation strategies for crop 
production than for livestock production. Participation in social groups has an important role in 
the adoption of crop adaptation strategies, which are often chosen as complementary to each 
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other, and group participation among women in particular improves their perception. It is found 
that male household heads are more likely to engage in coping and adaptive measures than 
female household heads. Men and women with greater social capital are more likely to 
generate income from off-farm activities or migratory labor and are less likely to sell household 
assets, borrow from informal lenders, and to withdraw children from school as immediate 
measures for coping with shocks. Whereas long-term adaptive strategies are often considered 
as complementary, short-term coping measures are generally mutually independent.  
Greater access to ICT among men and to training opportunities among women are important 
for the adoption of crop and livestock production adaptation strategies, as well as for awareness 
building about short-term coping tools. Campaign activities targeting women might be an 
effective tool for enhancing their social capital and participation in social groups is positively 
associated with making the decision to adopt adaptive practices and therefore should be 
considered by policy makers. Enhancing opportunities to generate off-farm income could be 
another strategy for dealing with negative shocks so that the poor do not liquidate their limited 
assets or compromise family diets. Opportunities to access credit during times of shock and 
food assistance or other forms of relief in times of negative shocks might be effective ways of 
preventing affected households from taking measures that negatively impact their well-being 
such as dietary restrictions, which are more prevalent in response to negative non-climatic 
shocks. These measures would also help to protect household asset bases and per capita 
consumption levels. 
Finally, this research effort provides empirical evidence of the positive welfare impacts of group 
based approaches, which is broadly treated as social and political capital in disaggregated forms. 
Gender differentiation is considered in terms of social and political capital and asset ownership. 
The results suggest that men and women prefer different types of groups depending on the 
benefits they perceive from group membership. Women mostly participate in credit groups, 
mainly initiated by NGOs, that provide credit to women and women’s groups. The majority of 
farmer group members are men. It is found that husbands generally participate more actively in 
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groups in numerical terms (of groups) and the amount of time spent in the most important 
group.  
For the analysis of welfare impacts a comprehensive index was created that combined social 
and political capital by using a PCA, and also analyzed them separately. The endogeneity 
inherent in the relationships among welfare and social and political capital was addressed using 
a set of instruments: household initiatives for local development, household group membership, 
and trust in strangers. The results suggest that group approaches generally have positive 
welfare impacts as measured by per capita consumption expenditures and asset holdings of 
household heads, which is mainly motivated by social capital.  
While social capital, human capital, livestock and land ownership, etc. have positive impacts on 
overall household welfare, these impacts differs for husbands and wives. As discussed above, 
greater welfare impacts on assets controlled by men are probably due to their more active 
participation in groups relative to women. Not only group membership but also strong informal 
networks are positively related with household welfare according to the findings. The positive 
results of group participation on men’s welfare suggest that policy initiatives for active 
participation in groups by women might benefit the ability of households to cope with shocks 
and adapt to climate change - the benefit reported by women by participating groups, which 
would ultimately improve livelihood outcomes. Moreover, strengthening informal networks 
may help to enhance awareness among women because women are generally busy with 
household maintenance activities and therefore they are more likely to lack access to 
information. The study findings suggest that related policies should consider gender specific 
aspects of group participation because men and women benefit from group participation in 
different ways: women by receiving information that helps them to cope with shocks while men 
benefit from group participation by upgrading their means of support. 
Household asset dynamics differ by gender based on a broad definition of both shocks and 
assets. The behavioral patterns of farmers subjected to shocks and the welfare impacts of these 
behavioral patterns, such as group based approaches were analyzed using a country 
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representative longitudinal dataset. However, it is also important to understand the gender 
disaggregated responses to shocks, especially in the case of the long-term adaptation strategies, 
which should be considered by subsequent research efforts. An economic cost-benefit analysis 
is needed to determine the advantages and disadvantages of adopting individual adaptation 
strategies. Moreover, to reveal the long-term welfare impacts of adopting adaptive strategies 
and group participation it is worthwhile for research efforts to use panel data.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A2:  Supplementary Tables  
Table A2.1: Types of assets used in the construction of the physical asset index 
Agricultural Goods Consumer Goods Housing Materials and Amenities  
Tractor 
Pump 
Deep tube well 
Shallow tube well 
Fishing net 
Boat 
Thresher 
Plough  
Radio 
Refrigerator 
TV 
Phone/cell phone 
Iron 
Fan 
CD player 
Sewing machine 
Jewelry 
Tube well 
Cycle 
Rickshaw 
Motorcycle 
Other vehicles 
Other 
Toilet 
Walls 
Roof 
Electricity 
Cooking fuel 
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Table A2.2: Summary statistics of disaggregated physical asset ownership  
 N Mean Std. dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
2010       
Consumer goods (husband) 678 4,056 11,600.29 0 1,263 179,945 
Consumer goods (wife) 678 382 2,809.65 0 0 51,000 
Consumer goods (joint) 678 914 5,127.86 0 0 116,450 
Jewellery (husband) 678 5,147 22,030.71 0 0 297,500 
Jewellery (wife) 678 4,566 14,475.67 0 0 180,000 
Jewellery (joint) 678 4,398 17,423.64 0 0 150,000 
Vehicle (husband) 678 4,542 31,071.29 0 0 510,000 
Vehicle (wife) 678 180 2,427.46 0 0 42,500 
Vehicle (joint) 678 154 1,946.26 0 0 38,250 
Poultry (husband) 678 1,014 6,376.33 0 0 102,000 
Poultry (wife) 678 571 2,101.33 0 0 42,500 
Poultry (joint) 678 233 2,530.22 0 0 42,840 
Cattle (husband) 678 14,346 29,511.31 0 0 455,000 
Cattle (wife) 678 2,344 17,930.90 0 0 425,000 
Cattle (joint) 678 1,044 6,953.63 0 0 80,000 
Agricultural tools (husband) 678 5,084 33,431.38 0 200 608,600 
Agricultural tools (wife) 678 264 2,908.59 0 0 59,585 
Agricultural tools (joint) 678 211 2,657.68 0 0 51,000 
2012       
Consumer goods (husband) 678 4,034 8,892.58 0 1,500 102,128 
Consumer goods (wife) 678 264 1,515.05 0 0 27,455 
Consumer goods (joint) 678 918 3,227.56 0 0 38,250 
Jewellery (husband) 678 5,815 29,291.24 0 0 425,000 
Jewellery (wife) 678 6,519 23,305.11 0 0 320,000 
Jewellery (joint) 678 5,858 23,560.41 0 0 300,000 
Vehicle (husband) 678 2,604 14,238.43 0 0 221,000 
Vehicle (wife) 678 495 8,602.70 0 0 212,500 
Vehicle (joint) 678 265 3,667.66 0 0 85,000 
Poultry (husband) 678 973 6,438.21 0 0 120,000 
Poultry (wife) 678 616 2,248.22 0 0 46,750 
Poultry (joint) 678 179 1,884.25 0 0 47,000 
Cattle (husband) 678 15,884 28,042.96 0 829 285,000 
Cattle (wife) 678 1,248 6,465.13 0 0 77,000 
Cattle (joint) 678 957 7,648.67 0 0 150,000 
Agricultural tools (husband) 678 4,136 20,730.88 0 300 400,000 
Agricultural tools (wife) 678 128 1,466.35 0 0 25,500 
Agricultural tools (joint) 678 112 1,717.73 0 0 42,500 
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Table A2.3: Summary statistics of household characteristics 
Household characteristics N Mean Std. dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
2010       
Household size in 2010 678 4.99 1.94 2 5 15 
Male-to-female ratio in 2010 678 1.20 0.85 0.14 1 5 
Age of the household head 2010 678 46.30 13.42 17 45 95 
Years of schooling of household head in 2010 678 3.68 4.17 0 2 17 
Household dependency ratio in 2010 678 0.67 0.15 0.2 0.67 1 
Use of credit in 2010 678 0.42 0.49 0 0 1 
Use of extensions in 2010 678 0.27 0.44 0 0 1 
Total plot size in 2010 (in square meters) 678 2,911 4,0493.251 0 1,230 27,836 
Total land value in taka in 2010 678 560,906 771,283.70 0 276,000 4,918,100 
Livestock value in taka in 2010 678 19,551 34,775.96 0 5,975 455,200 
Livestock in TLU in 2010 678 0.77 0.94 0 0.5 7.90 
Total non-land assets in taka in 2010 678 50,531 79,584.26 0 28,519 772,590 
2012       
Household size in 2012 678 4.91 1.90 1 5 14 
Male-to-female ratio in 2012 678 1.21 0.85 0.17 1 5 
Age of the household head 2012 678 48.70 13.22 21 48 97 
Years of schooling of household head in 2012 678 3.67 4.19 0 2 17 
Household dependency ratio in 2012 678 0.67 0.15 0.17 0.7 1 
Use of credit in 2012 678 0.47 0.50 0 0 1 
Use of extensions in 2012 678 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 
Total plot size in 2012 (in square meter) 678 3,193 4,658.79 0 1,520 38,053 
Total land value in taka in 2012 678 598,938 797,277.60 0 321,000 4,471,000 
Livestock value in taka in 2012 678 19,857 29,639.97 0 6,630 287,900 
Livestock in TLU in 2012 678 0.82 0.92 0 0.6 6.20 
Total non-land assets in taka in 2012 678 50,415 68,564.15 0 29,867 573,900 
Notes: TLU denotes tropical livestock units. 
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Table A2.4: The impact of shocks on land, non-land physical, and livestock assets (ordinary least squares estimates) 
 Land (square meters) Physical assets (index) Livestock (TLU) 
Husband  Wife  Joint  Husband  Wife  Joint  Husband  Wife  Joint  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Flood 0.199 
(0.199) 
0.005 
(0.079) 
0.204** 
(0.092) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
–0.005 
(0.057) 
–0.019 
(0.047) 
–0.031 
(0.027) 
Drought 0.378* 
(0.198) 
0.040 
(0.071) 
0.268*** 
(0.100) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.115** 
(0.055) 
–0.003 
(0.050) 
0.008 
(0.027) 
Cyclone 0.514*** 
(0.197) 
–0.011 
(0.077) 
0.264** 
(0.110) 
–0.004 
(0.008) 
–0.002 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.178*** 
(0.060) 
0.091* 
(0.052) 
0.015 
(0.027) 
Death/illness –0.120 
(0.197) 
–0.030 
(0.067) 
–0.009 
(0.080) 
–0.008 
(0.007) 
–0.002 
(0.003) 
–0.003 
(0.006) 
–0.049 
(0.051) 
–0.029 
(0.043) 
–0.008 
(0.024) 
Dowry payment –0.239 
(0.457) 
–0.095 
(0.095) 
–0.140 
(0.123) 
0.016 
(0.018) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
–0.030 
(0.110) 
0.088 
(0.093) 
–0.007 
(0.057) 
Remittance –0.406* 
(0.243) 
0.062 
(0.084) 
0.011 
(0.098) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
–0.001 
(0.007) 
0.102 
(0.066) 
0.202*** 
(0.058) 
0.046 
(0.036) 
Inheritance/dowry receipt –0.105 
(0.418) 
–0.118 
(0.119) 
–0.189* 
(0.109) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
–0.007 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
–0.087 
(0.109) 
–0.088 
(0.090) 
–0.051 
(0.059) 
Age of household head 0.024*** 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
–0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
–0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Household size 0.047 
(0.047) 
–0.021 
(0.014) 
0.011 
(0.019) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
–0.001 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
Male-to-female ratio 0.115 
(0.096) 
–0.100*** 
(0.024) 
–0.036 
(0.053) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
–0.002 
(0.003) 
0.067*** 
(0.016) 
0.021 
(0.012) 
0.029*** 
(0.008) 
Dependency ratio 1.051 
(0.643) 
0.223 
(0.200) 
0.044 
(0.263) 
0.006 
(0.024) 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
–0.019 
(0.018) 
0.033 
(0.028) 
0.037 
(0.024) 
–0.013 
(0.010) 
Years of schooling of head 0.110*** 
(0.023) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
–0.038 
(0.165) 
–0.101 
(0.133) 
–0.125 
(0.079) 
Year2010 –0.155 
(0.172) 
–0.034 
(0.057) 
–0.020 
(0.074) 
–0.019*** 
(0.007) 
–0.008*** 
(0.003) 
–0.015*** 
(0.005) 
–0.085* 
(0.047) 
–0.045 
(0.039) 
–0.007 
(0.023) 
Constant  3.168*** 
(0.663) 
0.165 
(0.202) 
0.228 
(0.302) 
0.122*** 
(0.024) 
0.075*** 
(0.012) 
0.061*** 
(0.018) 
0.078 
(0.163) 
0.321** 
(0.128) 
0.128* 
(0.072) 
Household fixed effects  No  No No No No No No No No 
R-squared 0.035 0.011 0.017 0.095 0.053 0.014 0.041 0.140 0.024 
N 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 
Note: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.0 
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Table A2.5: The impact of shocks on land, non-land physical, and livestock assets (weather shocks reported by community, fixed 
effects estimates) 
 Land (square meters) Physical assets (index)  Livestock (TLU) 
Husband  Wife  Joint  Husband  Wife  Joint  Husband  Wife  Joint  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Flood 0.130 
(0.215) 
–0.082 
(0.069) 
0.023 
(0.080) 
-0.019** 
(0.007) 
-0.039*** 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
–0.087** 
(0.041) 
–0.049 
(0.046) 
0.005 
(0.024) 
Drought –0.048 
(0.207) 
–0.020 
(0.077) 
–0.021 
(0.124) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.022*** 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
–0.006 
(0.047) 
–0.012 
(0.046) 
–0.034 
(0.022) 
Cyclone –0.376 
(0.247) 
0.027 
(0.068) 
0.238** 
(0.116) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
–0.100* 
(0.055) 
0.027 
(0.060) 
0.008 
(0.031) 
Death/illness –0.035 
(0.239) 
0.065 
(0.076) 
0.039 
(0.101) 
-0.004 
(0.007)  
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
–0.001 
(0.041) 
–0.015 
(0.041) 
–0.004 
(0.023) 
Dowry payment –0.401 
(0.590) 
–0.005 
(0.047) 
–0.025 
(0.183) 
-0.002 
(0.017) 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
0.003 
(0.010) 
–0.171 
(0.109) 
–0.058 
(0.129) 
–0.113** 
(0.058) 
Remittance –0.914*** 
(0.269) 
0.031 
(0.085)  
–0.364*** 
(0.133) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.020** 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
0.056 
(0.062) 
0.165** 
(0.068) 
0.037 
(0.027) 
Inheritance/dowry receipt 1.084** 
(0.536) 
–0.176 
(0.221) 
0.058 
(0.185) 
-0.030* 
(0.018) 
-0.003 
(0.016) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
0.103 
(0.106) 
0.000 
(0.113) 
0.025 
(0.023) 
Age of household head –0.015 
(0.022) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001** 
(0.001) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
–0.001 
(0.003) 
–0.002 
(0.002) 
Household size  –0.117 
(0.133) 
0.043 
(0.040) 
0.000 
(0.077) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
0.007*** 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.029) 
–0.008 
(0.032) 
–0.003 
(0.018) 
Male-to-female ratio 0.285 
(0.281) 
–0.076 
(0.053) 
0.234 
(0.199) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
0.014 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.052 
(0.069) 
–0.042 
(0.073) 
0.024 
(0.033) 
Dependency ratio 0.942 
(1.208) 
–0.036 
(0.290) 
0.000 
(0.471) 
-0.035 
(0.034) 
0.017 
(0.039) 
-0.009 
(0.024) 
–0.369 
(0.229) 
–0.348* 
(0.193) 
–0.061 
(0.128) 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.029 0.010 0.023 0.063 0.160 0.038 0.029 0.020 0.013 
N 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level and given in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 
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Table A2.6: The impact of shocks on monetary values of land, non-land physical, and livestock assets (fixed effects estimates) 
 Log(value of land) Log(value of physical assets) Log(value of livestock) 
 Husband  Wife  Joint  Husband  Wife  Joint  Husband  Wife  Joint  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Flood –0.119 
(0.557) 
–0.208 
(0.138) 
0.532* 
(0.310) 
–0.460* 
(0.271) 
0.498 
(0.311) 
0.076 
(0.233) 
–1.138*** 
(0.397) 
–0.173 
(0.389) 
0.034 
(0.229) 
Drought 0.382 
(0.493) 
–0.058 
(0.152) 
0.357 
(0.324) 
–0.057 
(0.226) 
0.956*** 
(0.313) 
0.302 
(0.211) 
–0.198 
(0.418) 
1.022*** 
(0.355) 
0.522** 
(0.227) 
Cyclone 0.964** 
(0.449) 
–0.276 
(0.168) 
0.676** 
(0.332) 
–0.390* 
(0.222) 
–0.447* 
(0.253) 
–0.361* 
(0.194) 
0.116 
(0.386) 
–0.657** 
(0.341) 
–0.392* 
(0.209) 
Death/illness –0.345 
(0.410) 
0.106 
(0.131) 
0.108 
(0.181) 
0.230 
(0.165) 
0.142 
(0.226) 
0.086 
(0.165) 
–0.174 
(0.295) 
–0.130 
(0.257) 
0.048 
(0.140) 
Dowry payment –1.181 
(0.959) 
0.034 
(0.057) 
0.051 
(0.353) 
0.117 
(0.383) 
–0.956** 
(0.475) 
–0.150 
(0.481) 
–0.888 
(0.768) 
–0.134 
(0.652) 
–0.455 
(0.315) 
Remittance –1.499*** 
(0.495) 
0.003 
(0.151) 
–0.551** 
(0.227) 
0.485*** 
(0.170) 
1.146*** 
(0.246) 
0.451** 
(0.198) 
–0.376 
(0.319) 
1.372*** 
(0.331) 
0.320** 
(0.164) 
Inheritance/dowry receipt 1.929** 
(0.932) 
–0.330 
(0.364) 
0.028 
(0.344) 
–0.206 
(0.357) 
–0.716 
(0.551) 
–0.260 
(0.272) 
0.124 
(0.611) 
–0.747 
(0.615) 
0.137 
(0.197) 
Age of household head –0.034 
(0.043) 
0.013 
(0.024) 
0.012 
(0.017) 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
0.017 
(0.019) 
–0.005 
(0.017) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
–0.015 
(0.021) 
–0.009 
(0.017) 
Household size –0.191 
(0.228) 
0.091 
(0.079) 
–0.028 
(0.137) 
0.163* 
(0.100) 
–0.020 
(0.130) 
0.157* 
(0.091) 
0.060 
(0.171) 
0.109 
(0.168) 
0.125 
(0.099) 
Male-to-female ratio 0.477 
(0.471) 
–0.144 
(0.110) 
0.342 
(0.354) 
–0.143 
(0.168) 
–0.717** 
(0.302) 
–0.008 
(0.188) 
0.058 
(0.305) 
–0.543 
(0.335) 
–0.018 
(0.128) 
Dependency ratio 1.704 
(2.181) 
–0.241 
(0.540) 
–0.060 
(0.859) 
–0.986 
(0.759) 
–0.248 
(0.946) 
0.289 
(0.666) 
–0.025 
(1.365) 
–1.135 
(1.244) 
0.005 
(0.731) 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.035 0.015 0.027 0.032 0.081 0.027 0.020 0.066 0.037 
N 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level and given in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 
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Appendix A3: Supplementary Tables  
Table A3.1: Sample household summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Min P50 Std. Dev. Max 
Gender of HH head 740 0.89 0 1 0.31 1 
HH size 740 4.80 1 4 2.04 20 
Male to female ratio 740 1.12 0 1 0.83 5 
Age of HH head 740 48 20 47 13.49 97 
Years of formal education of HH head 740 3.52 0 2 4.20 17 
HH dependency ratio 740 0.68 0 0.71 0.19 1 
Experience of HH head 740 22 0 20 14.18 65 
Whether or not HH functionally owns land  740 0.44 0 0 0.50 1 
Total value of HH physical assets  740 57315 17 34863 83341 772591 
Total value of HH physical assets (leave out village mean) 740 57315 18005   55310 19899 117404 
Physical asset index value 740 0.26    0 0.28 0.17 1 
Physical asset index value (leave out village mean) 740 0.26 0.17 0.25 0.06 0.42 
Total HH plot size 740 3076 0 1214 4550 38053 
Total HH plot size (leave out village mean) 740 4107 802 3743 1908 8138 
Total livestock in TLU  740 0.82 0 0.55 0.92 6.2 
Total livestock in TLU (leave out village mean) 740 0.96 0.27 0.90 0.37 1.95 
Access to credit 740 0.70 0 1 0.46 1 
Access to extension services 740 0.35 0 0 0.48 1 
Training received by primary HH adult male 740 0.10 0 0.07 0.14 1 
Training received by primary HH adult female 740 0.03 0 0.02 0.07 1 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult male  740 0.52 0 0.57 0.34 1 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult female  740 0.47 0 0.44 0.17 1 
Social capital of primary HH adult male  740 0.33 0 0.32 0.18 1 
Social capital of primary HH adult male (leave out village 
mean) 
740 0.36 0.24 0.36 0.05 0.54 
Social capital of primary HH adult female  740 0.26 0 0.24 0.12 1 
Social capital of primary HH adult female (leave out village 
mean) 
740 0.26 0.20 0.26 0.03 0.32 
Political capital of primary HH adult male   740 0.39 0 0.38 0.22 1 
Political capital of primary HH adult male (leave out village 
mean) 
740 0.46 0.32 0.44 0.06 0.63 
Political capital of primary HH adult female   740 0.19 0 0.17 0.09 1 
Political capital of primary HH adult female (leave out 
village mean) 
740 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.02 0.26 
Affected by flood 740 0.34 0 0 0.47 1 
Affected by drought 740 0.52 0 1 0.50 1 
Affected by cyclone 740 0.25 0 0 0.43 1 
Affected by climatic shocks 740 0.94 0 1 0.24 1 
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Table A3.2: Farmer perceptions of climate change based on group participation in Bangladesh  
 Probit model results 
Variable Temperature  
increase 
Precipitation 
decrease 
Temperature  
increase 
Precipitation 
decrease 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male-headed household  –0.015 
(0.042) 
–0.059** 
(0.028) 
–0.011 
(0.043) 
–0.059** 
(0.028) 
Age of HH head 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Years of formal education of HH head 0.004 
(0.003) 
–0.001 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
–0.001 
(0.003) 
Experience of HH head 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Whether or not HH functionally owns land  –0.016 
(0.027) 
0.034 
(0.023) 
–0.006 
(0.026) 
0.038* 
(0.024) 
Physical asset index value (leave out village mean) 0.154 
(0.188) 
0.225 
(0.170) 
  
Total livestock in TLU (leave out village mean) 0.067** 
(0.035) 
0.084*** 
(0.031) 
  
Physical asset index value   0.024 
(0.071) 
–0.047 
(0.070) 
Total livestock in TLU   –0.022 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
Access to credit –0.057** 
(0.025) 
–0.021 
(0.023) 
–0.062** 
(0.025) 
–0.024 
(0.023) 
Access to extension services –0.025 
(0.030) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
–0.017 
(0.029) 
0.040* 
(0.024) 
Affected by climatic shocks 0.045* 
(0.027) 
0.023 
(0.023) 
0.049* 
(0.027) 
0.025 
(0.024) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult male 0.153*** 
(0.039) 
0.094*** 
(0.036) 
0.163*** 
(0.039) 
0.099*** 
(0.036) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult female 0.032 
(0.075) 
0.066 
(0.073) 
0.020 
(0.076) 
0.071 
(0.073) 
Group participation by primary HH adult male –0.036 
(0.031) 
0.018 
(0.024) 
–0.036 
(0.031) 
0.016 
(0.025) 
Group participation by primary HH adult female 0.059** 
(0.029) 
0.065*** 
(0.023) 
0.064** 
(0.028) 
0.070*** 
(0.023) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.061 0.050 
Wald chi2(28)             
Total observations 740 740 740 740 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.  
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Table A3.3: Farmer perceptions of climate change based on social and political capital in 
Bangladesh  
 Probit model results 
Variable Temperature  
increase 
Precipitation 
decrease 
Temperature  
increase 
Precipitation 
decrease 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male-headed household  –0.012 
(0.040) 
–0.050* 
(0.028) 
–0.027 
(0.046) 
–0.019 
(0.043) 
Age of HH head 0.002 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Years of formal education of HH head 0.003 
(0.003) 
–0.001 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
–0.001 
(0.003) 
Experience of HH head 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Whether or not HH functionally owns land  –0.029 
(0.027) 
0.022 
(0.023) 
–0.014 
(0.027) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
Physical asset index value (leave out village mean) 0.283 
(0.247) 
0.472** 
(0.238) 
  
Total livestock in TLU (leave out village mean) 0.041 
(0.037) 
0.102*** 
(0.033) 
  
Physical asset index value   0.021 
(0.072) 
–0.040 
(0.072) 
Total livestock in TLU    –0.020 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.015) 
Access to credit –0.048* 
(0.025) 
–0.004 
(0.024) 
–0.054** 
(0.026) 
–0.014 
(0.024) 
Access to extension services –0.026 
(0.030) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
–0.024 
(0.030) 
0.043* 
(0.024) 
Affected by climatic shocks 0.024 
(0.026) 
0.022 
(0.024) 
0.052* 
(0.027) 
0.026 
(0.024) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult male 0.128*** 
(0.037) 
0.076** 
(0.036) 
0.157*** 
(0.039) 
0.113*** 
(0.036) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult female 0.104 
(0.073) 
0.078 
(0.073) 
0.029 
(0.075) 
0.071 
(0.072) 
Social capital of primary HH adult male (leave out 
village mean) 
–0.514** 
(0.231) 
–0.909*** 
(0.197) 
  
Social capital of primary HH adult female (leave out 
village mean) 
–1.176** 
(0.499) 
–0.136 
(0.471) 
  
Political capital of primary HH adult male (leave out 
village mean) 
0.954*** 
(0.242) 
0.065 
(0.202) 
  
Political capital of primary HH adult female  (leave 
out village mean) 
–0.495 
(0.744) 
–0.597 
(0.612) 
  
Social capital of primary HH adult male    –0.045 
(0.080) 
–0.106 
(0.071) 
Social capital of primary HH adult female   –0.015 
(0.110) 
0.232** 
(0.105) 
Political capital of primary HH adult male    0.040 
(0.082) 
–0.066 
(0.072) 
Political capital of primary HH adult female    –0.145 
(0.134) 
0.010 
(0.123) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.084 0.084 0.049 0.051 
Total observations 740 740 740 740 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.  
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Table A3.4: Farmer perceptions of climate change based on social and political capital in 
Bangladesh (Results of seemingly unrelated biprobit model) 
 Seemingly unrelated biprobit model results 
Variable  Temperature  
increase 
Precipitation 
decrease 
Temperature  
increase 
Precipitation 
decrease 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male-headed household  –0.058 
(0.207) 
–0.352 
(0.234) 
–0.130 
(0.247) 
–0.096 
(0.264) 
Age of HH head 0.008 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
–0.003 
(0.006) 
Years of formal education of HH head 0.017 
(0.016) 
–0.010 
(0.018) 
0.015 
(0.016) 
–0.008 
(0.018) 
Experience of HH head 0.002 
(0.006) 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
Whether or not HH functionally owns land  –0.144 
(0.136) 
0.135 
(0.135) 
–0.065 
(0.127) 
0.196 
(0.136) 
Physical asset index value (leave out village mean) 1.386 
(1.251) 
2.748** 
(1.414) 
  
Total livestock in TLU (leave out village mean) 0.197 
(0.187) 
0.585*** 
(0.197) 
  
Physical asset index value   0.091 
(0.338) 
–0.225 
(0.399) 
Total livestock in TLU    –0.092 
(0.064) 
0.019 
(0.081) 
Access to credit –0.258* 
(0.144) 
–0.017 
(0.141) 
–0.267* 
(0.141) 
–0.072 
(0.139) 
Access to extension services –0.119 
(0.144) 
0.220 
(0.154) 
–0.108 
(0.137) 
0.267* 
(0.148) 
Affected by climatic shocks 0.118 
(0.124) 
0.124 
(0.130) 
0.248** 
(0.121) 
0.145 
(0.125) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult male 0.651*** 
(0.190) 
0.455** 
(0.209) 
0.767*** 
(0.187) 
0.651*** 
(0.202) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult female 0.516 
(0.358) 
0.469 
(0.432) 
0.135 
(0.359) 
0.393 
(0.403) 
Social capital of primary HH adult male (leave out 
village mean) 
–2.585** 
(1.170) 
–5.316*** 
(1.148) 
  
Social capital of primary HH adult female (leave 
out village mean) 
–6.000** 
(2.529) 
–0.724 
(2.738) 
  
Political capital of primary HH adult male (leave 
out village mean) 
4.947*** 
(1.263) 
0.418 
(1.150) 
  
Political capital of primary HH adult female  (leave 
out village mean) 
–2.412 
(3.752) 
–3.380 
(3.475) 
  
Social capital of primary HH adult male   –0.245 
(0.378) 
–0.625 
(0.391) 
Social capital of primary HH adult female    –0.084 
(0.527) 
1.252** 
(0.590) 
Political capital of primary HH adult male    0.181 
(0.391) 
–0.385 
(0.397) 
Political capital of primary HH adult female    –0.650 
(0.643) 
0.153 
(0.704) 
Wald chi2(32)         80.62*** 58.05** 
Total observations    740 740 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.  
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Table A3.5: Marginal effects estimated for determinants of household crop adaptation 
strategies in Bangladesh, 2012 
 Probit model results 
variable Crop cycle 
timing 
Change in 
fertilizer 
use  
Change 
crop 
Irrigation 
use 
Changes in 
field 
managemen
t practices 
Seek 
migratory/off-
farm 
employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male-headed household 0.040 
(0.071) 
0.099* 
(0.061) 
0.075 
(0.069) 
0.079 
(0.075) 
–0.028 
(0.075) 
–0.208*** 
(0.077) 
HH size 0.002 
(0.010) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
–0.003 
(0.009) 
–0.028*** 
(0.010) 
0.020** 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
Male to female ratio –0.007 
(0.022) 
0.002 
(0.016) 
–0.010 
(0.020) 
0.020 
(0.023) 
–0.008 
(0.023) 
–0.024* 
(0.014) 
Age of HH head –0.003 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
–0.002 
(0.002) 
–0.002 
(0.002) 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
Years of formal education of HH head 0.001 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
–0.003 
(0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
–0.004 
(0.003) 
Dependency ratio –0.343*** 
(0.112) 
–0.184** 
(0.086) 
–0.087 
(0.101) 
–0.125 
(0.118) 
–0.130 
(0.114) 
–0.188*** 
(0.070) 
Work experience of HH head 0.000 
(0.002) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Whether or not HH functionally owns 
land  
0.115*** 
(0.039) 
0.027 
(0.028) 
0.059* 
(0.032) 
0.071* 
(0.040) 
–0.079** 
(0.039) 
–0.096*** 
(0.025) 
Physical asset index value (leave out 
village mean) 
0.933** 
(0.391) 
–0.370 
(0.294) 
0.126 
(0.351) 
–0.478 
(0.426) 
–0.131 
(0.415) 
–0.295 
(0.267) 
Total livestock in TLU (leave out village 
mean) 
0.116** 
(0.054) 
–0.018 
(0.042) 
0.048 
(0.049) 
0.079 
(0.059) 
0.048 
(0.058) 
–0.021 
(0.036) 
Access to credit –0.019 
(0.042) 
–0.028 
(0.029) 
–0.063* 
(0.034) 
–0.063 
(0.043) 
–0.021 
(0.042) 
0.011 
(0.027) 
Access to extension services 0.036 
(0.043) 
0.018 
(0.032) 
0.073** 
(0.037) 
0.195*** 
(0.041) 
0.112** 
(0.044) 
0.019 
(0.031) 
Affected by climatic shocks  0.137*** 
(0.037) 
0.122*** 
(0.033) 
0.158*** 
(0.036) 
0.156*** 
(0.041) 
0.075* 
(0.040) 
0.105*** 
(0.023) 
Training received by primary HH adult 
male 
0.152 
(0.241) 
7.049*** 
(1.381) 
–0.028 
(0.254) 
–0.114 
(0.255) 
0.651** 
(0.281) 
0.028 
(0.163) 
Training received by primary HH adult 
female 
0.028 
(0.130) 
0.111 
(0.115) 
0.510*** 
(0.177) 
0.087 
(0.148) 
0.089 
(0.145) 
–0.004) 
(0.107) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult 
male (index) 
0.016 
(0.061) 
0.136*** 
(0.045) 
0.086* 
(0.052) 
0.068 
(0.062) 
–0.007 
(0.062) 
0.03)2 
(0.038) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult 
female (index) 
–0.021 
(0.113) 
0.038 
(0.085) 
–0.196** 
(0.101) 
–0.018 
(0.119) 
–0.079 
(0.119) 
0.157** 
(0.080) 
Social capital of primary HH adult male 
(leave out village mean) 
–1.313*** 
(0.404) 
–0.228 
(0.273) 
–0.818** 
(0.331) 
–2.236*** 
(0.414) 
0.487 
(0.389) 
0.217 
(0.266) 
Social capital of primary HH adult 
female (leave out village mean) 
2.079*** 
(0.758) 
0.299 
(0.564) 
0.485 
(0.651) 
1.556** 
(0.796) 
0.186 
(0.773) 
0.364 
(0.484) 
Political capital of primary HH adult 
male (leave out village mean) 
–1.019*** 
(0.331) 
0.441* 
(0.255) 
–0.108 
(0.308) 
–0.577 
(0.358) 
–0.507 
(0.358) 
0.972*** 
(0.240) 
Political capital of primary HH adult 
female  (leave out village mean) 
2.486*** 
(0.950) 
–0.364 
(0.753) 
0.850 
(0.903) ) 
–1.410 
(1.017)  
–0.480 
1.022) 
0.952 
(0.648) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.106 0.115 0.117 0.153 0.051 0.152 
Total observations 740 740 740 740 740 740 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
 *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table A3.6: Marginal effects estimated for determinants of household crop adaptation 
strategies in Bangladesh, 2012 (Results of multivariate probit model) 
 Multivariate probit model results 
Variable  Change crop 
cycle timing 
Changes in 
fertilizer 
use  
Change 
crop 
Irrigation 
use 
Changes in field 
management 
practices 
Seek migratory/ 
off-farm 
employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male-headed household 0.110 
(0.201) 
0.337* 
(0.194) 
0.229 
(0.210) 
0.203 
(0.191) 
–0.061 
(0.194) 
–0.745*** 
(0.226) 
HH size 0.006 
(0.027) 
0.074** 
(0.029) 
–0.006 
(0.028) 
–0.067** 
(0.027) 
0.054** 
(0.027) 
0.034 
(0.032) 
Male to female ratio –0.008 
(0.061) 
0.006 
(0.063) 
–0.025 
(0.066) 
0.054 
(0.061) 
–0.015 
(0.060) 
–0.119* 
(0.074) 
Age of HH head –0.006 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
–0.004 
(0.005) 
–0.007 
(0.005) 
–0.005 
(0.005) 
–0.003 
(0.006) 
Years of formal education of HH head 0.003 
(0.014) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
0.000 
(0.015) 
–0.008 
(0.014) 
0.031** 
(0.013) 
–0.020 
(0.016) 
Dependency ratio –0.908*** 
(0.308) 
–0.801** 
(0.338) 
–0.414 
(0.356) 
–0.433 
(0.323) 
–0.326 
(0.294) 
–0.852** 
(0.352) 
Experience of HH head 0.000 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
Whether or not HH functionally owns 
land  
0.286*** 
(0.109) 
0.087 
(0.113) 
0.221** 
(0.112) 
0.205* 
(0.109) 
–0.204** 
(0.104) 
–0.466*** 
(0.135) 
Physical asset index value (leave out 
village mean) 
2.249** 
(1.077) 
–0.805 
(1.157) 
1.344 
(1.203) 
–1.016 
1.133) 
–0.186 
(1.087) 
–1.591 
(1.365) 
Total livestock in TLU (leave out 
village mean) 
0.287* 
(0.152) 
0.056 
(0.162) 
0.267* 
(0.157) 
0.276* 
(0.161) 
0.142 
(0.154) 
–0.119 
(0.185) 
Access to credit –0.067 
(0.112) 
–0.087 
(0.118) 
–0.178 
(0.121) 
–0.143 
(0.121) 
–0.052 
(0.109) 
0.050 
(0.140) 
Access to extension services 0.100 
(0.117) 
0.104 
(0.125) 
0.241* 
(0.133) 
0.542*** 
(0.120) 
0.294** 
(0.114) 
0.063 
(0.153) 
Affected by climatic shocks 0.392*** 
(0.110) 
0.426*** 
(0.112) 
0.477*** 
(0.111)  
0.399*** 
(0.107) 
0.195* 
(0.107) 
0.596*** 
(0.146) 
Training received by primary HH adult 
male 
0.529 
(0.686) 
20.446*** 
(6.413) 
0.026 
(0.940) 
–0.298 
(0.779) 
1.681** 
(0.723) 
0.131 
(0.993) 
Training received by primary HH adult 
female 
0.061 
(0.367) 
0.454 
(0.465) 
2.127*** 
(0.698) 
0.363 
(0.404) 
0.268 
(0.389) 
0.014 
(0.532) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult 
male  
0.094 
(0.167) 
0.425** 
(0.178) 
0.262 
(0.178) 
0.164 
(0.164) 
–0.024 
(0.162) 
0.182 
(0.189) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult 
female  
–0.070 
(0.304) 
0.314 
(0.323) 
–0.517 
(0.350) 
0.157 
(0.327) 
–0.178 
(0.311) 
0.760* 
(0.410) 
Social capital of primary HH adult 
male (leave out village mean) 
–3.328*** 
(1.082) 
–1.201 
(1.070) 
–2.971*** 
(1.121) 
–5.981*** 
(1.096) 
1.293 
(1.022) 
0.986 
(1.305) 
Social capital of primary HH adult 
female (leave out village mean) 
5.777*** 
(2.121) 
1.240 
(2.178) 
0.907 
(2.229) 
3.895* 
(2.186) 
0.220 
(2.002) 
1.567 
(2.455) 
Political capital of primary HH adult 
male (leave out village mean) 
–2.687*** 
(0.913) 
1.436 
(1.001) 
–0.591 
(1.049) 
–1.770* 
(0.964) 
–1.329 
(0.946) 
4.900*** 
(1.233) 
Political capital of primary HH adult 
female  (leave out village mean) 
6.392** 
(2.718) 
–1.130 
(2.995) 
3.826 
(3.084) 
–3.250 
(2.736) 
–1.332 
(2.673) 
4.847 
(3.250) 
 Rho1  Rho2 Rho3 Rho4 Rho5 Rho6 
Rho1 1      
Rho2 0 .571*** 1     
Rho3 0 .446*** 0 .418*** 1    
Rho4 0 .463*** 0 .507*** 0 .385*** 1   
Rho5 0 .246*** 0 .197*** 0 .135*** 0 .063 1  
Rho6 0 .150** 0 .135** 0 .182** 0 .124** 0 .276*** 1 
Likelihood ratio test chi2(15) =  271.429***    
Total observations 740      
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table A3.7: Marginal effects estimated from probit model of correlates of household livestock 
production adaptation strategies in Bangladesh, 2012 
 Probit model results Multivariate probit model results 
Variable  Veterinary 
intervention 
Change 
livestock feed 
Change 
livestock 
 Veterinary 
intervention 
Change 
livestock feed 
Change 
livestock 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male-headed household 0.057 
(0.072) 
0.014 
(0.072) 
–0.041 
(0.050) 
0.162 
(0.203) 
0.004 
(0.212) 
–0.266 
(0.249) 
HH size –0.003 
(0.010) 
0.015* 
(0.009) 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
–0.007 
(0.026) 
0.045* 
(0.027) 
0.053 
(0.034) 
Male to female ratio –0.033 
(0.024) 
–0.001 
(0.022) 
–0.001 
(0.012) 
–0.096 
(0.066) 
–0.002 
(0.065) 
–0.005 
(0.076) 
Age of HH head –0.004** 
(0.002) 
–0.003* 
(0.002) 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
–0.011** 
(0.005) 
–0.008 
(0.006) 
–0.010 
(0.007) 
Years of formal education of HH 
head 
–0.007 
(0.005) 
–0.005 
(0.005) 
–0.001 
(0.003) 
–0.018 
(0.014) 
–0.017 
(0.014) 
–0.008 
(0.016) 
Dependency ratio –0.055 
(0.117) 
–0.208** 
(0.109) 
–0.038 
(0.060) 
–0.195 
(0.312) 
–0.584* 
(0.321) 
–0.146 
(0.375) 
Experience of HH head 0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.008* 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
Whether or not HH functionally 
owns land  
0.116*** 
(0.040) 
0.071** 
(0.037) 
0.026 
(0.022) 
0.303*** 
(0.106) 
0.241** 
(0.107) 
0.171 
(0.139) 
Physical asset index value (leave out 
village mean) 
–0.728* 
(0.411) 
0.612 
(0.388) 
0.429** 
(0.196) 
–2.124** 
(1.094) 
1.901* 
(1.148) 
2.947** 
(1.308) 
Total livestock in TLU (leave out 
village mean) 
0.135** 
(0.056) 
0.136** 
(0.053) 
0.042 
(0.030) 
0.371** 
(0.150) 
0.401** 
(0.159) 
0.276 
(0.201) 
Access to credit –0.008 
(0.043) 
–0.022 
(0.040) 
0.022 
(0.021) 
–0.027 
(0.116) 
–0.054 
(0.116) 
0.150 
(0.150) 
Access to extension services 0.070 
(0.044 ) 
0.049 
(0.041) 
0.049* 
(0.026) 
0.187* 
(0.116) 
0.128 
(0.117) 
0.281* 
(0.147) 
Affected by climatic shocks 0.178*** 
(0.037) 
0.069* 
(0.037) 
0.065*** 
(0.019) 
0.494*** 
(0.109) 
0.212* 
(0.114) 
0.479*** 
(0.154) 
Training received by primary HH 
adult male 
–0.048 
(0.281) 
–0.197 
(0.232) 
0.131 
(0.139) 
–0.052 
(0.709) 
–0.461 
(0.640) 
0.930 
(0.912) 
Training received by primary HH 
adult female 
0.167 
(0.147) 
0.339** 
(0.139) 
0.070 
(0.067) 
0.431 
(0.402) 
0.933** 
(0.385) 
0.536 
(0.443) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult 
male  
0.018 
(0.062) 
0.202*** 
(0.057) 
0.093*** 
(0.032) 
0.039 
(0.168) 
0.585*** 
(0.166) 
0.544*** 
(0.209) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult 
female  
–0.037 
(0.118) 
–0.149 
(0.107) 
0.030 
(0.062) 
–0.087 
(0.316) 
–0.387 
(0.310) 
0.216 
(0.398) 
Social capital of primary HH adult 
male (leave out village mean) 
–1.985*** 
(0.411) 
–1.152*** 
(0.391) 
0.295 
(0.203) 
–5.299*** 
(1.071) 
–3.577*** 
(1.131) 
1.399 
(1.308) 
Social capital of primary HH adult 
female (leave out village mean) 
1.874** 
(0.778) 
1.052 
(0.742) 
0.644* 
(0.395) 
5.269** 
(2.124) 
2.575 
(2.216) 
3.221 
(2.530) 
Political capital of primary HH adult 
male (leave out village mean) 
0.961*** 
(0.362) 
–0.349 
(0.329) 
0.029 
(0.179) 
2.557*** 
(0.981) 
–1.060 
(0.969) 
0.017 
(1.167) 
Political capital of primary HH adult 
female  (leave out village mean) 
–1.299 
(0.987) 
0.292 
(0.923) 
1.107** 
(0.522) 
–3.084 
(2.645) 
1.398 
(2.716) 
6.868** 
(3.362) 
    Rho1  Rho2 Rho3 
Rho1    1   
Rho2    0 .585*** 1  
Rho3    0 .318*** 0 .269*** 1 
Likelihood ratio test    chi2(3) = 127.683*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.121 0.089 0.147  
Total observations 740 740 740 740   
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
126 
 
Table A3.8: Marginal effects estimated from probit model of household coping mechanism 
correlates based on group participation in Bangladesh, 2012 
Variable  Selling assets Informal 
borrowing 
Seeking migratory/ 
off-farm employment  
Reducing and 
modifying diet 
Withdrawing 
kids from school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Affected by flood –0.025** 
(0.012) 
0.042 
(0.028) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
0.023** 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
Affected by drought –0.005 
(0.015) 
0.029 
(0.026) 
–0.001 
(0.013) 
0.019** 
(0.008) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
Affected by cyclone –0.018 
(0.013) 
0.009 
(0.030) 
0.020 
(0.017) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
0.048*** 
(0.018) 
Affected by non-climatic 
negative shocks 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
0.126*** 
(0.019) 
0.034*** 
(0.010) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.021*** 
(0.007) 
Affected by positive shocks –0.009 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.023) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
Male-headed household –0.005 
(0.028) 
0.096*** 
(0.018) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
–0.029 
(0.029) 
–0.046 
(0.032) 
HH size –0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
–0.002 
(0.002) 
Male to female ratio 0.003 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
–0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Age of HH head 0.001 
(0.001) 
–0.002* 
(0.001) 
–0.001** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Years of formal education of HH 
head 
0.001 
(0.002) 
–0.002 
(0.003) 
–0.002 
(0.001) 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
Dependency ratio 0.005 
(0.034) 
0.129* 
(0.067) 
–0.079** 
(0.035) 
–0.017 
(0.019) 
0.015 
(0.023) 
Experience of HH head 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
Whether or not HH functionally 
owns land  
0.017 
(0.013) 
–0.015 
(0.021) 
–0.005 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
Physical asset index (leave out 
village mean) 
0.136 
(0.112) 
0.230 
(0.190) 
–0.027 
(0.095) 
0.134** 
(0.064) 
–0.039 
(0.083) 
Total livestock in TLU (leave out 
village mean) 
0.004 
(0.015) 
–0.004 
(0.029) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
Access to credit 0.014 
(0.013) 
0.088*** 
(0.019) 
–0.025* 
(0.016) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
Access to extension services 0.005 
(0.014) 
0.065** 
(0.026) 
0.041** 
(0.018) 
–0.003 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
Training received by primary HH 
adult male 
0.010 
(0.072) 
0.161 
(0.110) 
0.017 
(0.060) 
–0.414 
(0.277) 
–0.061 
(0.054) 
Training received by primary HH 
adult female 
0.002 
(0.038) 
–0.031 
(0.071) 
–0.027 
(0.053) 
–0.001 
(0.020) 
–0.081** 
(0.036) 
Access to ICT by primary HH 
adult male (index) 
0.040* 
(0.021) 
–0.059* 
(0.034) 
–0.063*** 
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
Access to ICT by primary HH 
adult female (index) 
–0.056 
(0.043) 
–0.040 
(0.063) 
0.036 
(0.034) 
0.006 
(0.019) 
0.015 
(0.022) 
Group participation by primary 
HH adult male 
0.007 
(0.016) 
0.003 
(0.024) 
–0.008 
(0.011) 
0.020* 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
Group participation by primary 
HH adult female 
0.011 
(0.020) 
–0.026 
(0.023) 
–0.002 
(0.013) 
0.014 
(0.014) 
0.032 
(0.020) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.096 0.166 0.157 0.140 0.183 
Total observations 740 740 740 740 740 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table A3.9: Marginal effects estimated from probit model for household coping mechanism 
correlates, based on social and political capital indices in Bangladesh, 2012 
Variable  Sale of 
assets 
Informal 
borrowing 
Migratory/ off-
farm 
employment 
Reducing and 
modifying diet 
Withdrawing 
children from school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Affected by flood –0.020* 
(0.011) 
0.025 
(0.026) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
0.020* 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
Affected by drought –0.008 
(0.015) 
0.038 
(0.025) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.020** 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.008) 
Affected by cyclone –0.018 
(0.012) 
–0.005 
(0.028) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.010 
(0.012) 
0.038** 
(0.015) 
Affected by non-climatic negative 
shocks 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.113*** 
(0.019) 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
Affected by positive shocks –0.005 
(0.014) 
0.018 
(0.025) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.022* 
(0.013) 
Male-headed household –0.003 
(0.026) 
0.088*** 
(0.018) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
–0.013 
(0.018) 
–0.031 
(0.025) 
HH size –0.007** 
(0.003)  
0.000 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
–0.002 
(0.002) 
Male to female ratio 0.004 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
–0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
Age of HH head 0.000 
(0.001) 
–0.002* 
(0.001) 
–0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Years of formal education of HH head 0.001 
(0.001) 
–0.002 
(0.003) 
–0.002 
(0.001) 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
–0.001 
(0.001) 
Dependency ratio 0.008 
(0.034) 
0.089 
(0.068) 
–0.054** 
(0.027) 
–0.025 
(0.019) 
0.018 
(0.023) 
Experience of HH head 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
Whether or not HH functionally owns 
land  
0.015 
(0.013) 
–0.013 
(0.020) 
–0.002 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
Physical asset index value (leave out 
village mean) 
0.214* 
(0.123) 
0.024 
(0.227) 
–0.095 
(0.088) 
0.092 
(0.067) 
0.048 
(0.081) 
Total livestock in TLU (leave out 
village mean) 
0.019 
(0.018) 
–0.034 
(0.033) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.018** 
(0.009) 
Access to credit 0.015 
(0.012) 
0.082*** 
(0.019) 
–0.026** 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
Access to extension services 0.004 
(0.013) 
0.058** 
(0.025) 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
–0.003 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
Training received by primary HH 
adult male 
–0.005 
(0.069) 
0.230** 
(0.106) 
0.010 
(0.045) 
–0.435 
(0.278) 
–0.060 
(0.053) 
Training received by primary HH 
adult female 
0.009 
(0.036) 
–0.040 
(0.074) 
–0.025 
(0.042) 
–0.005 
(0.023) 
–0.066** 
(0.031) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult 
male (index) 
0.038* 
(0.021) 
–0.059* 
(0.034) 
–0.050*** 
(0.016) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
–0.003 
(0.011) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult 
female (index) 
–0.051 
(0.041) 
–0.016 
(0.061) 
0.031 
(0.027) 
0.012 
(0.020) 
0.013 
(0.022) 
Social capital of primary HH adult 
male (leave out village mean) 
–0.349*** 
(0.122) 
0.057 
(0.195) 
–0.023 
(0.086) 
–0.005 
(0.067) 
–0.233** 
(0.098) 
Social capital of primary HH adult 
female (leave out village mean) 
–0.116 
(0.261) 
–0.983** 
(0.429) 
0.255* 
(0.154) 
–0.072 
(0.110) 
–0.138 
(0.133) 
Political capital of primary HH adult 
male (leave out village mean) 
0.034 
(0.094) 
0.702*** 
(0.195) 
0.088 
(0.077) 
0.117 
(0.076) 
–0.019 
(0.063) 
Political capital of primary HH adult 
female  (leave out village mean) 
–0.089 
(0.291) 
0.215 
(0.528) 
0.647*** 
(0.217) 
–0.024 
(0.164) 
–0.044 
(0.170) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.114 0.198 0.223 0.139 0.201 
Total observations 740 740 740 740 740 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table A3.10: Marginal effects estimated from the multivariate probit model for correlates of 
household shock coping mechanisms in Bangladesh, 2012 
Variable  Selling 
assets 
Informal 
borrowing 
Migratory / off-
farm employment 
Reducing and 
modifying diet 
Withdrawing 
children from school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Affected by flood –0.293* 
(0.180) 
0.173 
(0.162) 
0.053 
(0.228) 
0.487** 
(0.197) 
0.137 
(0.224) 
Affected by drought –0.105 
(0.198) 
0.270* 
(0.166) 
0.158 
(0.230) 
0.584*** 
(0.211) 
0.257 
(0.222) 
Affected by cyclone –0.289 
(0.216) 
–0.031 
(0.186) 
0.233 
(0.206) 
0.297 
(0.239) 
0.696*** 
(0.212) 
Affected by non-climatic negative shocks 0.403** 
(0.194) 
0.920*** 
(0.193) 
0.681*** 
(0.258) 
0.461* 
(0.243) 
0.721*** 
(0.278) 
Affected by positive shocks –0.074 
(0.199) 
0.124 
(0.147) 
0.225 
(0.217) 
0.252 
(0.192) 
0.517*** 
(0.191) 
Male-headed household –0.037 
(0.330) 
0.968** 
(0.396) 
0.424 
(0.321) 
–0.290 
(0.317) 
–0.511* 
(0.274) 
HH size –0.095** 
(0.043) 
0.002 
(0.034) 
0.018 
(0.042) 
0.009 
(0.048) 
–0.051 
(0.055) 
Male to female ratio 0.057 
(0.097) 
0.038 
(0.077) 
0.112 
(0.105) 
–0.267* 
(0.143) 
0.064 
(0.129) 
Age of HH head 0.006 
(0.008) 
–0.013* 
(0.007) 
–0.024*** 
(0.008) 
–0.003 
(0.008) 
–0.008 
(0.009) 
Years of formal education of HH head 0.018 
(0.020) 
–0.011 
(0.018) 
–0.036* 
(0.022) 
–0.017 
(0.029) 
–0.034 
(0.026) 
Dependency ratio 0.121 
(0.476) 
0.592 
(0.448) 
–1.158** 
(0.481) 
–0.735 
(0.554) 
0.476 
(0.638) 
Experience of HH head 0.005 
(0.008) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
–0.010 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
Whether or not HH functionally owns land  0.199 
(0.164) 
–0.104 
(0.132) 
–0.064 
(0.170) 
0.059 
(0.199) 
0.131 
(0.206) 
Physical asset index value (leave out village mean) 3.033* 
(1.757) 
–0.042 
(1.504) 
–2.055 
(1.860) 
2.996* 
(1.567) 
1.250 
(2.207) 
Total livestock in TLU (leave out village mean) 0.258 
(0.253) 
–0.240 
(0.223) 
0.105 
(0.250) 
0.178 
(0.252) 
0.469** 
(0.242) 
Access to credit 0.222 
(0.188) 
0.630*** 
(0.169) 
–0.455** 
(0.192) 
0.233 
(0.214) 
0.146 
(0.197) 
Access to extension services 0.047 
(0.177) 
0.362** 
(0.146) 
0.405** 
(0.192) 
–0.122 
(0.220) 
0.205 
(0.225) 
Training received by primary HH adult male –0.082 
(0.959) 
1.550** 
(0.698) 
0.080 
(0.997) 
–13.570 
(9.133) 
–1.583 
1.310) 
Training received by primary HH adult female 0.115 
(0.507) 
–0.250 
(0.493) 
–0.538 
(0.917) 
–0.113 
(0.625) 
–1.799** 
(0.810) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult male (index) 0.511* 
(0.278) 
–0.399* 
(0.231) 
–1.151 
(0.288) 
0.213 
(0.332) 
–0.117 
(0.306) 
Access to ICT by primary HH adult female (index) –0.715 
(0.561) 
–0.123 
(0.402) 
0.701 
(0.543) 
0.356 
(0.578) 
0.455 
(0.595) 
Social capital of primary HH adult male (leave out 
village mean) 
–4.827*** 
(1.677) 
0.346 
(1.308) 
–0.681 
(1.867) 
–0.692 
(1.753) 
–6.550** 
(2.557) 
Social capital of primary HH adult female (leave out 
village mean) 
–1.665 
(3.565) 
–6.412** 
(2.674)  
5.577* 
(3.233) 
–1.424 
(2.994) 
–4.111 
(3.638) 
Political capital of primary HH adult male (leave out 
village mean) 
0.403 
(1.296) 
4.659*** 
(1.333) 
1.891 
(1.587) 
3.191 
(1.983) 
–0.518 
(1.685) 
Political capital of primary HH adult female  (leave 
out village mean) 
–1.316 
(4.003) 
1.508 
(3.468) 
14.188*** 
(4.274) 
–0.454 
(4.778) 
–1.153 
(4.831) 
 Rho1  Rho2 Rho3 Rho4 Rho5 
Rho1 1     
Rho2 –0 .220** 1    
Rho3 –0 .182 –0 .101 1   
Rho4 0 .211 –0 .145 0 .246* 1  
Rho5 0 .017 –0 .197 –0 .165 0 .023 1 
Likelihood ratio test chi2(10) = 8.09 
Total observations 740     
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses, *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Appendix A4:  Supplementary tables 
Table A4.1: Household summary statistics  
Variable Obs. Mean Min P50 Std. Dev. Max 
HH head participating in groups 642 0.78 0 1 0.41 1 
Spouse participating in groups 642 0.43 0 0 0.50 1 
Number of groups the HH head participates in 642 1.58 0 2 1.21 7 
Number of groups the spouse participates in 642 0.92 0 0 1.28 7 
Year of schooling of HH head 642 3.47 0 2 4.24 17 
Year of schooling of spouse 642 2.98 0 1 3.46 15 
Age of HH head 642 49 22 48 13.03 97 
Age of spouse 642 40 18 39 11.49 75 
HH head employed off-farm 642 0.13 0 0 0.34 1 
Spouse employed off-farm 642 0.03 0 0 0.16 1 
Household size 642 4.97 2 5 1.93 14 
Male-to-female ratio 642 1.16 0.17 1 0.82 5 
Household dependency ratio 642 0.66 0 0.70 0.16 1 
Per capita monthly food expenditure 642 698 108 619 370 3217 
Per capita monthly non-food expenditure 642 1007 59 583 1485 16721 
Total value of assets 642 57072 0 37565 79910 772591 
Total value of assets of HH head 642 45073 0 23090 80626 855930 
Total value of assets of spouse 642 11772 0 2000 27691 321500 
Total plot size (square meters) 642 3255 0 1618 4701 38053 
Total livestock (TLU) 642 0.86 0 1 0.35 1 
Affected by climatic shocks 642 0.63 0 1 0.48 1 
Affected by non-climatic negative shocks 642 0.32 0 0 0.47 1 
Affected by positive shocks 642 0.27 0 0 0.45 1 
Relative participation  642 0.09 0 0.11 0.07 0.39 
Initiative in local development steps 642 0.27 0 0 0.41 1 
Trust in strangers 642 2.68 0 3 1.02 5 
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Table A4.2: Aggregate social and political capital and the asset index: OLS and IV results  
 Asset index 
 OLS IV  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Social and political capital of HH head 0.068 
(0.047) 
 0.172* 
(0.093) 
 
Social and political capital of spouse  -0.016 
(0.062) 
 1.208*** 
(0.408) 
Years of schooling of HH head 0.012*** 
(0.002) 
 0.011*** 
(0.001) 
 
Years of schooling of spouse  0.016*** 
(0.002) 
 0.016*** 
(0.002) 
Age of HH head 0.000 
(0.000) 
 0.001 
(0.000) 
 
Age of spouse  0.002*** 
(0.001) 
 0.001** 
(0.001) 
HH head working off-farm 0.003 
(0.016) 
 0.009*** 
(0.003) 
 
Spouse working off-farm  -0.008 
(0.020) 
 -0.051 
(0.042) 
Household size 0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
Male-to-female ratio 0.004 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.007)  
0.010 
(0.034) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
Household dependency ratio 0.010 
(0.034) 
-0.019 
(0.037) 
0.003 
(0.015) 
0.006 
(0.045) 
Log of total plot size (square meters) -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Total livestock (TLU) 0.001 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
Affected by climatic shocks -0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
Affected by non-climatic negative shocks -0.003 
(0.011) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
Affected by  positive shocks -0.002 
(0.011) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.028* 
(0.017) 
R- squared 0.147 0.135 0.140 0.315 
N 642 642 642 642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table A4.3: Social and political capital separately and household welfare: OLS results 
 Log of total assets Log of per capita consumption expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Social capital of HH 
head 
1.814*** 
(0.620) 
   0.758*** 
(0.165) 
   
Social capital of 
spouse 
 -0.074 
(0.703) 
   -0.007 
(0.189) 
  
Political capital of HH 
head 
  0.684 
(0.786) 
 
 
  0.130 
(0.233) 
 
Political capital of 
spouse 
   -0.258 
(0.822) 
   -0.242 
(0.353) 
Years of schooling of 
HH head 
0.078*** 
(0.016) 
 0.087*** 
(0.017) 
 0.037*** 
(0.006) 
 0.041*** 
(0.006) 
 
Years of schooling of 
spouse 
 0.145*** 
(0.023) 
 0.146*** 
(0.023) 
 0.052*** 
(0.008) 
 0.051*** 
(0.008) 
Age of HH head -0.014** 
(0.008) 
 -0.014** 
(0.008) 
 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 0.011*** 
(0.002) 
 
Age of spouse  -0.003 
(0.010) 
 -0.003 
(0.010) 
 0.016*** 
(0.002) 
 0.016*** 
(0.002) 
HH head working off-
farm 
0.032 
(0.206) 
 0.013 
(0.206) 
 0.011 
(0.061) 
 0.004 
(0.062) 
 
Spouse working off-
farm 
 -0.501 
(0.622) 
 -0.499 
(0.623) 
 -0.081 
(0.154) 
 -0.077 
(0.156) 
Household size 0.032 
(0.045) 
0.048 
(0.047) 
0.037 
(0.045) 
0.047 
(0.047) 
-0.074*** 
(0.014) 
-0.073*** 
(0.014) 
-0.072*** 
(0.014) 
-0.073*** 
(0.015) 
Male-to-female ratio -0.164 
(0.107) 
-0.165 
(0.108) 
-0.171 
(0.108) 
-0.165 
(0.108) 
0.029 
(0.030) 
0.027 
(0.030) 
0.026 
(0.030) 
0.027 
(0.030) 
Household 
dependency ratio 
0.534 
(0.596) 
0.048 
(0.644) 
0.466 
(0.599) 
0.060 
(0.642) 
0.220 
(0.151) 
0.118 
(0.160) 
0.196 
(0.150) 
0.125 
(0.160) 
Log of total plot size 
(square meters) 
0.043 
(0.028) 
0.046* 
(0.027) 
0.049* 
(0.028) 
0.046* 
(0.027) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
Total livestock (TLU) 1.102*** 
(0.332) 
1.145*** 
(0.331) 
1.112*** 
(0.327) 
1.150*** 
(0.332) 
-0.035 
(0.063) 
-0.014 
(0.064) 
-0.027 
(0.064) 
-0.010 
(0.064) 
Affected by climatic 
shocks 
-0.204 
(0.168) 
-0.183 
(0.165) 
-0.190 
(0.172) 
-0.183 
(0.166) 
0.075 
(0.047) 
0.086* 
(0.048) 
0.084* 
(0.048) 
0.086* 
(0.048) 
Affected by non-
climatic negative 
shocks 
-0.404** 
(0.185) 
-0.404** 
(0.185) 
-0.416** 
(0.188) 
-0.406** 
(0.185) 
0.068 
(0.048) 
0.081* 
(0.050) 
0.065 
(0.049) 
0.080 
(0.049) 
Affected by positive 
shocks 
-0.068 
(0.171) 
-0.034 
(0.175) 
-0.020 
(0.174) 
-0.037 
(0.170) 
0.017 
(0.050) 
0.038 
(0.053) 
0.034 
(0.051) 
0.038 
(0.052) 
 R-squared 0.113 0.116 0.104 0.116 0.190 0.160 0.167 0.161 
N 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table A4.4: Group participation and household welfare: OLS results 
 Log of total assets Log of per capita consumption expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HH head participated in groups 0.324* 
(0.199) 
 0.009 
(0.053) 
 
Spouse participated in groups  -0.326* 
(0.182) 
 -0.080* 
(0.046) 
Years of schooling of HH head  0.086*** 
(0.016) 
 0.041*** 
(0.006) 
 
Years of schooling of spouse   0.144*** 
(0.023) 
 0.051*** 
(0.008) 
Age of HH head -0.014* 
(0.008) 
 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 
Age of spouse  -0.004 
(0.010) 
 0.016*** 
(0.002) 
HH head employed off-farm 0.023 
(0.205) 
 0.005 
(0.062) 
 
Spouse employed off-farm  -0.431 
(0.624) 
 -0.063 
(0.154) 
Household size 0.048 
(0.047) 
0.047 
(0.047) 
-0.072*** 
(0.014) 
-0.073*** 
(0.014) 
Male-to-female ratio -0.176* 
(0.108) 
-0.169 
(0.108) 
0.025 
(0.030) 
0.026 
(0.030) 
Household dependency ratio 0.489 
(0.595) 
-0.031 
(0.647) 
0.201 
(0.149) 
0.098 
(0.161) 
Log of total plot size (square meters) 0.046* 
(0.028) 
0.045* 
(0.027) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
Total livestock (TLU) 1.110*** 
(0.337) 
1.118*** 
(0.331) 
-0.025 
(0.064) 
-0.021 
(0.064) 
Affected by climatic shocks -0.173 
(0.168) 
-0.148 
(0.164) 
0.087* 
(0.048) 
0.094** 
(0.048) 
Affected by  non-climatic negative shocks -0.406** 
(0.186) 
-0.367** 
(0.188) 
0.067 
(0.049) 
0.091* 
(0.049) 
Affected by positive shocks -0.038 
(0.172) 
0.017 
(0.176) 
0.032 
(0.051) 
0.051 
(0.053) 
 R-squared 0.107 0.121 0.166 0.164 
N 642 642 642 642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table A4.5: Informal network and household welfare: OLS results 
 Log of total assets Log of  per capita consumption 
expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Informal network of HH head  2.560*** 
(0.842) 
 0.984*** 
(0.249) 
 
Informal network of spouse   0.857 
(0.971) 
 0.488* 
(0.277) 
Years of schooling of HH head  0.084*** 
(0.017) 
 0.039*** 
(0.006) 
 
Years of schooling of spouse   0.145*** 
(0.023) 
 0.051*** 
(0.008) 
Age of HH head -0.015* 
(0.008) 
 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 
Age of spouse  -0.003 
(0.010) 
 0.016*** 
(0.002) 
HH head employed off-farm 0.039 
(0.203) 
 0.013 
(0.061) 
 
Spouse employed off-farm  -0.497 
(0.619) 
 -0.078 
(0.153) 
Household size 0.034 
(0.045) 
0.048 
(0.047) 
-0.073*** 
(0.014) 
-0.073*** 
(0.014) 
Male-to-female ratio -0.173 
(0.108) 
-0.168 
(0.108) 
0.025 
(0.030) 
0.025 
(0.030) 
Household dependency ratio 0.445 
(0.595) 
0.046 
(0.638) 
0.184 
(0.150) 
0.115 
(0.160) 
Log of total plot size (square meters) 0.045* 
(0.028) 
0.047* 
(0.027) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
Total livestock (TLU) 1.123*** 
(0.332) 
1.136*** 
(0.329) 
-0.026 
(0.063) 
-0.020 
(0.064) 
Affected by climatic shocks -0.197 
(0.168) 
-0.192 
(0.165) 
0.078* 
(0.047) 
0.081* 
(0.048) 
Affected by non-climatic negative shocks -0.409** 
(0.185) 
-0.399** 
(0.185) 
0.065 
(0.048) 
0.084* 
(0.050) 
Affected by positive shocks -0.054 
(0.170) 
-0.044 
(0.171) 
0.024 
(0.050) 
0.034 
(0.052) 
R-squared 0.113 0.116 0.185 0.163 
N 642 642 642 642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table A4.6: Social and political capital separately and household welfare: IV results 
 Log of total assets Log of per capita consumption expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Social capital of HH 
head 
2.275 
(1.525) 
   0.934** 
(0.406) 
   
Social capital of spouse  1.741 
(2.841) 
   1.457* 
(0.799) 
  
Political capital of HH 
head 
  3.251* 
(1.991) 
   0.983* 
(0.537) 
 
Political capital of 
spouse 
   7.406 
(9.102) 
   4.268 
(2.736) 
Years of schooling of 
head 
0.076*** 
(0.022) 
 0.080*** 
(0.021) 
 0.036*** 
(0.006) 
 0.039*** 
(0.006) 
 
Years of schooling of 
spouse 
 0.145*** 
(0.027) 
 0.150*** 
(0.028) 
 0.051*** 
(0.008) 
 0.054*** 
(0.008) 
Age  of HH head -0.014** 
(0.007) 
 -0.012* 
(0.007) 
 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 0.011*** 
(0.002) 
 
Age of spouse  -0.002 
(0.008) 
 -0.008 
(0.011) 
 0.017*** 
(0.002) 
 0.013*** 
(0.003) 
HH head employed off-
farm 
0.036 
(0.249) 
 -0.007 
(0.253) 
 0.012 
(0.066) 
 -0.003 
(0.068) 
 
HH head employed off-
farm 
 -0.570 
(0.543) 
 -0.641 
(0.572) 
 -0.137 
(0.153) 
 -0.160 
(0.172) 
Household size 0.030 
(0.047) 
0.044 
(0.048) 
0.034 
(0.048) 
0.072 
(0.057) 
-0.075*** 
(0.013) 
-0.076*** 
(0.014) 
-0.073*** 
(0.013) 
-0.059*** 
(0.017) 
Male-to-female ratio -0.161 
(0.103) 
-0.160 
(0.104) 
-0.165 
(0.104) 
-0.164 
(0.106) 
0.030 
(0.028) 
0.031 
(0.029) 
0.028 
(0.028) 
0.027 
(0.032) 
Household dependency 
ratio 
0.545 
(0.567) 
0.159 
(0.620) 
0.377 
(0.577) 
-0.161 
(0.666) 
0.224 
(0.151) 
0.208 
(0.175) 
0.167 
(0.156) 
-0.004 
(0.200) 
Log of total plot size 
(square meters) 
0.041 
(0.028) 
0.049* 
(0.028) 
0.050* 
(0.028) 
0.046* 
(0.028) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
Total livestock (TLU) 1.096*** 
(0.240) 
1.151*** 
(0.240) 
1.053*** 
(0.246) 
1.012*** 
(0.296) 
-0.037 
(0.064) 
-0.010 
(0.067) 
-0.046 
(0.066) 
-0.091 
(0.089) 
Affected by climatic 
shocks 
-0.211 
(0.173) 
-0.221 
(0.182) 
-0.244 
(0.179) 
-0.203 
(0.178) 
0.072 
(0.046) 
0.054 
(0.051) 
0.066 
(0.048) 
0.074 
(0.054) 
Affected by non-
climatic negative 
shocks 
-0.403*** 
(0.176) 
-0.430** 
(0.181) 
-0.454** 
(0.181) 
-0.363** 
(0.188) 
0.068 
(0.047) 
0.060 
(0.051) 
0.052 
(0.049) 
0.105* 
(0.056) 
Affected by positive 
shocks 
-0.076 
(0.187) 
-0.100 
(0.212) 
0.031 
(0.192) 
-0.030 
(0.191) 
0.014 
(0.050) 
-0.015 
(0.060) 
0.051 
(0.052) 
0.042 
(0.057) 
R-squared 0.113 0.107 0.088 0.058 0.188 0.090  0.143 0.098 
N 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table A4.7: Group participation and household welfare: IV results 
 Log of total assets Log of per capita consumption expenditure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HH head participated in groups 0.410 
(0.290) 
 
 
0.098 
(0.078) 
 
Spouse participated in groups  0.384 
(0.676) 
 0.041 
(0.182) 
Years of schooling of HH head  0.085*** 
(0.021) 
 0.040*** 
(0.006) 
 
Years of schooling of spouse   0.147*** 
(0.027) 
 0.052*** 
(0.007) 
Age of HH head -0.014** 
(0.007) 
 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
 
Age of spouse  -0.001 
(0.009) 
 0.016*** 
(0.002) 
HH head employed off-farm 0.024 
(0.250) 
 0.006 
(0.067) 
 
Spouse employed off-farm  -0.589 
(0.556) 
 -0.090 
(0.150) 
Household size 0.051 
(0.048) 
0.049 
(0.048) 
-0.069*** 
(0.013) 
-0.073*** 
(0.013) 
Male-to-female ratio -0.177* 
(0.103) 
-0.160 
(0.104) 
0.024 
(0.028) 
0.027 
(0.028) 
Household dependency ratio 0.488 
(0.568) 
0.151 
(0.624) 
0.201 
(0.153) 
0.129 
(0.168) 
Log of total plot size (square meters) 0.046* 
(0.027) 
0.048* 
(0.027) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
Total livestock (TLU) 1.106*** 
(0.240) 
1.178*** 
(0.247) 
-0.029 
(0.065) 
-0.011 
(0.067) 
Affected by climatic shocks -0.172 
(0.172) 
-0.227 
(0.189) 
0.087* 
(0.046) 
0.081 
(0.051) 
Affected by non-climatic negative shocks -0.406** 
(0.176) 
-0.449** 
(0.194) 
0.067 
(0.048) 
0.076 
(0.052) 
Affected by positive shocks -0.039 
(0.186) 
-0.100 
(0.218) 
0.030 
(0.050) 
0.031 
(0.059) 
 R-squared 0.106 0.097  0.163 0.155 
N 642 642 642 642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
Table A4.8: Group participation by types of group and household welfare: IV results 
 Log of total assets Log of per capita consumption expenditure 
 Farmer 
group by 
male 
Credit 
group by 
female  
Religious 
group by 
male 
Farmer 
group by 
male 
Credit 
group by 
female  
Religious 
group by 
male 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
HH head participated in groups 0.289 
(0.498) 
 2.292 
(1.674) 
0.084 
(0.134) 
 0.969** 
(0.487) 
Spouse participated in groups  -0.309 
(1.273) 
  -0.318 
(0.356) 
 
Years of schooling of HH head  0.093*** 
(0.021) 
 0.070*** 
(0.026) 
0.043*** 
(0.006) 
 0.034*** 
(0.007) 
Years of schooling of spouse   0.142*** 
(0.031) 
  0.049*** 
(0.009) 
 
Age of HH head -0.015** 
(0.007) 
 -0.024** 
(0.010) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
 0.007** 
(0.003) 
Age of spouse  -0.006 
(0.012) 
  0.014*** 
(0.003) 
 
HH head employed off-farm 0.000 
(0.252) 
 -0.122 
(0.281) 
0.007 
(0.068) 
 -0.043 
(0.082) 
Spouse employed off-farm  -0.520 
(0.570) 
  -0.030 
(0.159) 
 
Household size 0.058 
(0.051) 
0.059 
(0.048) 
0.029 
(0.053) 
-0.072*** 
(0.014) 
-0.075*** 
(0.013) 
-0.083*** 
(0.015) 
Male-to-female ratio -0.190* 
(0.105) 
-0.177* 
(0.104) 
-0.178 
(0.111) 
0.023 
(0.028) 
0.024 
(0.029) 
0.027 
(0.032) 
Household dependency ratio 0.378 
(0.572) 
-0.149 
(0.681) 
0.300 
(0.616) 
0.242 
(0.154) 
0.081 
(0.190) 
0.209 
(0.179) 
Log of total plot size (square 
meters) 
0.049* 
(0.028) 
0.046 
(0.028) 
0.047 
(0.030) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.009)  
Total livestock (TLU) 1.122*** 
(0.242) 
1.129*** 
(0.262) 
1.135*** 
(0.259) 
-0.021 
(0.065) 
-0.034 
(0.073) 
-0.018 
(0.075) 
Affected by climatic shocks -0.181 
(0.180) 
-0.199 
(0.176) 
-0.207 
(0.190) 
0.108** 
(0.048) 
0.107** 
(0.049) 
0.099* 
(0.055) 
Affected by non-climatic negative 
shocks 
0.044 
(0.181) 
0.043 
(0.179) 
0.083 
(0.194) 
-0.069 
(0.049) 
-0.071 
(0.050)  
-0.054 
(0.056) 
Affected by positive shocks -0.135 
(0.256) 
-0.157 
(0.276) 
-0.147 
(0.275) 
-0.040 
(0.069) 
-0.009 
(0.077) 
-0.046 
(0.080) 
R-squared 0.096 0.113  0.038 0.158 0.107 0.131 
N 642 642 642 642 642 642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table A4.9: Aggregate social and political capital and gender-disaggregated asset indices: OLS 
and IV results  
 OLS IV  
 Asset index of 
the HH head 
Asset index of the 
spouse 
Asset index of the 
HH head 
Asset index of 
the spouse 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Social and political capital of HH head 0.113** 
(0.051) 
 0.274*** 
(0.087) 
 
Social and political capital of spouse  0.005 
(0.026) 
 0.155 
(0.124) 
Years of schooling of HH head  0.008*** 
(0.001) 
 0.007*** 
(0.001) 
 
Years of schooling of spouse  0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Age of HH head 0.000 
(0.000) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Age of spouse  0.000 
(0.000) 
 0.000 
(0.000) 
HH head employed off-farm -0.012 
(0.014) 
 -0.012 
(0.014) 
 
Spouse employed off-farm  0.018 
(0.024) 
 0.012 
(0.013) 
Household size 0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
Male-to-female ratio -0.001 
(0.006) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
Household dependency ratio 0.018 
(0.029) 
0.022* 
(0.012) 
0.017 
(0.032) 
0.025* 
(0.014) 
Log of total plot size (square meters) 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Total livestock (TLU) 0.010 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
Affected by climatic shocks -0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Affected by non-climatic negative shocks -0.030*** 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.031*** 
(0.010) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
Affected by positive shocks -0.009 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
R- squared 0.120 0.105 0.101 0.053 
N 642 642 642 642 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
